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This thesis analyses the conditions for the promotion of ecological citizenship, 
using the tools of political theory. I examine the role of the state, the green state, the green 
public sphere and civil society in the articulation of ecological citizenship. The dominant 
position in this debate is that states should be actively involved in the greening of 
citizenship, using different strategies to encourage ecological habits and values among 
citizens. These possibilities are analysed and assessed. Some have argued, drawing on 
studies of the ecological reform of the state, that in order to foster ecological citizenship, 
states should undergo transformations so as to become green states. This view is examined 
with a focus on the difference between the liberal state and the green state in order to 
clarify the distinct conceptions of ecological citizenship that they uphold, and the variety of 
mechanisms and institutions used by each of them to articulate ecological citizenship. 
Although the green state offers more opportunities for the promotion of ecological 
citizenship, some of the problems of state-centric approaches persist, so the discussion 
moves onto actors and spaces outside state institutions. This part of the research starts with 
a discussion of the notion of the green public sphere and investigates how ecological 
citizenship may be defined within this sphere. This analysis concludes that a conception of 
the green public sphere different from that which dominates the eco-political literature is 
required both for the promotion of ecological citizenship and a politics of sustainability. To 
this end, I suggest a redefinition of the green public sphere. Finally, after distinguishing 
between the public sphere and civil society, I examine the possibilities of nurturing 
ecological citizenship in civil society.    
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ethics. She introduced me to what was then a new discipline for me and for the first time I 
heard about ecological citizenship. Carmen was also the first person to encourage me to 
follow the path that today culminates in this thesis. For all this, I am indebted to her. 
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available, always positive, he is a mentor and a friend, a great source of support on all 
fronts. I wish to thank him for giving me his time and knowledge so generously, and 
because through him I found a family in Keele.    
Keele Univerity has provided a perfect environment in which to work, not only 
because of its beautiful and green surroundings but also because of its people. I benefited 
from a group of friends and colleagues with whom I could share intellectual interests and 
good times at the pub. I am especially grateful to Mark Charlesworth, Phil Burton-
Cartledge and Ryan Windeknecht for their comments on my work and their help at 
different moments of my PhD. My second supervisor, Brian Doherty, provided invaluable 
assistance during the early stage and friendly support all the way through.       
In writing this thesis I have been lucky to find personal encouragement and 
academic guidance from researchers working on related fields. Attending the annual 
Manchester Green Political Theory Workshops has been a very positive experience. There 
I have discussed with colleagues some of my ideas and received constructive comments, 
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Fernando Arribas and Ernest García for the interest they have shown in my work and the 
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through it without my friends in Valencia, in Keele and in many other places. I thank them 
for making me feel complete, for their loyalty, despite the eternal distance, and for 
reminding me what the important things in life are. 
My family has always been my main source of motivation. Their love and care 
keep me going. It is because of them that I developed a passion for books, for writing, for 
nature, and they have taught me the most beautiful things I know. As an attempt to 
clumsily express my admiration to them, and my gratitude for all the sunsets by the sea, I 





  This thesis deals with the promotion of ecological citizenship from the point of 
view of political theory, and there are several reasons for this focus. Citizenship has 
become a vibrant field of analysis within environmental politics, and this project joins 
these debates. In addition, this type of research is relevant in terms of policy: governments 
seek cooperation in achieving sustainability, and they may be encouraged to think about 
greening citizenship as a path to environmental protection. Yet there are three more 
specific reasons that explain my interest in the practical aspects of the concept of 
ecological citizenship.    
One goes back to the time I first read theories of ecological citizenship. I was 
attracted by the normative force of the concept, and felt that many of my political and 
theoretical concerns converged on it: democratisation, justice, equality, ecological 
sustainability. In addition to this, and perhaps as a consequence, I understood ecological 
citizenship above all as a theory for social and environmental transformation. But it was 
not clear to me how this process was to be developed, where it would start – in the state or 
outside of it, in laws or in the economy, in the institutions of liberal democracy, in schools 
or in environmental organisations - what the role of citizens might be in bringing it about, 
what the other elements were in this framework for change, and what could encourage 
people to act as ecological citizens. So I wanted to contribute to debates examining the 
development of the concept of ecological citizenship, to investigate the ways in which this 
potential for transformation might be realised, what activities, relations and mechanisms 
might facilitate ecological citizenship motivations to act, and how ecological citizenship 
duties of justice could be articulated in people’s lives and within institutions.  
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The second question, which underpins my focus on collective agency and 
organisation in particular, developed as I learnt that for some green scholars and policy 
makers, mainstream environmental NGOs and individual citizens, the idea of being an 
ecologically aware citizen is reduced to individual, personal transformation, to changes in 
lifestyles. From this perspective, some reject ecological citizenship for being related to a 
green fashion – even a green business - that they are not willing to embrace. Others 
emphasise that what is at stake here is to get people to behave in an environmentally-
conscious way in order to achieve sustainability targets – mostly, those related to tackling 
climate change - and that we should not use this idea as an excuse to advance a holistic 
ethico-political programme for change.  
The above reasons led me to focus on agency and forms of social organisation. My 
intention is to stress that, regardless of how it is conceived, ecological citizenship goes 
beyond individual and behavioural change and that it requires a context within which it is 
to be placed, whether this is state legislation and courts, a participatory democracy, a 
system of exchange of goods, or a combination of the three (depending on what aspect of 
ecological citizenship or even what definition one considers most important). And this is 
so, precisely, because ecological citizenship is about socio-environmental transformation 
and in this sense, it includes those organisations that its activity and practice seeks to 
transform. 
Finally, with this research I seek to strengthen the connection between the 
promotion of ecological citizenship and civil society. I argue that environmental political 
thought has shifted attention from the community and grassroots politics to the state. The 
view that dominates discussions on green political agency is that the state system should be 
a central figure in the eco-political project. And this has resulted in a proliferation of 
studies on the ecological reform of state structures, so as to use them to achieve 
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sustainability objectives. Even from the angle that acknowledges that green movement 
organisations operate on the terrain of civil society, analyses predominantly focus on how 
organisations influence the state and its policies, on how the movement’s activity may 
trigger transformation in state institutions, functions and objectives. This perspective is 
certainly important and the role of states and green states in the cultivation of ecological 
citizenship is assessed in this thesis. Yet with this project I wanted to praise green politics 
and ecological citizenship away from the orbit of the state, and consider civil society as a 
terrain autonomous from state structures so as to explore the idea of change in social and 
economic relations that takes place without state intervention.   
 In order to address these concerns I deal, in what follows, with the state, the green 
state, the green public sphere and civil society and explore how ecological citizenship is 
promoted by each of these agents and in each of these spaces. The main purpose is to 
identify the conditions for the flourishing of ecological citizenship by looking at the 








1. Promoting ecological citizenship: political agency and forms of social 
organisation 
 
Ecological citizenship is an issue of increasing importance to international 
institutions, governments and non-governmental organisations1. It is even used by 
corporations, and analyses of corporate environmental responsibility are now being made 
with reference to “corporate environmental citizenship” (Smith and Pangsapa, 2008; 
Rondinelli and Berry, 2000). Within green political theory, debates on citizenship emerged 
in the 1990s and have triggered a significant amount of work in recent years. Discussion 
has focused above all on the nature and elements of the concept, its connection with green 
values and aims, and the relationship between ecological citizenship and the different 
schools of thought and theories of citizenship. 
There is evidence that ecological citizens do exist beyond institutional documents 
and academic theorising (Seyfang, 2009; Jagers, 2009; Wolf et. al., 2009; Berglund and 
Matti, 2006). Yet ecological citizenship is not a quality individuals are born with; it has to 
be cultivated and learnt. How do individuals get to be ecological citizens in their daily 
lives? How can their experiences and circumstances be expanded in society? Addressing 
                                                 
1 For instance, the United Nations Environment Program has adopted a Global Environmental Citizenship 
Project. At the governmental level, examples of an environmental citizenship discourse can be found in 
Canada’s Green Plan (1990) and the UK’s Environment Agency (2005). 
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these questions leads to the practical implications of ecological citizenship. Especially 
since 2000, there has been some concern about the obstacles and opportunities that 
neoliberal democracies and capitalist economies present for ecological citizenship. 
However, issues of political agency and social organisation have not been systematically 
explored in relation to ecological citizenship. With the purpose of addressing this gap, I 
undertake in this thesis an inquiry into the possible agents and loci for ecological 
citizenship transformation and the conditions necessary for its promotion. The overall aim 
of this thesis is to identify the agents and forms of social organisation that may best 
facilitate the expression of ecological citizenship in people’s lives and within political and 
economic systems, and analyse and assess different ways of encouraging its practice. To 
this end, I examine the roles, tools and initiatives adopted by the state, the “green state”, 
the “green public sphere”, and civil society. This project contributes to research on the 
different forms ecological citizenship can adopt and the spaces where it can be enacted, on 
the conditions adequate to its flourishing and expansion, and the structures needed to 
support it. 
Bell notes that environmental citizenship “entered the policy discourse before it 
entered the academic discourse of environmental politics or environmental political 
theory” (2005: 36). In this respect, it is often stressed that the term “environmental 
citizenship” was first used in 1990 by a state body, Environment Canada - the Canadian 
Ministry of the Environment (Szerszynski, 2006: 75). Most theoretical understandings of 
ecological citizenship and institutional campaigns assume a state committed to its 
promotion. There is an increasing awareness that environmental sustainability requires 
cooperation between different actors, including states and their citizens. The dominant 
position among green scholars is that the move toward environmental citizenship requires 
governmental policies to create the conditions for its exercise (MacGregor and Pardoe, 
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2005: 3; Dobson and Valencia Sáiz, 2005: 162). Partly because most green theorists of 
citizenship live in liberal democratic states, partly because it is thought that any 
transformation of the political order has to depart from existing institutions, attempts have 
been made to demonstrate that current neoliberal states can and should encourage more 
sustainable forms of citizenship (Dobson, 2003a; Bell, 2005; Hailwood, 2005; Valencia 
Sáiz, 2005). In this sense, it has been suggested that states can play an active role in the 
greening of citizenship, using tools like legal and monetary incentives (Connelly, 2006; 
Barry, 2006), granting environmental substantive and procedural rights to citizens (Bell, 
2005; Hailwood, 2005; van Steenbergen, 1994; Twine, 1994), or through ecological 
citizenship education in schools (Dobson, 2003a; Hailwood, 2005; Barry, 2006). This view 
assumes that regulation, as well as softer forms of encouragement of ecological behaviours 
and values, are needed if ecological citizens and sustainable societies are to be fostered. 
The state, then, emerges as the first potential agent for the transformation of citizenship. 
Yet despite the potential that the state apparatus has for the promotion of green 
accounts of citizenship, actually existing states are still far from endorsing a politics of 
environmental sustainability. Since the green movement started placing ecological issues 
on the public agenda in the 1970s, general environmental awareness has increased. 
However, our societies, state bodies and economies, like many of our daily practices, are 
still unsustainable. Some of the key contributions to green theory of citizenship advocate 
economic and political reforms oriented toward the emergence of a green state that would 
facilitate the promotion of ecological citizenship as part of the project of creating more 
sustainable societies and democracies (Eckersley, 2004; Christoff, 1996; Barry, 2006). 
From this perspective, it is argued that a green state may be in a better position than the 
liberal-capitalist state to articulate ecological citizenship and implement the green 
democracy needed to frame it. At the same time, theorists of the green state contend that 
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ecological citizens are the main actors in the process of greening state institutions. In this 
sense, Barry argues that one of the main objectives of ecological citizens should be the 
development of a “sustainable/legal state apparatus” together with a “sustainability 
culture” (1996: 126). This claim suggests that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between the consolidation of green states and the articulation of ecological citizenship. 
Thus green states are considered as the second possible vehicles for the promotion of 
ecological citizenship. Key questions are: are contemporary states ready to encourage 
ecological citizenship or do state institutions need to be transformed, resulting in a green 
state? What is the difference between a conventional state that has adopted environmental 
policy and legislation and a green state? These issues are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
Achieving the aims of political ecologism demands a process of democratisation. 
Greens argue that economic reforms, scientific-technological advances and lifestyle 
changes will not be enough. Citizens’ involvement in environmental decision-making is 
seen as crucial, and therein lies the necessary revision of liberal institutions. Situated 
within this debate, ecological citizenship requires reforms in legislations and political 
processes so as to design more participatory democratic institutions that facilitate its 
promotion (Christoff, 1996a; Barry, 1999, 2002; Bell, 2005). Some of these reforms, it is 
argued, could be aimed at instantiating a deliberative democracy where citizens would 
learn the virtues and values of ecological citizenship (Barry, 1999; 2002). Deliberation can 
take place within state institutions. In this sense, my research explores the possibilities for 
the promotion of ecological citizenship in a deliberative democracy implemented by an 
ecological state.  
Now, is there any room beyond or outside state institutions for the promotion of 
ecological citizenship? The indispensability of state intervention dominates debates on 
ecological citizenship. Going beyond mainstream approaches, I argue that states are not the 
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only organisations with the capacity to promote ecological citizenship. Other spaces hold 
promise for the practice of ecological citizenship, and in this context I am particularly 
interested in public spheres and civil societies. 
Debate and democratisation can take place outside the state system, in the public 
sphere of civil society. It has been suggested that the environmental movement is building 
a “green public sphere” where discussion about environmental issues is taking place 
(Torgerson, 1999). I analyse the idea that the promotion of ecological citizenship may 
demand a green public sphere for citizens’ deliberation, political engagement and learning, 
and assess its implications. Most notions of the public sphere and green public sphere 
focus on political participation understood as what Crouch and colleagues have defined as 
“the last step in the unfolding of citizenship” (2001: 13). In this sense, citizen participation 
and deliberation are conceived as ends. It is a central contention of this thesis that 
deliberation should be viewed also as a means to achieve ecological and justice-related 
purposes. Both approaches to citizenship and political speech are explained and contrasted 
in Chapter 4. 
Finally, I focus on the cultivation of ecological citizenship in the terrain of civil 
society. There are few contributors to this approach; some of them stress that the study of 
ecological citizenship and civil society has to be linked with working towards new theories 
of the state, specifically, with both empirical and normative work on the green state (Barry, 
2005; Christoff, 1996; Eckersley, 2004; Dryzek et. al., 2003). From this angle, it is argued 
that the green state would be created by citizens and groups in civil society, opposing anti-
environmental state institutions. Civil society is therefore seen as an instrument for the 
making of eco-states and disregarded as a field for transformation in its own right. The 
approach I take in this thesis is different. I focus on civil society not as functional for a 
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green state but as a form of social organisation that can contribute to the democratisation of 
societies and economies, justice and sustainability. 
It is insightful in this respect to examine existing research that explores the 
possibilities of enacting ecological citizenship through environmental activism (Horton, 
2006; Latta, 2007) and alternative economic practices in civil society, such as sustainable 
consumption (Seyfang, 2005), the social economy (Smith, 2005a) and the informal 
economy (Barry, 1999). What is interesting about these approaches is that they stress the 
connection between ecological citizenship, self-regulation and self-organisation. This link, 
in turn, points at mechanisms for the promotion of ecological citizenship different from 
those used in state-sponsored initiatives. Taking some of the above work into account, I 
analyse in Chapter 5 the way in which certain civil society-based practices, as well as 
constituting practical forms of ecological citizenship, may lead to ecological 
transformations and democratisation within society apart and independent from the state. 
The structure of this thesis revolves around the study of the possibilities offered by 
states, green states, green public spheres and civil societies for the promotion of ecological 
citizenship, and the obstacles they represent. I am aware that it is difficult to draw rigid 
boundaries between these four concepts. For instance, the green state is a type of state; 
therefore it will share features with more conventional state forms, as I explain in Chapters 
2 and 3. At the same time, civil society is key to the construction of green states. In fact, 
the green state could be seen as an intermediate political agent, located between the state 
and civil society, since it shares some features with the modern nation-state, while 
incorporating an openness, flexibility and inclusiveness of actors and political processes 
more typical of civil society. In addition, some theorists are inclined to place public 
spheres in that space of intersection between state and non-state institutions. And, in any 
case, civil society actors influence state policies, while the institutional and political 
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contexts provided by the state shape the strategies and choices of members of civil society. 
This elasticity is taken into account and addressed throughout the thesis to the extent that it 
affects the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
The rest of the present chapter introduces the conceptual tools that will enable me 
to develop my arguments hereafter. I provide some basic definitions of the main concepts 
that shape my research – state, green state, green public sphere and civil society - and start 
thinking about the channels used by each of them in the promotion of ecological 
citizenship. This will enable us to reflect on the different conceptions and meanings of 
ecological citizenship. In the final section, I explain the definition of ecological citizenship 
I take as a starting point. Theories of ecological citizenship are briefly examined, with a 
critical focus on dominant understandings of ecological citizenship in academic debates. 
But before proceeding, it seems appropriate to acknowledge why the market is not 
included in my analysis of forms of agency and action coordination that may lead to the 
promotion of ecological citizenship. Economic relations are a central aspect of ecological 
citizenship, and this is made clear throughout this thesis. The economic sphere offers 
different opportunities for the practice of ecological citizenship and, at the same time, 
ecological citizenship activity can lead to renewed economic institutions, as I explain in 
Chapter 5. In this sense, I align myself with those who argue that the economy is 
increasingly becoming a site for the practice of citizenship.  
Classical economists and some political scientists perceive the economy and the 
market as fields independent from the political arena. Following this logic, a conception of 
the economy or the market as an agent for the transformation of citizenship could have 
been considered – alongside the state, green state, green public sphere and civil society2. 
                                                 
2 This is, for instance, the approach taken by Crouch and colleagues (2001). Drawing on the idea that markets 
and states are different modes of social integration, they make a contrast between the promotion of 
citizenship by the state and the integration and participation of citizens through the market, or “the 
marketization of citizenship”, which in their view escapes democratic control. Although I agree with them in 
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However, my view, in line with more recent trends in political theory and political studies, 
is that the economy cannot be detached from both society and the state.  
Green political economy challenges the view of the market as self-regulating: the 
market is not spontaneous and free but sustained by the action of public agencies and 
private corporations, and orchestrated through state legislation. Conceiving markets as self-
regulating removes political considerations from the economic sphere and disembeds the 
economy from ecological and social processes (Torgerson, 2001: 476; Barry, 1999: 159).  
My analysis assumes and stresses the connection between states and the market 
capitalist economy. A capitalist state promotes a capitalist order “by providing the 
necessary legal and social infrastructure for business to flourish, as well as those facilities 
and services that contribute to the growth of capitalist society” (Eckersley, 2004: 55). In 
fact, as Eckersley notes, “[g]lobal markets cannot exist without the national legal systems 
of states, which provide the basic stability, contractual certainty, and the protection of 
private property rights necessary for investment” (2004: 67). Moreover, through 
participation in fair trade agreements states uphold international markets (Eckersley, 2004: 
51). The neoliberal agenda suggests that states support the market economy by 
deregulating markets, removing taxation – or establishing low taxation – cutting down on 
public spending and privatising services. 
Proposals to promote ecological citizenship through the social economy, informal 
economy, taxes, fiscal incentives or consumption public policy respectively demand the 
state’s intervention, civil society’s cooperation or a combination of both. So rather than 
looking at these economic forms of ecological citizenship as if they emanated from an 
impersonal market or economy, I consider them in relation to state and civil society actors 
upholding them. Although it could be argued that sustainable consumption policy and 
                                                                                                                                                    
that the promotion of citizenship by the market, or rather the promotion of consumerism by the market, is not 
subject to democratic control, my claim is that states provide the regulatory framework and use their legal 
and fiscal powers to encourage the marketisation of citizenship.   
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fiscal incentives to discourage over-consumption are market mechanisms, in line with the 
above arguments I relate them to the state. With this, I stress the point that states use the 
market as a tool to achieve sustainability aims. By the same token, I argue that non-state 
actors like citizen and community groups, as well as participating in or resisting global and 
national markets, sometimes create alternative (i.e. non-capitalist) local, informal markets 
and currencies, such as local employment and trading systems (LETS) or community-
based consumer and producer cooperatives. Therefore I explain these practices in relation 
to civil societies3.  
 
 
2. The state 
 
Most writings on ecological citizenship and existing initiatives aimed at its 
promotion assume that states are responsible for implementing the mechanisms and 
creating the conditions for its practice. In view of investigating the potential of states to 
foster ecological citizenship, attention is paid in the following chapters to states’ functions 
and to the means and mechanisms deployed by states in the exercise of these functions. 
Both normative and descriptive or sociological approaches are taken into account: other 
than explaining what states are doing to promote ecological citizenship and environmental 
sustainability, I focus on what states could do, on other roles they should assume and 
different ways in which their machinery may be used. My analysis concentrates on 
Western socio-liberal democratic states because the different conceptions and practical 
                                                 
3 Initiatives like LETS are defined by authors like Seyfang (2009; 2005) as non-market exchange 
mechanisms while others like Barry (1999: 161-162) would see them as alternative, non-capitalist market 
relations, in the sense that they facilitate innovation, voluntary exchange of goods and services at the level of 
the community, production of local wealth and needs satisfaction, instead of aiming at capitalist 
accumulation. Although I agree with Barry in that there is a difference between capitalist markets and other 
types of markets, I still think that the initiatives he associates with local, alternative markets do not emerge 
nor are they ordered spontaneously but are created and sustained by the action of citizens and groups in civil 
society. And that is why I discuss them when dealing with civil society. 
 10 
forms of ecological citizenship studied in this thesis have been conceived to be articulated 
in the context of economically developed countries4. In addition, I further restrict my scope 
of analysis by focusing on the state and on the nation-state, leaving aside the concept of 
“nation”
5
. Since I deal with contemporary states, I use the terms “state” and “nation-state” 
indistinctly6.     
When approaching the state in order to assess its role as facilitator of ecological 
citizenship, the first obstacle one encounters is that there are many different types of states, 
perhaps as many as the number of states itself. In addition, the term “state” is used to refer 
to a myriad of realities, from parliaments, governments, legislative powers and 
bureaucracies, to physical territories, and institutions like schools and hospitals 
(Whitehead, et. al., 2007: 13). It is thus problematic to offer a definition and make general 
claims about states’ composition and structure. In this respect, Held suggests that the state 
cannot be viewed as a “simply unified entity”; instead, it should be conceived as “a cluster 
of agencies, departments, tiers and levels, each with their own rules and resources with 
varying purposes and objectives”, therefore as a “highly complicated set of relations and 
processes” (Held, 1989a: 2). Bearing this variety and multiplicity in mind, rather than 
providing a working definition of the state, it is more instructive to refer to those theories 
of the state that help contextualise the discussion of ecological citizenship-state interaction 
that will be undertaken in subsequent chapters. These theories inform, to various degrees, 
green views and critiques of the state, explained in Chapter 2, and offer different accounts 
                                                 
4 Very little research has explored the implications of ecological citizenship in non-Western countries 
(Gudynas, 2009; Smith and Pangsapa, 2008). This is clearly a future research agenda for green scholars of 
citizenship.  
5 While the concept of “state” usually refers to the political system of a given country and alludes to 
administration, rule of law and sovereign power, the term “nation” often designates “the cultural systems and 
modes of ethnic identification that binds groups of people together” (Whitehead. et. al., 2007: 10).The nation 
usually refers to a certain people, homogeneous, and different from others in language, culture, race, history 
and religion (Pierson, 1996: 13). 
6 It is usually argued that it was during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when states became nation-
states; the purpose was to attach a particular nation or national identity to their territory (Opello and Rosow, 
2004; Schulze, 1996). 
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of states’ functions and means, which is useful as we start thinking about the ways in 
which states may promote ecological citizenship, further explored in Chapter 3.  
 Thomas Hobbes’ political thought may be a good point of departure. Although it 
has been argued that Hobbes was aware of the need to preserve freedom and equality 
among individuals and that he accepted that the organisation of life in common should be 
based on consent, his philosophy is usually invoked to illustrate an authoritarian view of 
the state. He is notorious for being in favour of a powerful state able to implement the law 
and secure the basic conditions of life (Held, 1989b: 14). As I will explain in Chapter 2, 
Hobbesian accounts of state organisation inspire eco-authoritarianism. From this 
perspective we could think of a Leviathan proclaiming itself as the guardian of the 
environment. Capitalist societies, where each individual pursues her own interests, are 
characterised by high levels of resource exploitation. On these grounds, a solid institution 
with authority to protect the environment could be justified. This view of the state as 
embodying a unique form of power and authority to enforce pro-environmental conduct 
may result in a conception of the state as the key agent for the promotion of ecological 
citizenship. Although this faith in the capacity of states to redress the anti-ecological 
situation has led in some cases to eco-authoritarian solutions, it has also crystallised in the 
defence of a strong and environmentally-oriented but democratic and constitutional state. 
Many eco-political thinkers believe that, to a certain extent, state authority is needed to 
promote sustainability and ecological citizenship. But they contend that state intervention 
can only be justified insofar as it is a democratic and constitutional state. I will return to 
these questions shortly.      
 Max Weber gave one of the most influential accounts of the state, viewed as a 
community of men dominated by men and characterised by the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force (Weber, 1994; 1978). For Weber the state is a set of specialised bureaucratic 
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institutions and civil servants devoted to management activities, emanating from and 
organised around a centre which covers a territorially defined area over which it exerts the 
monopoly of rule-making and of legitimate use of physical violence. This definition 
emphasises the idea of autonomous power of state institutions achieved through centralised 
administration, political bureaucracy and “trained policy elites” (Whitehead et. al., 2007: 
36). Weber’s descriptive understanding results in a definition of the state based on the 
mechanisms it deploys: control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, 
constitutionality, impersonal power, bureaucratic form of administration, authority and 
legitimacy, and taxation (Pierson, 1996: 8-34; Vincent, 1987: 19-21).     
The variety of tools available to states has led some green scholars to endorse state-
centric politics and to argue that these means should be subordinated to the ends of 
ecologism. According to Whitehead et. al., this account of the link between state authority 
and the environment has resulted in a conception of the state as “a collective ecological 
agent” (2007: 35). This Weberian-inspired view of the state seems to inform positions like 
that of Eckersley, who contends that sustainability demands  
 
the deployment of the regulatory and fiscal resources of the state to ensure 
that the economy and society respect the integrity of ecosystems in which 
they are embedded in order to minimize the consumption of energy and 
resources, reduce pollution, and protect life support systems and 
biodiversity...This state capacity arises precisely because it enjoys a (virtual) 
monopoly of the means of legitimate coercion and is therefore the final 
adjudicator and guarantor of positive law. In short, the appeal of the state is 
that it stands as the most overarching source of authority within modern, 
plural societies (2005a: 172).   
 
In line with this image of the state, there is a tendency to argue that states’ 
resources and steering capacity can be used to promote green behaviours as a platform to 
 13 
extend ecological citizenship. Regulatory tools are sometimes adopted to compel citizens 
to act in accordance with the ecological common good, imposing restrictions on activities, 
like driving in city centres, and enforcing practices like recycling. States likewise deploy 
their fiscal competences to instil green behaviours into the citizenry; this happens, for 
instance, when over-consumption of household electricity is penalised. The ways in which 
the authoritative means of the state may be used to promote ecological citizenship and 
achieve sustainability targets are further analysed in Chapter 3.    
The “administrative capacity” associated with the complex organisation of state 
agencies and departments indicates that the state has the appropriate infrastructure to lead 
the collective “management of nature” (Whitehead et. al., 2007:4, 37). From a Weberian 
perspective, Johnston (1996) argues that the administrative state is the only institution with 
the wherewithal to deal with ecological problems and monitor the appropriate use of 
natural resources. In order to perform these functions, a number of environmental agencies 
have been created since the 1970s. Other than managing environmental risks, Johnston 
argues that these agencies protect environmental rights and facilitate, through research and 
technological innovation, the generation and centralisation of environmental knowledge. 
This approach highlights a conception of the state as a manager of environmental risk and 
collector of environmental information (Whitehead et. al., 2007: 120).  
This view of the state results in particular approaches to the promotion of 
ecological citizenship, grounded on providing citizens with information generated by state 
environmental agencies and asking citizens to cooperate with the state in its task of 
ecological manager. In these cases, states attempt to mould citizens’ behaviour through 
informational campaigns and institutions like schools. In doing so, states are defining 
ecological problems and framing environmental issues in specific ways; they are shaping 
social and individual perceptions of nature and prescribing solutions to be adopted by 
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citizens. These forms of state action point towards a particular conception of ecological 
citizenship: a tool in the project of managing socio-natural relations. I will return to these 
questions in Chapter 3. 
Weberian analyses have also inspired green critiques of the state’s administrative 
power and rationality. Due to the unpredictability of many environmental risks and the loss 
of legitimacy of the neoliberal state to act as a guarantor of the common good and the 
public interest, that is, to be a good environmental manager, states contribute to deepening 
the environmental crisis (Paehlke and Torgerson, 2005). The implications of this critique 
for the promotion of ecological citizenship are teased out in the following chapters. 
Recent theories stress the state’s autonomy from society and the economy. 
Distancing themselves from Marxist analyses, which see state power as being the 
expression of class interests, these accounts assert that states have their own will and 
represent their own interests, which cannot be reduced to the interests of any social group 
(Evans, et. al., 1985)7. Drawing on this approach, and emphasising the functions and roles 
of states over their means, Dryzek defines states’ interests as “a set of imperatives for 
collective action” (2000: 82). State imperatives are functions “that governmental structures 
must perform if those structures are to secure longevity and stability” (Dryzek, 2000: 83). 
They exist independently of public officials’ will and override their preferences in case of 
conflict. These imperatives are five: domestic peace, survival or the need to respond to 
external threats, economic imperative or the need to prevent capital flight, raise revenues 
and the legitimation imperative (Dryzek, 2000: 83; Dryzek et. al., 2003: 12). In order to 
meet those imperatives, states develop “core functions”, which “constitute the essential 
areas of state activity”; these are “national security and foreign policy, fiscal, monetary and 
                                                 
7 States’ autonomy from social groups does not mean that they do not favour particular groups to the 
detriment of others. For instance, states’ need for capital accumulation renders their own interests coincident 
with those of economic elites. Yet this claim is different from arguing that states are instruments of the 
capitalist class, as in Marxist understandings (Carter, 2010, 1999, 1993).  
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trade policy, the welfare state, civil and criminal justice, environmental and natural 
resources policy” (Dryzek, 2000: 84). Dryzek’s definition of the state in terms of 
imperatives will prove useful to understand how a green state may originate and what 
could be the role of ecological citizens in this process, as well as to identify obstacles to 
state-sponsored ecological citizenship. 
 Finally, Foucauldian interpretations of the state are also relevant when thinking 
about the promotion of ecological citizenship. Following Foucault, it could be argued that 
states have been “governmentalised”. A governmental state “is characterised by a rational 
science of government, which is based upon the systematic collection of knowledge 
concerning that which is to be governed, and the use of that knowledge to ensure the 
ordered government of a particular people and territory through various techniques and 
tactics” (Whitehead et. al., 2007: 13). In this view, states are increasingly controlling the 
natural world as well as individual and social behaviours towards the environment. This 
analysis of power and its ecological readings, crystallised in the notion of “environmental 
governmentality” (Darier, 1999, 1996; Luke, 1999), are important when assessing the role 
played by states in the promotion of ecological citizenship, as it will be clear in Chapter 3.  
  
     
3. The green state 
 
Ecological analyses of the state indicate that state institutions are implicated in 
different ways in the process of environmental destruction. Greens have long claimed that 
liberal democracies are failing to address sustainability issues effectively. Liberal 
democracies and their institutions hold an instrumental account of the non-human world 
and do not have the tools to effectively organise the political participation and 
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representation all those affected by environmental risks, including future generations and 
non-human nature. Moreover, actually existing liberal states do not take seriously enough 
the harmful consequences for nature produced by political centralisation, poverty, 
militarisation and the pursuit of economic growth (Hailwood, 2004: 142)8. This scenario 
makes it difficult for citizens to assume responsibility for their environments and 
constitutes an obstacle to ecological citizenship. From this point of view, it has been 
argued that the promotion of ecological citizenship should go hand to hand with the 
ecological transformation of the state. Barry observes that, just as the liberal state promotes 
liberal citizenship, a green state would use its resources to encourage “citizens to become 
‘ecological stewards’, responsible partners, along with the state and other institutions such 
as economic organisations, for the management of the environment” (1999: 228).  
Environmental state theorists distance themselves from conventional conceptions of 
the state like those illustrated in the previous section. They offer an ideal account of the 
targets and functions states should endorse from a political ecology perspective. Although 
most of them agree that any green form of state organisation is to emerge from actually 
existing states, they contend that the magnitude of the changes required in state institutions 
and competences is such that the result would be a type of state different from the liberal 
democratic state: a “green state”. Eckersley argues that a green state is more than a liberal 
democratic state governed by a green party with an environmental agenda; it is an 
alternative to the classical liberal state, the welfare state and the neoliberal competition 
state, grounded on new values, procedures, decision rules and forms of participation and 
representation (2004). Similarly, Paterson and colleagues observe that the rise of green 
states requires structural changes to “democratize, decentralize and downsize the state” in 
                                                 
8 The critique of “really existing liberalism” (2004: 142) leads Hailwood to a liberal “eco-reformist statism” 
(2004: 88). This green liberalism thus differs both from demands for minimal state intervention of classical 
liberalism, and from other eco-liberal understandings that praise the conversion of the environmental 
common goods into private property, on the grounds that a system of legal property rights is the best 
mechanism to preserve natural resources. 
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order to make it less dependent on capital accumulation and economic growth (Paterson et. 
al., 2006: 152). The claim that the idea of a green state involves more than introducing 
environmental reforms in existing state institutions has implications for the promotion of 
ecological citizenship.  Thus in Chapter 2 I return to the issue of the difference between a 
green state and a conventional (liberal-capitalist) one, and in Chapter 3 I explore the 
argument that the green state may be a more appropriate agent to enhance ecological 
citizenship than a conventional state. 
 Green theorising on the state connects the moral and practical principles of the 
green movement with contemporary debates about the state, democracy, and citizenship. In 
this respect, Eckersley refers to three “basic interrelated ideals” emanating from the 
practice and demands of ecologism and indicative of the type of state that would facilitate 
a politics of nature. These ideals suggest that a green state should be a “good state”, 
understood as an ethical and democratically responsible state which promotes 
environmental justice. Consequently, it should also be a “strong and effective state”, 
capable of stimulating good environmental practices and redistribution of resources while 
prohibiting socio-environmentally hazardous activities, in order to relate environmental 
justice to social justice. Finally, the state should act as a “good international ecological 
citizen” in the global arena (Eckersley, 2004: 11-13). Other than pointing to the difference 
between a green state and actually existing states, these normative ideals allude to the 
potential of green states to promote ecological citizenship. In what follows I tease out this 
potential, which is further analysed in Chapters 2 and 3.    
There are different accounts of the green state and diverse understandings of the 
way it may be created. Central issues in these debates are the “greening of sovereignty” 
(Eckersley, 2004: 203) and the re-definition of state functions and policy-processes in 
order to enhance environmental protection. First and foremost, greening the state means 
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democratising its institutions. According to Eckersley, the minimum requirements a 
democratic green state must observe are “the rule of law and the separation of powers, be 
free of corruption, and uphold those civil and political rights that are essential to the 
practice of ecological citizenship” (Eckersley, 2004: x). So within a green state, ecological 
citizenship is developed through the implementation of a framework of rights. 
Other than being democratic and constitutional, the green state is a governance 
state, which offers meaningful opportunities and resources for increased citizen 
participation in environmental policy-processes. Green statists are aware that in view of 
managing the ecological crisis, states can only be one amongst a multiplicity of local, 
regional, national and international actors involved in environmental renewal (Eckersley, 
2004: 6). It is often argued that realising green principles and objectives is a matter of 
“governance” rather than “government”, centralisation and bureaucratisation (Barry, 1999: 
103). What is more, some commentators contend that once the ecological society has been 
created, there will be less of a need for state-centred politics (Barry and Doherty, 2001: 
597-598). In this respect, green theorists of the state differ from conventional statists, for 
whom the state is the main political actor. Barry notes that eco-governance is not imposed 
by the state but is a conscious, collective decision (1999: 103). For him, the project of 
“collective ecological management” (Barry, 1999: 101) - within which the greening of the 
state machinery is placed - refers to the structures needed to manage the interaction 
between societies and their environments. This project includes non-state actors like the 
market and civil society and results in a new conceptualisation of the state-civil society 
interaction, with a redefinition of the state as “an enabling state” within such interaction 
(Barry, 1999: 210). Barry notes that for citizens to learn the virtues needed for the practice 
of ecological citizenship they need to be socialised within civil society groups as well as 
within public institutions like the education system (1999: 232-233). The green state, as a 
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governance state, arguably facilitates this double focus on state and civil society for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship. 
Collective ecological management demands a “simplification” (Barry, 1999: 211) 
of economic and social life so as to minimise the need for large-scale institutions and 
bureaucracies and increase “opportunities for citizens to take responsibility for their own 
affairs” (Barry, 1999: 233). This implies the decentralisation of existing state systems, 
which is another feature of the green state. De Geus uses the metaphor of the “telescopic 
eco-state” to reflect the idea of a decentralised state organisation. This is a flexible state, 
which “can shove in and out like a telescope” (1996: 202). According to this view, the state 
will be decentralised whenever that is possible and centralised in those cases in which there 
is real need for centralisation, according to the scale of environmental problems to be 
resolved and to the different policy sectors. The telescopic green state would allow for a 
combination of direct democracy to solve ecological problems at the level of the 
municipality and political representation at the regional, national and international 
dimensions (de Geus, 1996: 206-207). Similarly, other approaches suggest that 
decentralisation could be facilitated through deliberative mechanisms (Eckersley, 2004; 
Barry, 1999) and other participatory reforms like referenda and the constitution of regional 
parliaments (Christoff, 1996). A green state described along these lines would offer plenty 
of possibilities for meaningful citizen participation in policy-formation. So, besides the 
articulation of rights, a green state promotes ecological citizenship through democratic 
processes. 
Throughout the past century states have undertaken important transformations to 
make their apparatus more attentive and responsive to ecological issues. They have 
acquired new environmental functions and responsibilities. However, green states as 
described by eco-political thinkers do not exist yet. There is a broad consensus amongst 
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green theorists of the state that the kinds of transformations that will, in the long term, lead 
to the materialization of eco-states are not likely to originate within the state apparatus 
itself but outside state institutions, in the realm of civil society. Green statists argue that, in 
order to come about, a green state needs citizens’ action to influence debates about the role 
and functions of the state and force the necessary changes in existing institutions. 
Comparative research on the way ecologists have influenced environmental public policy 
helps understand how green states could develop (Hunold and Dryzek, 2005; Dryzek. et. 
al., 2003).  
 Drawing on Dryzek’s own characterisation of the state in terms of imperatives and 
core functions – explained above - Dryzek and colleagues (2003) show how environmental 
citizens and organisations can prompt a series of transformations similar to those which 
gave birth, first, to the liberal capitalist state and, then, to the welfare state. These changes 
would result in the emergence of a green state. Just as the bourgeoisie and the working 
class did earlier, if the green movement can connect its defining interest of environmental 
protection with the core of the state, they argue that the prospects for the rise of a green 
state are promising. Political innovation in the history of Western modern states, they 
claim, begins with social movements and the fact that they could attach their respective 
defining interests to an incipient state imperative. If environmental values were to be 
linked with both legitimation and economic state imperatives, a green state with an 
environmental conservation imperative could be established. The first linkage - 
legitimation - could be done through a politics of environmental risk, whereas the second – 
economic growth - could be articulated through ecological modernisation. These 
arguments highlight that ecological citizens and groups are the architects of the reforms 
that will culminate in green states. It appears then that ecological citizenship is both a 
precondition for the rise of green states and a key element to sustain them.  
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4. The green public sphere 
  
Dryzek shows that the public sphere and civil society provide opportunities for 
testing different degrees of democracy in a way generally not allowed in the state system, 
limited by imperatives and administration (1996: 47-48). These opportunities, I argue, are 
relevant for the promotion of ecological citizenship. So I suggest that we consider spaces 
and agents outside state and green state institutions. The first one I examine is the green 
public sphere.  
A “political public sphere” refers to those “conditions of communication under 
which there can come into being a discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a 
public composed of the citizens of the state” (Habermas, 1992: 446). Public spheres are a 
form of social interaction and coordination, like states and markets.  Yet the public sphere 
is different from and “rival” to states and market relations in that it is based on discourse 
and rationality, on citizens’ debate about issues of common concern, while states and 
markets are not communicative modes of coordination; they are respectively grounded on 
money and authoritative power instead of public discourse (Calhoun, 1992: 6; Fraser, 
1992: 110-111). I am interested in the green public sphere as a framework for discussions 
about the definition, ends and possibilities for ecological citizenship, and for the 
development of ecological citizens’ motivations and preferences informing their actions. 
Public spheres are “communication networks” whose participants “address a real 
and present public and/or a broader, imaginary ‘public’ (that is affected by proposals) with 
reasoned arguments with a view to seeking agreement by means of the force of the better 
argument”; as such, they are “means for enhancing the reflexive learning potential of both 
the state and civil society” (Eckersley, 2004: 140). This definition gives us an idea of the 
potential of public spheres for ecological citizenship learning, and of the way public 
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spheres are also relevant when thinking about the promotion of ecological citizenship 
within the institutions of the green state. Following Habermas, theorists of the green state 
stress the role of public spheres in connecting civil society with the state (Eckersley, 2004; 
Barry, 1996, 1999). For green statists, the public sphere is part of the institutional state 
structure, and the vehicle for the transmission of civil society deliberations to the state, so 
that such deliberations are institutionalised and implemented. According to this view, the 
main function of public spheres is to democratise the state. My approach to the study of 
public spheres diverges from that of green theorists of the state. I focus on public spheres 
as forms of organising collective action outside state institutions, seeking to influence and 
democratise society itself. 
My analysis of the potential of public spheres for the promotion of ecological 
citizenship takes as a point of departure Torgerson’s concept of the “green public sphere”. 
His notion is the most developed view of the public space within the eco-political 
literature. In Torgerson’s account, the green public sphere is a “space of appearance” 
(Torgerson, 1999: 157) where individuals enact their citizenship identities, where debate is 
conducted in green terms and created with endogenous purposes. This Arendtian-inspired 
model of the public space is a celebration of the performative, intrinsic value of political 
action, debate and citizenship. It is animated by a rejection of instrumental green politics. 
Torgerson’s reading of the Arendtian image of the public space corresponds to 
what Benhabib describes as Arendt’s “associational” model of the public space that sees 
the emergence of a public sphere in those times and places where, as Arendt put it, “men 
act together in concert”
9. Thus it is not a space in a physical sense but any place where 
individuals get together to speak. So a town square where people do not act jointly would 
not be a public sphere while a private room where people act in concert and practise 
                                                 
9 As Benhabib notes, Arendt always referred to “men”. Her denial of gender issues and of the exclusion of 
women in her androcentric depiction of public sphere has struck feminists thereafter. 
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discourse would give rise to public space (Benhabib, 1992: 78). According to Benhabib, 
this associational view is a procedural account of the public sphere, where all that matters 
is that debate is conducted in a certain way - without force, violence and constraint (1992: 
80)10. 
Situated within dominant accounts of the green public sphere, the promotion of 
ecological citizenship stresses diversity and plurality. In the course of debates, different 
positions, understandings of sustainability and citizenship arise, shaping the views of 
ecological citizens. The various meanings of ecological citizenship are learnt and 
negotiated by citizens themselves. This exchange of points of view and preferences is the 
essence of deliberative understandings of ecological citizenship, where the process of the 
creation of ecological citizens is stressed over the objectives that the practice of ecological 
citizenship seeks to promote. Acknowledging the intrinsic value of citizenship and its 
democratic elements, I seek to move debates of the green public sphere and ecological 
citizenship beyond the virtues inherent to the deliberative process and focus on the ends of 
debate.  
To this purpose, I analyse the weaknesses of Torgerson’s model. Focusing on the 
functions of public spheres within democratic theory, I offer a redefinition of the green 
public sphere that holds more promising for the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
Drawing on Habermas and other public sphere theorists like Fraser, Dryzek and Benhabib, 
I argue that the merits of the green public sphere are to be evaluated not only in relation to 
the type of interaction they facilitate (i.e. rational-discursive), but especially to the extent 
that it is critical with power and influential on society and democracy. I further elaborate 
                                                 
10 Benhabib contrasts this associational account with Arendt’s “agonistic” view that envisages the public 
sphere as a realm of appearances where men compete with each other for recognition and where “moral and 
political greatness, heroism, and preminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others” (Benhabib: 1999: 
78). Benhabib compares the two republican-inspired Arendtian models with Habermas’ “discursive public 
space”, part of the political project of “democratic-socialist restructuring of late capitalist societies” 
(Benhabib: 1999: 73). She also refers to a third model, the “legalistic” account of the public sphere, inspired 
in the liberal tradition. I will return to this distinction later on, although for the purposes of my discussion 
here only the Aredtian and Habermasian conceptions will be relevant.  
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these arguments in relation to ecological citizenship and, as a result, my picture of the 
green public sphere includes value-driven purposive activity and aims at social change. As 
will become clear in Chapter 4, this type of activity is different from instrumental, value-
free action. This redefinition of the green public sphere challenges dominant notions, 




5. Civil society 
 
Scholars of civil society and the public sphere often use both terms indistinctly. The 
two concepts are, of course, connected: public spheres are predominantly and most 
distinctively located in civil society, although as I will explain in the following pages, 
public spheres can be constituted within administrative and green states. My position is 
that it is important to be clear about the difference between civil society and the public 
sphere, and to acknowledge that not all aspects and elements of civil society are discursive. 
In Chapter 4 I indicate why I regard this distinction as crucial in the context of studying the 
possibilities for the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
 In its contemporary form, civil society relates to “the organization of social life on 
the basis of interpersonal relationships, group formation, and systems of exchange linking 
people beyond the range of intimate family relations and without reliance on direction by 
the government” (Calhoun, 2001: 1901). Civil society embodies “a political commitment 
to collective self-determination” (Terrier and Wagner, 2006: 232). Thus civil society 
stresses communities’ capacity of self-organisation regardless of state authority. Yet it also 
alludes to diversity and plurality. All these features underline that the promotion of 
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ecological citizenship in civil society is connected with autonomy, democracy, and a 
political order where citizens can collectively determine how to organise socio-natural 
relations and systems of provision.  
One of the most influential theorists of civil society, John Keane (1998a, 1998b, 
1998c), describes civil society in terms of non-governmental organisations in permanent 
tension with state institutions which shape, constrict and enable their activities. These 
organisations – such as NGOs, political parties and independent media - are “intermediary 
institutions” between the citizen and society. As Terrier and Wagner note, definitions like 
this identify civil society with “associative life” (2006: 228). Although I acknowledge that 
NGOs are representative of the functions and types of activities typical of civil societies, 
and devote some time to explain an activist-based account of ecological citizenship, I 
endorse a broader conception that goes beyond the focus on environmental associations in 
order to capture the myriad of activities that seek to advance the practice of ecological 
citizenship in civil society. 
Building on Hegel, most contemporary accounts view civil society in contrast to the 
state. Although the separation between state and civil society is assumed, some scholars 
argue that civil society’s deliberations and activities have to be supported by a state power 
that secures the very existence of civil society itself. This trend stresses that the 
institutionalisation and legitimacy of civil societies has to be backed by states. The 
indispensability of the state has resulted in a tendency to establish a linkage between, on 
the one hand, civil society and, on the other, the state and the law (Terrier and Wagner, 
2006: 228-229). I depart from this position, represented by theorists like Keane (1998b), 
Khilnani (2001), Habermas (1996) and, I argue, scholars of the green state. For instance, 
for Eckersley (2004), the institutionalisation of civil society deliberations requires a 
constitutional framework of rights and mechanisms that guarantee the participation of 
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citizens and groups in the policy processes of the state. From this perspective, civil society 
uses state institutions to realise itself. This leads to the belief that, although states and civil 
societies are separate entities, they are interdependent and equally necessary for 
democratisation. Green theorists have embraced the idea of the double democratisation of 
states and civil societies as a condition for both the emergence of green states and the 
articulation of ecological citizenship. This stance results in an approach to the study of the 
promotion of ecological citizenship that, although focusing on civil society, accentuates the 
connection between civil society and the green state, as in these accounts the aim is to 
develop a green theory of the state (Barry, 1999, 2006; Eckersley, 2004; Christoff, 1996). 
From this perspective, the stress is placed on the way ecological citizens and groups in 
civil society may trigger the kinds of transformations that will culminate in greener states. 
As indicated earlier, this view is analysed in Chapter 3, where I specifically deal with the 
green state as an agent for the promotion of ecological citizenship. But when I focus on 
civil society, I will leave aside the green state framework.  
In the same way that I do not explore the relationship between the green public 
sphere and ecological citizenship with a unique focus on the green state, my interest in the 
concept of civil society does not lie in the functions it plays in the ecological 
transformation of states. It is not my intention to deny the interdependent relationship 
between states and civil societies. I do think that states and civil societies influence and 
constrain each other, and that state legislation, policy and organisation profoundly shapes 
civil society actors, the choices they make, the tools available to them and the sorts of 
activities they engage with. However, the position animating my research is that civil 
society decisions do not need further institutionalisation by the state for them to be 
legitimate and brought to fruition, and that civil society can exist irrespectively of a state-
based framework of support. In this sense, I follow Terrier and Wagner when they claim 
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that civil society deliberations and decisions have to be institutionalised but that this can be 
done irrespective of states. They refer to this idea as “the problem of self-realization of 
civil society: the problem of a consolidation and enforcement of its contingent decisions” 
(Terrier and Wagner, 2006: 230). In their view, only a political institution with political 
power can solve this conundrum. Civil society, they argue, needs institutions and these 
could be the institutions of the state. Yet the argument that the state is the only institution 
with political power that can assume the task of institutionalisation of civil society is an 
assumption that should be resisted. States are not the only political institutions and politics 
should not be reduced to states. 
Terrier and Wagner note that “social arrangements take the form of ‘civil society’ 
when a large portion of the members of a collectivity show interest in, and take part in, 
collective debates on social institutions with a view to decide upon their desirability, and to 
establish or modify them accordingly” (Terrier and Wagner, 2006: 231). This definition 
emphasises that “the social is predominantly conceived as a series of institutions deriving 
from the conscious action of a collection of human beings” (Terrier and Wagner, 2006: 
231). This idea of conscious collective action embodies the notions of communication and 
consent, which, according to Terrier and Wagner, are characteristic of civil society. And 
for them, communication and consent can be the basis of the establishment of legitimate 
institutions (2006: 229-230).  
Although I draw on Terrier and Wagner’s view of the state-civil society interface 
and on the possibilities for the institutionalisation of civil society outside state institutions, 
my understanding of civil society is broader than theirs. For them civil society is a “space 
for deliberation” (Terrier and Wagner, 2006: 232). Under the influence of Habermas’ work 
on the public sphere, there is a tendency to conceive civil society in deliberative terms. For 
Habermas, civil society organisations exhibit a deliberative form of rationality and are the 
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main actors in public spheres11. I clearly do not seek to deny the discursive aspect of civil 
society and its importance for the promotion of ecological citizenship. Yet as I argued in 
relation to dominant discussions of the green public sphere, I also seek to transcend the 
deliberative focus in civil society debates. It is my position that civil society agents are 
engaged in other forms of non-discursive action and that these are as relevant for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship as the communicative forum. And this is precisely the 
reason why I consider public spheres and civil society as two distinct – though related – 
agents for the promotion of ecological citizenship.  
 
 




Before we start examining the practical implications of ecological citizenship 
transformation, something should be said about the meaning of the term “ecological 
citizenship”. As noted earlier, citizenship has been a topical issue within green political 
theory since the 1990s, a time coincident with the revival of citizenship debates13. 
Thereafter, a myriad of concepts suggests different approaches to the relationship between 
citizenship and the environment, namely “ecological citizenship” (Christoff, 1996a; 
Dobson, 2003a, 2006b; Smith, 1998; Curtin, 1999, 2002), “green citizenship” (Dean, 2001; 
Smith, 2005a), “environmental citizenship” (Dobson and Bell, 2006; Hawthorne and 
Alabaster, 1999), “sustainability citizenship” (Barry, 2006), “environmentally reasonable 
                                                 
11 Deliberative politics and discursive notions of ecological citizenship are a clear example of the interface 
between agents for transformations mentioned above, as they can be related either to the green state, the 
green public sphere, civil society and to a lesser extent perhaps also to actually existing states. 
12 Some of the arguments in this section are included in Melo-Escrihuela (2008). 
13 For an analysis of the context in which green debates on citizenship rose, see Valencia Sáiz (2004, 2005, 
2009) and Latta and Garside (2005).  
 29 
citizenship” (Hailwood, 2005) and “ecological stewardship” (Barry, 1999, 2002)14. This 
conceptual diversity, far from being a matter of terminological preference, reflects the 
complexity of the citizenship and environment question and highlights the diversity of 
meanings15. A variety of themes in green political theory are being discussed from a 
citizenship perspective, and green debates on citizenship have expanded ecological thought 
towards novel areas of interest. In this sense, we find issue-specific-studies relating 
ecological citizenship to areas as disparate as ecological and political identities 
(Tomashow, 1996; Hilson, 2001), spirituality (Ashley, 2000) and virtue (Barry, 2002; 
Connelly, 2006; Smith, 2005), as well as ecofeminist analyses of the concept (MacGregor, 
2006a, 2006b; Pettus, 1997), phenomenological (Reid and Taylor, 2000) and corporeal 
(Gabrielson and Parady, 2010) definitions of green citizenship as a politics of the body and 
the place, urban ecological citizenships (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003; Light, 2001, 2003; 
Travaline and Hunold, 2010), and interpretations of ecological citizenship through the 
work of philosophers like Arendt, Benjamin and Foucault (Smith, 2005; MacGregor and 
Szerszynski, 2004). All these writings add further dimensions that enrich our 
understanding of ecological citizenship and witness the relevance that citizenship 
theorising has acquired within – as much as outside - environmental politics.  
As with most theories of citizenship, environmental analysis has focused on the 
content of the status of citizenship – defined in terms of rights and duties - and the issue of 
membership of the relevant political community – traditionally attached to the nation state. 
From diverse angles and approaches, green theorists of citizenship stress the way in which 
environmental considerations impact on our conventional understanding of the nature of 
                                                 
14 Environmental, ecological and green citizenship are the most common expressions and they are used 
synonymously, often without much precision as to their meaning.   
15 Indeed, there are specific situations in which a particular notion of ecological citizenship, or one of its 
features, directly conflicts with another. For instance, while for most authors activities such as recycling or 
sustainable consumption fall into the category of ecological citizens’ duties - and some even argue that these 
should be enforced by the state - as we shall see, Bell defines them in relation to ecological citizens’ right to 
live a green life (2005). 
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citizen’s rights and responsibilities, and compel us to rethink the composition of the 
political community. So to offer an overview of main debates and provide a working 
definition I will refer to conceptions developing the question of rights, notions stressing 
responsibility and duty, cosmopolitan or global understandings, and postcosmopolitan 
visions. As often happens with categorisations, most of the proposals mentioned fit within 
more than one of the stances treated, since concepts of ecological citizenship always 
include a combination of these elements. 
 Models of ecological citizenship centred in rights predominantly draw on the liberal 
tradition (Bell, 2005; Hailwood, 2005; Twine, 1994). From this position, it is argued that 
an environmental dimension can be added to the status of citizenship to complement civil, 
political and social rights16. This new dimension stems from the recognition of a human 
right to the environment and seeks the legal protection of substantive environmental rights 
- such as the right to a healthy and liveable environment - and procedural rights – to protect 
substantive rights and participate in political life. These accounts are premised on the belief 
that liberalism is not incompatible with a green concept of citizenship, although a liberal 
environmental citizenship requires the redefinition of some of the tenets of liberal 
philosophy – above all, its conception of nature as property - so as to make it more 
environmentally-sensitive17. Liberal notions of ecological citizenship draw on debates 
seeking to bring liberalism and ecological politics into contact (Hailwood, 2004; Barry and 
Wissenburg, 2001; Bell, 2001; Stephens, 2001; Eckersley, 1996; Wissenburg, 1998; Arias 
Maldonado, 2008) and stress that liberal democracies can endorse sustainability goals, 
including green definitions of citizenship, while respecting individual autonomy and their 
                                                 
16 Hailwood’s account also encompasses a sense of responsibility for the impact of one’s actions on others 
(2005). In contrast, Bell challenges what he defines as “private pro-environmental duties”, and states that the 
only ecological citizenship duty is to obey the law (2005). 
17 In this sense, Hailwood’s “environmentally reasonable citizenship” is based on “the otherness view” which 
incorporates into liberalism a respect for nature as independent from humans’ use (2004, 2005). Bell 
encourages liberal environmental citizens to view nature as a provider of basic needs and “a subject about 
which there is disagreement” (2005: 185)  
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commitment to value pluralism (Hailwood, 2005; Dobson, 2003a). This definition of 
ecological citizenship as entitlement to environmental rights nurtures some of the state and 
green state-sponsored initiatives to promote ecological citizenship that I examine in 
Chapter 3.  
Green political thought is perhaps more familiar with the notions of environmental 
responsibility and active citizenship - encouraging individuals to think about the 
implications of their actions and sacrifice private interests for the sake of the common 
sustainability good – than with rights. These ideas have great resonance with the civic 
republican model of citizenship (Curry, 2000; Barry and Smith, 2008); they inform images 
of ecological citizenship centred on duty (Barry, 1999, 2002, 2006; Light, 2001, 2002; 
Newby, 1996; Curtin, 1999, 2002; Dean, 2001; Smith, 1998)18. Of course, both 
entitlements and obligations are acknowledged in what is being defined here as rights and 
duty-based approaches, but the stress is placed respectively on one dimension. Concepts 
focused on duty delineate a virtue-based understanding of ecological citizenship as the 
assumption of responsibility for one’s acts and the fulfilment of personal duties toward the 
non-human environment, future generations and fellow citizens19. They are premised on 
the well-established principle in green political thought that citizen responsibility goes 
beyond the political sphere in the conventional sense, to embrace activities like recycling 
and consumption. Some voices argue that the assumption of responsibility for the 
environment, future generations and fellow citizens is best expressed through access to 
information and participation in policy-making processes and political debate so that the 
interests of those to whom we owe obligations can be defined and taken into account 
                                                 
18 Although Smith (2005) encourages us to distinguish between ecological citizenship “duty” and 
“obligation”, these terms are used interchangeably in most of the literature.   
19 Whether the existence of citizen obligations toward non-human nature implies granting them rights is a 
contested issue. While van Steenbergen (1994: 146) and Christoff (1996: 159) argue that citizens have duties 
to protect the rights of non-human animals, Barry (1999: 234) and Dobson (2003a: 50) consider that 
accepting the existence of citizen duties owed to non-humans does not lead to acknowledging that they have 
rights, but to accepting the expansion of the moral community. Hailwood (2005) offers a different 
justification.      
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(Christoff, 1996; Barry, 1999; Scholsberg et. al., 2006).  In fact, as MacGregor notes, most 
green theorising on citizenship makes a case for the connection between citizenship, 
democratisation and environmental sustainability: uncertainty about environmental issues 
suggests democratic governance involving high levels of citizen participation in public 
debates so that different views on sustainability can arise (2006a: 85). From this angle, 
ecological citizenship is conceived as an institution for democratic participation, 
representation and inclusion. These ideas of personal responsibility in daily activities and 
participation in democratic life run through the majority of proposals to foster ecological 
citizenship in the context of states, the public sphere and civil societies, as we shall see. 
Duty-based notions of ecological citizenship, including participatory and 
deliberative definitions, can be attached either to local democracy, the nation state or the 
international arena, and often include a combination of all spheres. Cosmopolitan visions, 
in contrast, are global in nature (Urry, 2000; van Steenbergen, 1994; Steward, 1991; Jelin, 
2000). They encompass both global rights – often related to the entitlement of risk-free 
environments - and obligations to act so as to preserve the sustainability of all forms of life 
on earth20. Sometimes the idea of ecological citizenship as the entitlement to a universal 
human right to an adequate environment is stressed, and with this a connection between 
sustainability, human rights and ecological citizenship is made (Jelin, 2000). What is most 
distinctive about this cosmopolitan approach is its focus on the idea of a postnational space 
– which emerged with globalisation - that constitutes the community of ecological citizens. 
This view results in a definition of the ecological citizen as an “earth citizen” (van 
Steenbergen, 1994) or a citizen of “planet earth” (Steward, 1991)21. Green cosmopolitan 
representations of citizenship illuminate, in part, the transnational aspirations of notions of 
                                                 
20 Although this cosmopolitan extension of rights draws, to some extent, on liberal notions of citizenship, the 
global nature of rights – beyond the nation state – requires, according to Jelin (2000) and van Steenbergen 
(1994), a framework beyond the liberal understanding of citizenship.  
21 See MacGregor (2004) for a critical discussion of different approaches to cosmopolitan environmental 
citizenship. 
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ecological citizenship defined by green states – as Chapters 2 and 3 will show – and the 
post-cosmopolitan theory, to which I turn next.    
Drawing on some of the features of the approaches to citizenship and the 
environment issue explained above, yet arguing that ecological citizenship cannot be fully 
captured by any of these, Dobson develops his post-cosmopolitan citizenship type (2003; 
2004)22. This account transcends green reinterpretations of the liberal, civic republican and 
cosmopolitan traditions of citizenship and develops ecological citizenship as a new theory 
of citizenship. In this account, ecological citizenship is a virtue and duty-based notion of 
citizenship, yet it differs from the civic republican conception with regard to 
membership23. Political space and the extension of the political community are determined 
by the idea of the ecological footprint. According to this conception, each living being on 
Earth is entitled to a share of ecological space. But, in an asymmetrically globalised world, 
available space, natural resources and environmental risks are unequally distributed. Some 
use more ecological space than what is due to them and this has a negative effect on others 
– distant in space and time - and on the environment. These asymmetries, triggered by the 
socio-environmental impact of one’s acts, constitute relationships of injustice, and give rise 
to non-contractual, asymmetrical and non-reciprocal duties, in the sense that they are not 
correlative to rights or owed by everyone to everyone else. In short, only those falling into 
an over-use of ecological space, with over-sized ecological footprints, have ecological 
citizenship duties.  
                                                 
22 See also Dobson (2006a; 2006b) for more elaborated critiques of cosmopolitanism and the development of 
“thick cosmopolitanism” as different from “thin” models. 
23 Distancing himself also from the liberal tradition, Dobson introduces a distinction between ecological and 
environmental citizenship, where the later expresses a liberal view of the citizenship-environment connection 
(2003a: 88-90). This is grounded on the distinction between a more radical ecologism and a more reformist 
environmentalism (Dobson, 2000: 2-12; Bookchin, 1980: 77-78; Eckersley, 1996: 234). Unlike ecological 
citizenship, environmental citizenship seeks the inclusion of an environmental dimension into the package of 
citizenship rights, is tied to the nation state and practised exclusively in the public sphere. Barry draws a 
similar distinction between environmental and sustainability citizenship (2006).   
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 Ecological citizenship goes beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation-state 
and embraces both the private and public spheres. The ecological citizen’s main duty is to 
reduce the size of one’s ecological footprint motivated by a sense of justice. Hence 
activities and relations between citizens themselves within the family and the household - 
traditionally relegated to the private realm - are included in the political sphere of 
citizenship. In order to meet obligations, the virtue of justice is required - as well as other 
citizen and ecological virtues, such as care and compassion. Dobson’s treatment draws our 
attention to what motivates pro-environmental action – to do justice - and highlights that 
citizenship is about daily activity as much as it is about political status24. 
 I take Dobson’s notion as the main subject of my analysis on the possibilities of 
and obstacles to the promotion of ecological citizenship. I have made this choice for two 
reasons: first, because he provides the most theoretically sophisticated account, and 
perhaps also the most theoretically robust – although as we shall see shortly this view is 
challenged by his critics; and second, because environmental and global justice is at the 
core of this notion that stresses political and power relations beyond moral arguments and 
changes of consciousness, and this – apart from being more citizenly - makes it more 
appropriate than other accounts to deal with socio-political change. However, I consider 
and assess initiatives seeking to foster some of the other understandings of ecological 
citizenship indicated above, not only because they share some elements with Dobson’s 
concept, but also in view of elucidating whether they may lead to – and perhaps be the first 
step towards - the promotion of a justice-based notion of ecological citizenship. 
                                                 
24 Smith and Pangsapa also advance a conception of ecological citizenship grounded on relations of injustice. 
They develop a “circuit of justice” representing “particular ways of thinking about injustice, and the forms of 
citizenship that emerge… to address them” (2008: 51). They stress the connection between social and 
environmental justice and how these converge into practices of citizenship, shaping the meaning of 
citizenship itself. Although drawing on Dobson’s contribution, their conception reconciles the distinction 
between morality and politics, central to Dobson (2003a). 
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Dobson’s notion of ecological citizenship has been the object of various critiques
25. 
Some of these focus on his theoretical landscape and problematise the use of ecological 
footprints as the political space and source of citizen obligations. In this sense, it has been 
argued that this account of the political community excludes the victims of injustice - as 
only those who benefit from global inequalities have ecological citizenship obligations, 
that the construction of political obligations as obligations of justice are not proper citizen 
obligations and that justice should not be the main virtue (Mason, 2009; Hayward, 2006a; 
2006b; Luque, 2005; Smith, 2005). Others stress that ecological citizenship is “gender 
blind” and is likely to result in increased responsibilities for women due to gender 
inequalities and unbalanced distribution of socially necessary labour (MacGregor, 2005, 
2006a, 2006b); that it is informed by an instrumental account of citizenship as a tool to 
achieve sustainability aims and, as a result, the intrinsic value of citizenship and its 
democratic dimension are neglected (Gabrielson, 2008; Latta, 2007; Latta and Garside, 
2005; Agyeman and Evans, 2006; MacGregor and Szerszinsky, 2004); and that it over-
stresses the role of individual action to the detriment of social structures (Luque, 2005; 
MacGregor, 2006). Some of these critiques are more relevant to my project than others, as 
they suggest problems that the promotion of ecological citizenship faces, so they will be 
further explained. This is true especially of the need to take into account social and 
economic institutions that frame citizens’ actions – a central concern throughout this thesis. 
The accusation of instrumentalism – which, critic points, pervades green theory of 
citizenship in general - is specifically addressed in Chapter 4.  
 It is now time to start the analysis of different ways in which ecological citizenship 
can be promoted. How do we get people to behave and think as ecological citizens 
motivated by justice? Which forms of social organisation, sites and initiatives encourage 
                                                 
25 Dobson responds to some of these criticisms in the preface of the Spanish edition of his Citizenship and the 
Environment (2010).  
 36 
sustainable living and the reduction of one’s ecological footprint? In the next chapter I 
begin to answer these questions by examining different conceptions of the state within 
ecological thought - including the notion of the green state – that inform state-sponsored 














One of the greatest successes of the green movement has been the conceptualisation 
of the ecological crisis as a global crisis. It is now commonplace to argue that 
environmental problems like pollution, global warming and ozone depletion are 
transnational and do not respect state territorial boundaries. Equally, it is widely accepted 
that global ecological risks seriously question the capability and morality of an 
international order based on the primacy of states. Green politics is being developed by a 
variety of civil society actors, market organisations and state agencies. New forms of 
governance, which coexist with the pluralist state-based global order, have proliferated 
(Hurrell, 2006).  
This changing context has some implications for citizenship: it suggests that the 
general assumption that citizenship has to be attached to the state is wrong (Dobson, 
2003b). The ecological crisis provides the grounds for stressing “the language of citizens 
of ‘Planet Earth’, rather than the language of the nation-state democracies” (Held, 1991: 
25). Despite these facts, it is widely believed that the promotion of ecological citizenship 
requires state policies. What is more, state-centric views pervade contemporary green 
political theory in general. Notwithstanding the much debated erosion of their sovereignty 
and loss of legitimacy, states are still conceived as the most distinctive form of socio-
political organisation. There is wide consensus among political theorists that states are and 
will remain, at least for the foreseeable future, “the basic building blocks of the global 
38 
 
order” (Opello and Rosow, 2004: 2)
1. The same assumption pervades accounts of the state 
within the green political literature. Eckersley illustrates the dominant position when she 
argues that any future conversion of the current political system will be either a revolution 
or state-centred (2004: 5; 2005a: 159). So state structures remain the main focus of 
political analysis. Ecological thought is making a significant contribution to the 
contemporary rethinking of the state. 
In this chapter I look at conceptions and roles of the state in environmental political 
theory and at the evolution in attitudes towards the state within the green movement2. This 
evolution - which has led ecologists from an opposition to an enthusiastic acceptance of 
state-centric politics - is marked by the influence that the diverse schools of environmental 
thought have exerted over the green movement, as a result of various context-specific 
factors. It is instructive to look at the changing nature of the relationship between 
ecologism and the state in historical perspective to tease out why statism has come to 
dominate green political theory – and what happened to other options like eco-anarchism - 
and to explain the arguments put forward by greens to justify an increased role for the state 
in the creation of sustainable societies. This analysis sets the foundations for the 
examination of state-sponsored accounts of ecological citizenship, which is the topic of 
Chapter 3. The discussion in this chapter helps understand why most theorists of ecological 
                                                 
1 Despite the preeminence of state-centric politics, the concept and role of the state has been highly contested. 
Critiques of the state have been advanced by liberals, Marxists, anarchists, feminists and postmodernists, and, 
as I explain in this chapter, ecologists. Hoffman (1995) offers a comprehensive overview of such critiques.  
2 Doing research on the conception, functions and justification of the state in different schools of ecological 
thought is not the only way to look at the relationship between the state and the environment. There are at 
least three other approaches. One, more empirical, focuses on the state as an actor in both domestic and 
global environmental politics; this approach is well documented in the fields of international relations and 
global environmental politics, environmental policy and comparative politics. A collection of essays in these 
disciplines can be found in Barry and Eckersley (2005b). A second type of research investigates state-nature 
relations in the history of political thought and philosophy. Thirdly, some literature explores how states and 
nature have shaped, and still shape, each other: states have defined, humanised, territorialised, nationalised 
and instrumentalised the environment in various ways, while the natural environment has determined the 
formation and development of nation states geographically and economically. For the second and third 
approaches, see Whitehead et. al. (2007). For reasons of space and relevance to my arguments, I am not able 
to deal with these three alternative perspectives in detail. However, it will become clear in the following 
pages that these approaches influence green theories of the state in different ways.   
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citizenship believe that the state should facilitate its promotion despite the fact that, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, ecological citizenship involves activity, values and motivation, 
beyond legal status.  
When examining the state and the environment connection, it must be accepted that 
one thing is the ideal theory of ecologism, and another is the strategic choices greens have 
to make. Keeping this distinction in mind, one can ask with Brian Baxter: “In the area of 
ideal theory is there any distinctively ecological reason for favouring state-like modes of 
political organisation? Given a blank sheet, would ecologism inscribe the state upon it?” 
(1999: 138). Thinking through these questions may be illuminating in view of considering 
if the emphasis placed on the state as an agent for the promotion of ecological citizenship 
responds to ecological or tactical arguments.  
The second half of the chapter is devoted to exploring the concept of the “green 
state”, with particular attention being paid to whether it constitutes a distinctive type of 
state, or is an extension of the liberal state. Clarifying this distinction is important in view 
of assessing the potential of the green state for the promotion of ecological citizenship, 
especially when compared with the role played by actually existing states.  
 
 
1. Early ecologism or the state as an evil: from eco-authoritarianism to the 
denial of the state 
 
Political ecologists have always had an ambiguous relationship with the state. In 
the 1960s, when the green movement arose, its members were mainly scientists, most of 
them with little experience in conventional politics. They naively assumed that, once their 
analysis of the environmental crisis was proved, governments would immediately 
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intervene to redress the unsustainable situation. But this was far from becoming true. 
Consequently, democratic politics were dismissed by some greens for failing to 
acknowledge the urgency of measures to be adopted and for pointlessly attempting to 
accommodate diverse interests in a period of ecological constraint. Due to the complexity 
of environmental issues, some voices argued that those in possession of the right 
knowledge, namely scientific experts, should take decisions. It was assumed that the 
environmental crisis could only be solved by establishing an eco-dictatorship presided over 
by an ecologist-king. Thus, an authoritarian environmentalism emerged in the 1970s, with 
its desperate, Hobbesian, anti-democratic and pessimistic vision of a future dominated by 
sacrifice and constraint. Since survival was the main social objective, strong governmental 
action was the only solution (Hay, 2002: 173-175; Barry, 1999: 195).  
Representative of this trend are the works of Garret Hardin (1968; 1973; 1974), 
Robert Heilbroner (1974) and William Ophuls (1973; 1977), who advocated an 
environmental Leviathan. In their view, humans would never agree to see their freedoms 
restricted in order to reverse the ecological crisis. They argued for a strong and centralised 
state as the only structure capable of enforcing the drastic measures required, such as 
population control, limits to economic growth and decrease in the levels of material 
consumption (Hay, 2002: 175). This eco-authoritarian trend made a greater impact in 
academia than outside. Although some environmentalisms were rather authoritarian, the 
day-to-day practice and demands of the green movement were democratic, calling for more 
rather than less democracy (Paehlke, 2005).  
The “doomsday phase” of ecologism coexisted with green concerns about 
democracy and justice. The scientists that led the environmental movement in its early 
stages were gradually replaced by philosophers, political thinkers and social theorists 
interested not only in resolving the ecological crisis but in proving that a sustainable 
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society would be a better place to live, in terms of well-being and justice. The period that 
followed encapsulated the opposite values: it was highly optimistic, and it favoured small-
scale, decentralised and participatory politics. The green movement gave itself a 
democratic impetus, presenting citizen participation and green politics and lifestyles as 
something positive, a better alternative for a “liberatory rather than constraining” future 
(Hay, 2002: 177-186). Although it was long thought that it had been silenced, eco-
authoritarianism may be making a comeback in the writings of ecological thinkers like 
Lovelock (2006)3.  
During the early stage, environmental activists and theorists were generally 
committed to visions of the political sphere based on  direct democracy and organised 
within small-scale, decentralised, self-sufficient communities, based on ecocentric, 
egalitarian and socialist-libertarian values. Perhaps the most influential writer of this period 
was social ecologist Murray Bookchin (1980; 1982). It has been argued that the societies 
envisaged by greens and the reforms they proposed were so different from the actual 
world, that radicalism and utopianism were seen as the only possible way of writing a 
green political theory. With their “neither left nor right” position, greens dissociated 
themselves from other ideologies. The fact that ecologists were outside policy-making 
processes helped the consolidation of a green identity and a non-conventional 
understanding of politics – based on ideas like “the personal is political” (Barry 1999: 94-
95; Paterson et. al., 2006: 135).  
Green politics is characterised by an emphasis on dualisms: ecologism vs. 
environmentalism, anthropocentrism vs. ecocentrism, reformism vs. radicalism, or a 
mechanicist worldview vs. an organic worldview. The state, Barry argues, is no exception: 
                                                 
3 In order to tackle issues like global warming, Lovelock (2006) justifies a transitory loss of personal freedom 
and suggests a non-political solution: authoritarian, technocratic and high-tech measures adopted by a select 
community of scientists, assisted by the leadership of a technically advanced state. Scientific and 
technological development would confer on this state its legitimacy and political authority to make decisions 
in the name of the global community. 
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the options were either centralisation or decentralisation, rejection of the state or 
embracing the status quo. The possibility of green politics being reformist was generally 
ruled out. It was widely agreed that cooperation with the state would only accentuate the 
anti-ecological dynamics; therefore, the parliamentary path and the achievement of 
political power were rejected. In Barry’s view, the combination of dualist thinking and 
demands for radicalism and utopianism (so that there was a distinctively green position), 
together with the need to dismiss authoritarian solutions, led many ecologists to favour 
anarchist positions (Barry, 1999: 96). 
Several commentators have noted the anarchistic tendencies of green political 
theory (Barry, 1999; Dobson, 2000; Eckersley, 1992b; Goodin ,1992). This should not 
seem odd given concerns of classical anarchism with socio-natural processes. Thinkers like 
Emma Goldman, William Goldwin and Peter Kropotkin stressed the relation between the 
rise of state systems, the destruction of nature and the loss of political autonomy. In their 
writings, the state is a repressive entity while nature represents the realm of freedom 
(Whitehead, et. al., 2007: 28-32). Anarchist-inspired visions of the political society seeking 
to re-embed humans within the natural world were widely endorsed by ecologists. In a 
period in which greens were trying to draw moral and political lessons from a conception 
of nature as a terrain of cooperation, interconnectedness, absence of hierarchy and 
harmony, the natural order suggested an anarchistic social order. The anarchistic 
worldview embodied “the basic principles and values of green politics: ecological and 
social harmony, decentralisation, simple living, quality of life, community and direct 
democracy” (Barry, 1999: 94). Bearing this in mind, it is useful to recall the question that, 
following Baxter, I posed earlier: are there ecological reasons for greens to support or 
reject the state? The eco-anarchist position is that the state is not a natural structure but an 
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institution imposed upon society. This view leads to the denial of the state on 
natural/ecological grounds.  
The anarchist rejection of all forms of authority exerted a powerful influence on 
green thought and had an impact on ecologists’ suspicion of the state. Greens long held a 
conception of the state as being inherently anti-ecological and responsible for the 
unsustainable socio-political reality. This anti-statism was based on different accounts of 
the state.  
In the first place, the state was perceived as an institution of domination, hierarchy 
and violence, which encourages high levels of resource exploitation (Paterson et. al., 2006: 
140-141). This view can be illustrated with the work of Bookchin (1980; 1982; 1992b). For 
him the main cause of environmental degradation is the domination of nature by humans, 
which, in turn, stems from another hierarchical relationship: the domination of some 
humans by other humans. Insofar as the state encapsulates and perpetuates all these forms 
of hierarchy, it is responsible for the ecological crisis and, on these grounds, it is rejected. 
In line with classical anarchism, social ecologists believe that the state is an artificial 
institution and that, if freed from state domination, both human and ecological life will 
naturally flourish in a cooperative way.  These sorts of arguments advocating the rejection 
of states due to their oppressive and hierarchical nature are marginal in contemporary eco-
political literature, with few exceptions like Alan Carter’s work (2010, 1999, 1993).  
The second negative account of the state, the “administrative state”, emerged under 
the influence of Weberian state theory, explained in Chapter 1. This is a view of the state 
as being a bureaucratic, technocratic institution that embodies instrumental reason. The 
objective of measuring and controlling nature underpins this mode of rationality, in which 
the environment is valued in instrumental terms. This has resulted in environmental 
managerialism, the dominant discourse of international organisations and a significant 
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number of environmental NGOs. The administrative state consolidates environmental 
destruction and domination of the non-human natural world by humans. According to this 
interpretation, then, the state appears as one of the root causes of the environmental crisis 
(Paterson et. al., 2006: 138-140; Barry 1999: 78-79)4.  
Finally, the green critique of the state should be related to the limitations of liberal 
democracy. Ecologists have been very critical of the inability of liberal democratic 
institutions to foster citizens’ participation, and to democratise economic processes, the 
sphere of reproduction, science and technology. And this, it is argued, compromises the 
capacity of the liberal democratic state to deal effectively with environmental issues and to 
achieve democratic and green objectives. In the 1970s, an initial response to this critique 
resulted in eco-authoritarian alternatives, as we have seen. But, as part of the reaction 
against green authoritarianism, this very same critique of liberal democracy manifested in 
the rejection of state-centred democratic practice, and in favour of stronger forms of 
political participation organised, mainly, around the community (Paterson et. al., 2006: 
142-143; Hay, 2002: 303). 
 
 
2. Contemporary ecologism: the return of the state 
 
The previous section stressed that early environmentalists never saw the corridors 
of power or parliament as the places where their demands could be articulated. Global 
politics and transnational organisations were also dismissed. However, the 1990s witnessed 
a change. Today there is wide consensus that the green political project demands a myriad 
of places, from the local community, to the nation state and transnational institutions 
                                                 
4 See Whitehead et. al. (2007) for case studies providing evidence of the role administrative and bureaucratic 
states have played in legitimising and securing an unsustainable pattern of development.  
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(Barry, 1999: 97). Although the emphasis on participation persists in the green literature, 
eco-anarchist ideas have been diluted inside less radical approaches and a more positive 
view of the possibilities of greening liberal democracy and the state. 
 
 
2.1 The pragmatist turn: beyond eco-anarchism and green utopias 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, green political theory attempted to list the basic principles 
of ecologism, which would distinguish it from other ideologies and which could be used to 
evaluate how green certain ideas and organisations were. Today, it is widely believed that, 
for its own survival and success, green thought should be characterised by openness, 
flexibility and ongoing debate among various ethico-political options (Torgerson, 1999; 
Hailwood, 2004; Barry 1999). The reaction against blueprinting and the rejection of the 
possibility of drawing lessons from nature, or living according to nature, conferred a 
different direction to green politics. Current debates seem to be less concerned with ethical 
accounts of the sustainable society and more with its institutional aspects. This shift 
implies thinking about which instruments would best facilitate ecological aims and 
designing the institutional elements of the ecological society, including citizenship, the 
state and the market. In this respect, eco-politics has become mainstream and has 
interacted with different ideologies. Many in the green movement have welcomed this new 
direction; they advocate a non-utopian and less naïve – but, in their view, equally 
distinctive and transformative - green political thought that accepts a reality made up of 
states. These arguments are premised on the idea that eco-anarchism cannot inform the 
current focus on structures, strategy and institutionalisation, and that rejecting the state 
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would limit the options available in the task of creating the sustainable society (Barry, 
1999; Hailwood, 2004; de Geus, 1996; Baxter, 1999).  
Following recent developments in state theory by green thinkers (Eckersley, 2004; 
Dryzek et. al., 2003; Barry and Eckersley, 2005b), the dominant position in environmental 
political theory today is to see the violent, hierarchical and non-ecological features of the 
state as historically contingent rather than inherent to a static, abstract and essentialist 
conception of the state. The focus now should be, the argument goes, on those features 
that, as they evolved in response to historical circumstances, can be transformed and 
adapted to present conditions (Paterson et. al., 2006: 150-151). This implies a shift in the 
conception of the state from an agent responsible for environmental destruction to a 
“facilitator of progressive environmental change” (Barry and Eckersley, 2005a: x). The 
solution is to engage in an immanent critique that accounts for the limitations of state-
centred politics, drawing on the present situation, rather than starting from a utopian 
blueprint for the future. Barry observes that this approach – shared by him – represents a 
transition from utopian and ideological green politics to pragmatist theoretical accounts 
(1999). As I will explain later, the concept of the green state is built upon this type of 
immanent critique.  
This change of orientation has had some implications for ecological citizenship and 
its promotion. MacGregor notes that it is within the anarchist and anti-authoritarian 
traditions of green political thought that one finds “the longest-standing approaches to 
green citizenship, which favour political decentralisation and direct face-to-face democracy 
at the local or community level” (2006: 86). In fact, as MacGregor observes, Bookchin was 
one of the first green scholars to write about citizenship. In his view, the promotion of a 
green and active notion of citizenship takes place within the local community, the 
municipality and the city (Bookchin, 1980, 1982, 1992b). Bookchin’s notion of citizenship 
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is defined in terms of participation and political engagement, as an attempt to replace the 
delegation of power that takes place in a representative democracy. This idea is embodied 
in his notion of “libertarian municipalism” (1992a). Opposing the state, Bookchin defends 
a citizen politics at the lowest possible level, where citizens get involved in political life 
through a direct democracy in self-managed, co-operative communities.  
From the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, green writings on citizenship give more 
importance to the issue of institutionalisation. The move away from radical green politics 
and the dialogue with other ideologies has paved the way for liberal interpretations of 
citizenship (Hailwood, 2005; Bell, 2005), outlined in Chapter 1. Perhaps with the 
exception of Curtin (1999), community-like accounts of ecological citizenship have been 
replaced by state-based approaches. The stress is now placed on the formal rights of the 
ecological citizen and on the mechanisms for citizen participation in environmental 
deliberation and policy-making processes within the institutions of the democratic state. 
The work of Barry (1999) and Christoff (1996) serves well to illustrate this 
transition. Barry attempts to develop a green political theory which transcends anarchistic 
and blueprint-like visions of eco-politics, such as that of Bookchin. This leads him to 
accepting and reforming, rather than rejecting, the state and liberal democracy. 
Cooperation between the state and citizens in “collective ecological management” is 
crucial. Barry specifically relates the promotion of ecological citizenship to the state. This 
shift is based on the assumption that citizens do not always act in the ecological interest, so 
state action is needed - through regulation, rights of participation and education - to make 
them take into account the interests of non-human nature and future generations and 
assume responsibility for the environment.  
Christoff (1996) also favours using the machinery of states to promote the rights 
and duties of ecological citizens, and to include ecological values within constitutions and 
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legislation. Like Barry, Christoff views policy processes as a key locus for the practice of 
ecological citizenship, and considers that states should play an important role, 
implementing the right mechanisms to help citizens assume responsibility for the creation 
of the sustainable society. Although both Christoff and Barry argue that democratic 
participation is an appropriate vehicle for ecological citizenship learning, they contend that 
it is not enough. In this sense, the policy mechanisms and institutions of the state become 
important to them. These state-sponsored accounts of ecological citizenship are explored in 
Chapter 3.    
 
 
2.2 Why the state? 
 
The view that fuels the discussion illustrated so far is that the shift in attitudes 
towards the state may have influenced the way ecological citizenship is understood in the 
green literature and determined the practical initiatives aimed at its articulation. As noted 
earlier, there is a tendency to argue that the state should be active in the transition toward 
ecological citizenship. Yet, why should greens favour a state-centred account of ecological 
citizenship? In Chapter 1 I started thinking through these questions. Here these arguments 
are pushed further. Some of them suggest mechanisms that states can use and different 
functions they could adopt to encourage sustainable practices and behaviours among 
citizens. Whether these lead to the promotion of ecological citizenship or not is a matter 
examined in Chapter 3.  
If there is a green vision of the state dominating the field of political ecology today 
it is “that the nation-state plays, at best, a contradictory role in environmental management, 
facilitating both environmental destruction and environmental protection. At worst, it is 
49 
 
fundamentally ecocidal” (Eckersley, 2005a: 159). On the one hand, the state is implicated 
in global ecological degradation; hence cooperation with the state can be futile. This 
antipathy towards the state originates in the critiques illustrated above, and is shared by 
ecoanarchists, bioregionalists, antiglobalisation and global political ecology scholars 
(Barry and Eckersley, 2005a: x). On the other hand, as noted earlier, the state is conceived 
as the dominant form of collective organisation and the main source of political power; 
thus, it is regarded as central to the transition to environmental sustainability (Hurrell, 
2006: 180).  Despite anti-statist slogans and principles - such as decentralisation, grassroots 
democracy and non-violence - green groups often place among their demands more state 
regulation and control of those instruments which can be used for the environmental cause, 
such as taxes and legislation (Eckersley, 2004: 11-13). Several reasons help explain why 
there is such a confidence in the state and justify greens’ adherence to state-based politics. 
I argue that these same reasons inform the dominant view that states are to be involved in 
the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
The seriousness and irreversibility of ecological problems like climate change 
demands urgent responses. Most eco-political writers consider that it is better to use the 
structures available and direct efforts to reform the state, rather than embarking on the task 
of creating new forms of organisation (Eckersley, 2004: 91). A culture of sustainability 
favourable to the promotion of ecological citizenship demands significant alterations in 
societies and economies. Eckersley suggests that, due to states’ implication in most social 
and economic activities, like wealth and risk distribution, production of environmental 
information, effective enjoyment of citizens’ rights and the legal framework for capitalism, 
shifts are not likely to occur without the state’s involvement (Eckersley, 2004: 5-6). And 
there is evidence that some states are undertaking transformations in this direction (Barry 
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and Eckersley, 2005b). These could be good reasons for endorsing state-sponsored 
accounts of ecological citizenship. 
While most early environmentalists exhibited a radical rejection of the market, 
contemporary greens are not opposed to the market in principle. This does not mean that 
they are not critical of existing global markets. Indeed, a vast amount of green literature 
has illustrated the problems related to market-based approaches to green politics: market 
mechanisms are not appropriate for dealing effectively with the complexity of the 
environmental crisis and, especially, with the issues of scale that ecological problems raise. 
The market alone, it is argued, cannot deliver the type of structural change that 
sustainability requires because market-centred solutions do not pay attention to the 
normative and political aspects of green issues, and to justice-related questions. Due to 
these and related criticisms, there is a growing interest in the green restructuring of the 
market. The objective is to make corporations serve democracy and not the other way 
round. But the market is not likely to be susceptible to citizens’ scrutiny and to undergo 
spontaneous endogenous transformations. From this point of view, state regulation is 
needed to correct the failures of an unregulated free-market economy, to set environmental 
standards and prosecute polluting and risk-generating industries (de Geus, 1996; Barry, 
1999; Eckersley, 2004). Since only states possess the “monopoly of means of legitimate 
coercion”, they can educate and cajole consumers, producers and investors (Eckersley 
2004: 12)5. State intervention to impose strict environmental standards on companies 
would indirectly encourage sustainable consumption and facilitate individuals to enact 
their ecological citizenships through consumption habits.  
                                                 
5
 De Geus argues that precisely this will to reform the market is a powerful reason for greens to embrace 
state-based politics and, consequently, to reject eco-anarchism and its economic order characterised by 
communal ownership of resources, self-regulation of the economy by the community and self-sufficiency 
(1996: 205). Yet in Chapter 5 I look at the advantages of market reform instantiated at the community level 





The collective nature of environmental goods, such as clean air or water, leads 
some greens to believe that a democratic and constitutional power is necessary in order to 
avoid “the tragedy of the commons” and free-rider behaviours (Hardin, 1968). This type of 
claim is typically put forward by those who regard human nature as being selfish and self-
interested. People are always in need of environmental public goods but, the argument 
goes, they are not always willing to pay for them. The state is the only authority able to 
prevent environmentally and socially destructive behaviours (de Geus, 1996: 189-191). 
This is the classical eco-authoritarian argument for the justification of the illiberal, 
autocratic state, as we saw. Although most greens reject this solution today, it is still 
possible to find similar arguments in the eco-political literature in favour of democratic and 
constitutional but strong, constraining policies, such as bans on plastic bags or limits to car 
circulation in the cities. These are seen as necessary, legitimate and reasonable enforceable 
measures to start creating a culture of sustainability. Those who support the state on these 
grounds generally believe that people will not do the right thing by themselves because of 
the trade-offs that pro-environmental behaviours always involve (i.e people act motivated 
by economic interests rather than by environmental ones). They think that the state can use 
its regulatory and coercive machinery to impose ecological behaviours and to give 
individuals the right signs and incentives to act as ecological citizens.  
Some green writers (Barry, 1999: 112; Eckersley, 1992b: 175) argue that the state 
is better suited to delivering distributive justice than the market and anarchistic forms of 
social organisation. The state is said to have the appropriate capacity and authority to make 
a connection between environmental and social justice, so as to ensure that a sustainable 
society is also more just (Eckersley, 2004: 12-13). This view invokes socialist arguments 
to justify the existence and role of the state: to guarantee social justice, redistribution of 
resources and equality. Given the relationship between justice, sustainability and 
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ecological citizenship, state intervention appears from this perspective an important 
facilitator of ecological citizenship. States could eliminate barriers that do not allow people 
to behave along ecological lines and remove obstacles to ecological citizenship, such as 
income and gender inequalities.  
All the above points of connection between the state, green politics and citizenship 
constitute pragmatic arguments to accept state-centred politics. Since there is no unified 
view of the ideal mode of social organisation that would best lead to the realisation of 
environmental values and goals - or, in other words, since there is no consensus on the 
relationship between, on the one hand, green aims and values and, on the other hand, social 
institutions - it does not seem plausible to derive a green theory of the state out from 
ecological principles.  
Shaped by Robert Goodin’s (1992) influential distinction between a “green theory 
of value” and a “green theory of agency”, and following his claim that the second should 
be subordinated to the first, an instrumental account of political agency and social 
organisation pervades environmental thought (Dobson, 2003b: 208-209). From this angle, 
the state - as well as any other form of collective organisation – is not to be judged in the 
abstract (looking at the concept of the state itself) but in light of its suitability for achieving 
the aims of ecologism. Therefore, Baxter’s conundrum regarding the existence of 
ecological reasons for supporting the state – posed at the beginning of this chapter - could 
also be approached in negative terms: it is not that the principles of ecologism lead to the 
state as the ideal form of social organisation –or to the rejection of the state6. Rather, for 
the reasons earlier indicated, the state appears to be a very well suited instrument to realise 
sustainability aims and implement the kinds of policies, values and institutions greens 
favour, including ecological citizenship. 
                                                 
6 The fact that there is an ecological or natural argument to oppose the state is, as noted earlier, the eco-
anarchist response and a way to answer Baxter’s question affirmatively.  
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3. The green state: an overview 
  
The discussions in the previous sections allude to a tension between the generalised 
opinion that some kind of coercion in the form of regulation and state intervention is 
needed, and the belief that green politics should preserve autonomy and personal freedom. 
Perhaps due to this tension, it has been argued that, for a long time, the idea of a “green 
state” suggested either an indulgent state presiding over an ecotopia, or an authoritarian 
state imposing strict environmental regulation and control (Eckersley, 2004: 1). As I 
mentioned above, recent work done by green scholars has prompted a different approach to 
the state within environmental politics (Eckersley, 2004; Barry and Eckersley, 2005b; 
Dryzek et. al., 2003). The green critique persists; however, this is not addressed to an 
abstract concept of state, but to the liberal democratic state. In this sense, green political 
thought has been defined as “postliberal”, since, although critical of liberalism, it takes as a 
point of departure some of its features (Eckersley, 1992b, 2004; Doherty, 1996; Barry, 
1999). From this position, it is argued that green states are to emerge from an immanent 
revision of the liberal democratic state and its institutions. This requires a “consciously co-
ordinated and well-designed” strategy that transcends both the “radical utopian model” 
with its suspicion of the state, and the “piecemeal engineering” or weak ecological 
modernisation view that assumes that small reforms of the liberal state and its democratic 
institutions will be enough to deliver sustainability (de Geus, 1996: 197-200)7.    
This postliberal, in-between posture informs the work of Robyn Eckersley, who 
offers the most comprehensive theory of the green state (2004). Thus it is appropriate to 
spend some time analysing her approach to the question of the nature and features of the 
eco-state. I do so with two purposes in mind: first, because it is her notion of the green 
                                                 
7 See Paterson et. al. (2006) for similar arguments.  
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state that I use in the following chapter to study the role of the green state in the 
articulation of ecological citizenship; and, second, because a more detailed account of the 
green state is needed in view of establishing the difference between a green state and a 
conventional one, a distinction that is required in order to compare the ways in which these 
two types of structure engage with the promotion of ecological citizenship.  
Like for most green scholars, the green state is for Eckersley a democratic and 
constitutional state. It is governed by a “green constitution” that instantiates an “ecological 
democracy” as the political system of the state and grants a series of environmental 
substantive and procedural rights to citizens. In Eckersley’s theory, the green state is also a 
transnational state that has developed its sovereignty and identity beyond its borders, and 
assumes responsibility for citizens of other states whenever there is a problem of “common 
or transboundary ecological concern” (2004: 248).  
The green state is not a neutral organisation, but an “ethical and democratically 
responsible state” (Eckersley, 2004: 12), informed by “ecologically responsible statehood” 
(Eckersley, 2004: 228). The main purpose of the green state is to achieve communicative, 
social and environmental justice (Eckersley, 2004: 10)8. These values are to guide 
relationships with citizens and other states; they also inform institutional structures and 
policies. Eckersley offers a normative account of the state. In her view, if the objectives of 
environmental, communicative and social justice, as well as a new moral approach to the 
natural environment, are to be entrenched within the state apparatus, a distinct form of 
statehood is needed: state reflexivity. With this, Eckersley refers to state’s learning 
capacity so as to include transformations in policy instruments, policy goals, policy 
                                                 
8 With communicative justice, Eckersley refers to “a free/fair communicative context in which wealth and 
risk production and distribution decisions takes place in ways that are reflectively acceptable by all ‘different 
situated others’ (or they representatives who may be affected)” (2004: 10, emphasis in the original). 
Environmental justice is defined as a “fair distribution of benefits and risks” (2004: 10) and as the reduction 
of such risks. Eckersley’s green theory of the state is an attempt to integrate both social and environmental 
justice within communicative justice.  
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paradigm - or “the hierarchy of policy goals” - and a new role for the state (Eckersley, 
2004: 80). Without changes in the rationale and functions of the state – from an agent of 
environmental exploitation to “public environmental trustee” and facilitator of 
environmental and social justice, transformations in policy instruments, policy goals and 
policy paradigm will be in vain, and the contradiction between the accumulation and 
legitimation imperatives will never be solved (Eckersley, 2004: 81). Indeed, as Eckersley 
points out, most states have undergone transformations in policy instruments and goals 
without any satisfactory results in terms of effective environmental protection and 
environmental justice. Broader changes are thus required.  
These new institutions, functions and rationale of the state are entrenched in a green 
constitution. A green constitution is also needed to encourage, and enforce if necessary, 
governmental assumption of responsibility for the generation of environmental risks. A 
series of functions of the green state that seek to implement social, environmental and 
communicative justice are also constitutionally established. These include to facilitate 
transboundary ecological democracy, to act as ecological steward or trustee - assuming 
responsibilities towards its national citizens and territory, citizens of other states and the 
global commons- to protect biodiversity and the integrity of ecosystems, to act as an 
international ecological citizen in the society of states, to adopt a strong ecological 
modernisation, to instantiate a politics of just environmental risk assessment, and a 
commitment to respect and enhance human rights within and beyond its borders. With this, 
states become “planetary stewards” and “custodians of the biosphere”, rather than nation 
states driven by narrowly defined interests (2004: 50).  
How is this ideal green state endowed with new values, roles, policy objectives and 
democratic institutions to develop? What are the necessary reforms to be undertaken and 
who is to initiate them? These questions are relevant to understanding the functions played 
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by ecological citizens in the project of creating a green state, to considering the tools 
available to green states for the promotion of ecological citizenship, and to explaining the 
difference between a liberal and a green state.   
Eckersley develops her notion of the green state from a “critical political ecology 
perspective” (2004: 9). This approach draws on the insights of critical theory and its 
method of immanent critique of social and political life in order to identify resources that 
will render higher forms of freedom possible. As noted earlier, this method permeates 
contemporary green state theory and seeks to avoid “wishful utopian dreaming” 
(Eckersley, 2004: 4). The main obstacles hindering the rise of green states at present are 
identified: the anarchic international system of states, economic globalisation and 
liberalism. Their emancipatory potential is assessed to determine the way they could be 
used to ameliorate the ecological crisis. This potential is to be found in some of the recent 
and mutually reinforcing developments fostered by liberal democratic states that represent 
modest advances in the creation of sustainable societies, namely environmental multilateral 
cooperation between states (that would replace the international anarchic state system), 
weak ecological modernisation (which replaces laissez faire capitalism by integrating a 
state-regulated form of capitalism with the discourse of sustainable development), and 
deliberative democratic innovations (an alternative to the administrative, technocratic and 
hierarchical rule making-processes of liberal democracy).  
Thus, for Eckersley, green states will emerge from practices conceived to reduce 
the negative effects of those structural features of modern states that have long acted as 
obstacles to the rise of greener states and sustainable societies. Notwithstanding, 
deliberative innovations, weak ecological modernisation and environmental multilateralism 
are just the tip of the iceberg; they have to be further deepened so as to result in strong or 
reflexive ecological modernisation, ecological democracies and a world order of post-
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Westphalian or Kantian transnational states acting as ecological citizens in the 
international arena. This three-fold process would mean the “mutual democratisation of 
states and their societies” (Eckersley, 2004: 241). 
Economic transformation precedes the move towards greener states in Eckersley’s 
account. Neoliberal policies have triggered the emergence of the “competition state”, 
aimed at attracting capital and making national economies more competitive in the 
international context. In a world of globalised capitalism and great economic inequalities, 
the generation of green states will take place only if states, especially the most 
economically powerful, internalise the strong ecological modernisation paradigm9. But 
this, Eckersley argues, will not be possible unless states endorse a different set of values. 
Strong ecological modernisation is a learning process that has to be achieved 
democratically. Significant changes in the democratic and institutional structures of 
economically developed countries (seeking the introduction of environmental justice 
considerations) are needed for the international economy to be made more fair and 
sustainable (Eckersley, 2004: 253).  
Yet liberal democracies do not seem to have the right tools to facilitate strong 
ecological modernisation and to institutionalise environmental justice. According to 
Eckersley, they lack the free communicative framework that would enable the adoption of 
fair and unconstrained decisions about production and consumption. The ideal of liberal 
democracy is not met if key issues, like the economy, are excluded from democratic 
                                                 
9Claims that it will not be possible to reform the state along ecological lines unless the economic system is 
transformed are well documented in green political theory (Paterson et. al., 2005; Dryzek, 1996a, 2000; 
O’Connor, 1998). This position rests on a view of capitalism as being essentially anti-ecological. And, given 
that states uphold capitalism and that they are part of the same dynamics, the transformation of the capitalist 
order appears as a necessary precondition for state reform. The role of states in the process of ecological 
destruction that is functional to capitalist accumulation can be explained from a Marxist angle, assuming that 
states are an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie and the economic elites. Other views suggest that 
state actors pursue their own interests and that it is in the interest of states that those who have economic 
power continue to enjoy a dominant position in society because they can organise the capital accumulation 
that states need for their survival. These two views are contrasted by Carter (1993, 1999, 2010). Analyses in 
terms of imperatives, such as Dryzek’s –explained earlier - also present states’ interests in the accumulation 
process as independent from – yet coincident with – the objectives of the capitalist class.  
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control. The challenge, for Eckersley, is not to achieve the liberal democratic ideal – 
although in her view this would not be a bad starting point – but to replace it with “a 
distinctively green set of regulative ideals” so as to create a state “that is less exclusionary 
and more public spirited than the liberal democratic state” (Eckersley, 2004: 93). 
Consequently, liberal democracy should give way to an ecological and deliberative 
democracy that better suits the rationale of the green state. So, in this model, the transition 
to ecological democracy appears as a requisite for the implementation of reflexive 
ecological modernisation which, in turn, is a condition sine qua non for the genesis of a 
green state.  
For changes in economic policy and democratic innovation to result in green states, 
they have to be reinforced by public debates about the conditions for ecological 
sustainability and how these may be incorporated into new state functions and roles. This 
debate, which aims to replace liberal democracy with ecological democracy, is to be 
initiated by civil society actors in the public sphere (Eckersley, 2004: 139, 241)10. The 
green movement, including ecological citizens, has to create a multiplicity of green public 
spheres that will facilitate ongoing debate on the meaning of - and the best means to 
achieve - sustainability (Eckersley, 2004: 245-246), while, at the same time, using the 
party system to influence the conventional locus of politics (2004: 254). In order to green 
the state, it is necessary to transform the relationship between the state, civil society and 
the public sphere in a way that there is a “productive tension” between them (Eckersley, 
2004: 169). Hence the green constitution, ecological democracy, civil society and 
ecological modernisation are all complementary and mutually reinforcing elements; they 
constitute a “virtuous circle of change” that will not take place without a dynamic green 
                                                 
10 Eckersley follows Habermas’ discourse theory of law, democracy and the state and his emphasis on the 
necessary institutionalisation of deliberative processes both in civil society and the state. She argues that the 
essence of democracy and of democratic deliberation is located in civil society and the public sphere 
(Eckersley, 2004: 147). This view leads her to assert that the existence of green public spheres is a 
precondition for the consolidation of eco-states (Eckersley, 2004: 253). 
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public sphere (Eckersley, 2004: 246). I will return to these issues in Chapter 4, where I 
examine the concept of the green public sphere and its connection with both the state and 
civil society.   
Yet, according to Eckersley, a single green state cannot bear the responsibility for 
achieving environmental change. An international community of transnational green states 
is needed. The move from an anarchic to a post-Westphalian culture based on 
environmental multilateralism will only be possible in the case of states with shared values 
and a common historical background regarding security and environmental issues11. In 
Eckersley’s words, “the mutual democratization of states and their societies appears to 
operate in a virtuous relationship with reflexive ecological modernization at the domestic 
level and more active environmental multilateralism by such states (and their citizens) on 
the international stage” (2004: 202).  
 
 
4. The green state vis-à-vis the liberal state 
 
In Chapter 1 I noted that environmental theorists of the state argue that actually 
existing states do not have the adequate mechanisms, and cannot implement the policies 
required, for the promotion of ecological citizenship and the objectives of sustainability 
and justice associated with it. As an alternative to the limitations of the liberal democratic 
state to deal both with the promotion of just sustainability and ecological citizenship, they 
praise a green state. Given these claims, it thus seems appropriate to devote some time to 
                                                 
11 For Eckersley, the European Union - where common discourses of security, ecological modernisation and 
sustainable development have emerged out of a shared historical background - embodies the closest 
approximation to green readings of the Kantian ideal. These European joint discourses have resulted in 
environmental multilateral agreements and environmental rights common to all member states. The European 
Union has taken a prominent role in international negotiations and is exerting some influence on the green 
agendas of other states. Eckersley believes that it could lead the international community toward an 
environmental post-Westphalian order (Eckersley, 2004: 47-51). 
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analyse the difference between a liberal state and a green state in view of assessing how 
these two agents engage with the promotion of ecological citizenship and how the green 
state could provide more opportunities for ecological citizenship than a conventional one. 
Although these issues will be further elaborated in the next chapter, here I start considering 
the possibility that a green state may be a better promoter of ecological citizenship than 
existing states.  
As explained earlier, Eckersley’s theory of the green state advances environmental 
multilateralism, ecological modernisation and ecological democracy as ways to overcome 
the current anti-ecological order. It may be insightful to consider these three developments 
if we are to assess the singularity of the green state when compared with the liberal-
capitalist state, and its potential for the promotion of ecological citizenship. Since 
environmental multilateralism mainly refers to interactions between states and I am 
concerned with the relations between citizens and states, I focus on ecological 
modernisation and ecological democracy.   
States sustain the capitalist economy in different ways, to the point that we can talk 
about a “state capitalist system” (Eckersley, 2004: 56). The green state adopts reflexive 
ecological modernisation to overcome the contradictions of capitalism. One should 
question whether ecological modernisation is still a capitalist tactic or whether it makes the 
green state postcapitalist, as Eckersley argues, and, in this respect, different from the 
liberal-capitalist state. Eckersley seems to have a rather ambiguous view of capitalism. On 
the one hand, she regards capitalism as the main obstacle to a green state - indeed, she 
suggests that states will not become green states until they are freed from “systemic, anti-
ecological pressures” arising from the global capitalist order (2004: 51). On the other hand, 
she concedes that ecological modernisation is a way to reconcile capitalism and the 
economic growth imperative with environmental protection. In fact, we are told that 
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ecological modernisation is a “competitive strategy” for the “competition state” to adapt 
itself to demands of greater competitiveness by global markets and neoliberalism 
(Eckersley, 2004: 69). Thus, if ecological modernisation does not replace capitalism but 
offers a way to accommodate the sustainable development discourse with capitalism, it can 
be argued that the green state is still a capitalist state, despite Eckersley’s assertion that it is 
postcapitalist. This is what Eckersley seems to be suggesting when she holds that a green 
democratic state would still rely on “private capital accumulation to fund, via taxation, its 
programs”, although she argues that safeguarding capital accumulation would no longer be 
the rationale of the state (2004: 83). 
It is beyond the remit of my project to discuss ecological modernisation in detail. 
For our purposes, it is enough to accept that insofar as the adoption of reflexive ecological 
modernisation depends on the further democratisation of, especially, the most 
economically developed states – as noted earlier - and given that ecological modernisation 
is, arguably, an ameliorated version of capitalism, we may assume that the distinctiveness 
of the green state resides in its ecological democracy.  
Although ecological democracy emerges from existing liberal institutions and 
values, Eckersley claims that it is not a green liberal democracy. It is not antiliberal either, 
in the sense that it does not reject value pluralism, indicating one true path while 
precluding others. Ecological democracy draws on the main achievements of liberalism 
(i.e. representative democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, the protection of civil and 
political citizenship rights, the election of representatives and the separation of powers), to 
address their limitations. This makes ecological democracy, according to Eckersley, a 
postliberal democracy (Eckersley, 2004: 96). She refers to some features of liberalism that 
prevent it from delivering environmental protection and environmental justice, namely its 
notion of value pluralism, its conception of autonomy, the public-private divide, ethical 
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subjectivism, and liberal values and dogmas. These concepts are questioned and improved 
in an ecological democracy, so it seems instructive to discuss each of them briefly in order 
to assess the ways in which ecological democracy differs from liberal democracy. 
In an ecological democracy liberal pluralism is not eliminated but radicalised. This 
means that attention is paid to the collective structures where people’s values and 
preferences are formed. A focus on the social context reveals that some individuals have 
more resources than others (e.g. easier access to information, skills for lobbying, time, 
income and education), and it is their values and preferences that always win in political 
bargaining. Liberal politics, at present, do not consider the social context, but just look at 
values and preferences, taking them as pre-given. When this happens, politics is seen as a 
way to solve conflicts of interest between equally free and autonomous citizens, while the 
reality that partisan private interests of the most resourceful groups are systematically 
favoured in democratic procedures is ignored (Eckersley, 2004: 96-99).  
The “enlightenment ideal of autonomy” is accepted although revised at least in 
three different ways. Firstly, the concept of autonomy is examined in relation to the way it 
informs the liberal individualistic ontology of the self as detached from any biological and 
social constraints. Communitarians have long argued that the liberal notion of the self and 
the definition of autonomy lead to an instrumental conception of ‘others’. Political 
ecologists can, in Eckersley’s view, expand this critique showing that the liberal ontology 
of the self does not acknowledge the subject’s dependence on nature. The liberal attempt to 
extend and preserve humans’ autonomy assumes the need for human domination of the 
natural world, which in turn means increasing the influence of science, technology and 
instrumental reason. This notion of autonomy and the liberal conception “of the self-
interested rational actor as natural or eternal” have to be replaced by others that 
acknowledge the interdependence between humans and both their social and natural 
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environments (Eckersley, 2004: 108). As Eckersley notes, this is related to different 
conceptions of the common good: for liberals it is the individual common good that 
matters, while for communitarians, and now for political ecologists, the common good is a 
question of public deliberation, as it cannot be the result of mere aggregation of individual 
preferences. Ecological democracy has to justify itself by embracing complexity, as well as 
social, ecological, technological and economic interdependence. This reinterpretation of 
the liberal notion of the common good and the liberal ontology of the self strengthens the 
connection between the protection of nature and social justice (Eckersley, 2004: 104-107).  
The second way in which the concept of autonomy is altered is implicit in that 
those responsible for risk-generating activities have to give reasons in an open and free 
communicative context to justify their views that might lead to norms or policies that 
create unjust risks. Public scrutiny obliges them to consider the views and objections of all 
those affected by the risk in question , as well as the impact that their decisions will have 
on other human and ecological communities (Eckersley, 2004: 114, 133). The burden of 
proof for suffering the consequences of a risk or environmental injustice is, thus, reversed. 
When liberal democracies do not take into account the impact that certain activities have 
on others, the concepts of autonomy and individual freedom that are central to liberalism 
are restricted for environmental victims. In an ecological democracy, all risk-generating 
decisions are subject to public deliberation and their potential effects on all possible 
victims are taken into account. In this way, decisions and policy outcomes which are anti-
ecological or which represent a concept of autonomy “that cannot be generalized” are 
potentially undercut (Eckersley, 2004: 107). With this, both the power of technocrats and 




Ecological democracy as the political system of the green state implements 
mechanisms that encourage citizens to use moral arguments in their deliberations. Moral 
arguments, unlike pragmatic or ethical ones, allow for the consideration of the interests of 
non-human nature and future generations, since they are treated as a matter of justice. 
According to Eckersley, in liberal democracies issues related to the non-human world and 
future generations belong to the realm of the ethical, to particular conceptions of the good; 
they are not moral issues, in the sense that they are not issues of justice. And, since they 
are not a matter of justice, they do not define procedural rules, but rather relate to 
outcomes. Whether the interests of non-humans and future generations are to be taken into 
account or not in a liberal democracy, will be determined in the course of deliberation 
because this is only one among other conceptions of the good that debate might end up 
favouring (Eckersley, 2004: 165-166)12. If democratic deliberation is to promote 
environmental justice, non-humans and future generations have to be represented in 
political processes regardless of the particular conceptions of the good that participants in 
debate hold. This represents an expansion of the moral community or community of 
justice, so as to include and represent non-human nature, future generations and members 
of other states in institutionalised – and constitutionally entrenched - political debate. Such 
a configuration of the relevant moral and political community as a “community of the 
affected”, results in the inclusion of groups traditionally excluded from participation or 
representation in decisions concerning the production of environmental risks that will have 
some impact on them, whether future generations, citizens of other states or non-human 
nature (Eckersley, 2004: 109). In this way, the principle informing ecological democracy 
that all those potentially affected by a risk should take part in the decisions that will 
                                                 
12 Eckersley argues that this is also a feature of non-ecological accounts of deliberative democracy, such as 
that of Habermas, on whom she draws. She claims that her model gives a normative content to that of 
Habermas, which for her, is purely procedural. 
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generate that risk is institutionalised. This constitutes the third way in which the liberal 
concept of autonomy is extended.   
In an ecological democracy the distinction between the private and the public is put 
into question. In so far as activities like investment, production and consumption are 
regarded as private matters, liberalism depoliticises decision-making. These issues are risk-
generating activities that can affect others in negative ways; therefore, they have to be 
considered as public concerns, and subject to democratic debate (Eckersley, 2004: 96-98, 
242). As defined in the previous chapter, ecological citizenship is practised in the private 
as well as the public sphere. Activities and relations belonging to the private realm as 
conventionally understood have public implications, since they affect other people’s lives 
and generate ecological footprints. Furthermore, many of the so-called private activities in 
a liberal democracy refer to human relations with nature and in this sense they are political. 
So they have to be included within the realms of citizenship and democracy. By 
politicising these activities and making them subject of public debate within an ecological 
democracy, a green state enhances discussion about ecological citizenship obligations.   
Eckersley argues that “liberal dogmas”, like “the sanctity of private property 
rights”, freedom as “material plenitude” and “overconfidence in the rational mastery of  
nature through further scientific and technologic process”, would be questioned if there 
was a “genuinely free communication-community” (2004: 108). But, as she notes, such a 
community does not exist at present. Liberal democratic procedures exclude from citizens’ 
analysis the political and economic interests that continue to benefit over and over again 
from the preservation of such dogmas. An ecological democracy provides the free and 
unconstrained communicative context where liberal creeds can be contested. Similarly, the 
liberal concept of “public reason” that encourages “rational, autonomous, and freely 
choosing individuals” is replaced by a “critical ecological reason” (Eckersley, 2004: 139-
66 
 
140). This distinctly green form of reason stimulates socially and ecologically responsible 
relationships between individuals themselves, and between individuals, communities and 
businesses. Other principles challenged in an ecological democracy are the 
anthropocentrism and instrumentalism towards nature characteristic of classical liberal 
thought. The rejection of these values, together with the extension of the moral community, 
opens the door to the possibility of environmental policy that acknowledges the protection 
of the natural world for its autonomy from humanity and its own value (Eckersley, 2004: 
103). From this point of view, a green state could nurture the assumptions and values 
upholding ecological citizenship, including a conception of environmental sustainability 
that encompasses justice and transcends narrow anthropocentrism, and facilitates the 
assumption of ecological citizenship duties.  
Lastly, the transnational dimension of ecological democracy should be considered 
as one of the elements that make the green state a postliberal state. While liberal 
democracies are nation-state based, a green state that institutionalises “the all-affected 
principle” (Eckersley, 2004: 186) incorporates foreign interests into domestic politics. 
Whenever there is an ecological problem that concerns individuals in other states, 
deliberative mechanisms are opened to participation or representation of non-national 
citizens; in this way, citizenship is transnationalised. This transboundary element has the 
potential to place the green state in a better position to protect the environment and 
implement ecological citizenship than a liberal state system13.  
                                                 
13 Eckersley argues that her green theory of the state differs from liberal cosmopolitan accounts of the state 
and democracy. In her view, models like that offered by David Held praise the imposition from above of a 
cosmopolitan global order, with cosmopolitan law and global institutions in favour of which all states have to 
hand over part of their sovereignty. Rather than creating supranational structures that states have to adhere to 
and recognize, Eckersley’s position is that it is better to rely on multilateral agreements between states that 
create different structures of governance for particular issues, but which could later be extended to more 




All the above reconfigurations of liberal democratic principles are connected to 
deliberative conceptions of democracy. As explained earlier, Eckersley conceives 
ecological democracy as a deliberative democracy, since she believes that political 
deliberation is the democratic tool that will best assist the green state to develop its 
functions and accomplish its objectives. One of the keys to understanding the difference 
between Eckersley’s green state and a liberal state lies in distinguishing deliberative 
understandings of democracy – i.e. ecological democracy – from aggregative accounts – 
i.e. liberal democracy. This has clear implications for ecological citizenship, which are 
explored in next chapter. Suffice to mention at this point that the communicative 
architecture of the green state renders it more legitimate than its liberal counterpart in 
terms of democratic participation and representation. Within a green state, deliberation 
over common issues is emphasised, instead of assuming citizens’ preferences as pre-given 
and non-negotiable. In addition, democratic procedures are more inclusive and remain 
opened up to those systematically excluded by the liberal state. To this end, an ecological 
democracy introduces deliberative designs that complement representative institutions, like 
community right-to-know legislation, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences or public 
environmental enquiries (Eckersley, 2004: 92).  
Yet this procedural difference between liberal and ecological democracy is not 
what makes the green state substantially different from a liberal state. In this respect, 
Eckersley concedes that the “institutional innovations” that she offers do not represent “a 
radical departure from liberal democracy, merely a radical extension of it” (2004: 137, 
emphasis in the original). In fact, institutional innovations like those suggested by 
Eckersley have already been tested by some liberal democratic states (Smith, 2005b). This 
indicates that the formal dimension of ecological democracy, or part of it, can be 
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incorporated by liberal democracies. So, in this respect, ecological democracy and the 
green state are perhaps not so different from their liberal homologues after all.  
 Yet it could be argued that the main difference between a liberal democracy and a 
postliberal one is not procedural, but normative. This is not to say that the green state 
embodies certain values while the liberal state is value free, as Eckersley points out. It is 
the difference between the respective set of values and objectives that their procedures and 
institutions encapsulate that constitutes the main difference between both types of state 
(Eckersley, 2004: 137-138). So, although I argued that a liberal state could incorporate the 
formal dimension of ecological democracy, the normative-ecological aspect 
(environmental justice-related functions and rationale and the moral considerability of the 
natural world) is most distinctively postliberal. However, this normative facet is embodied 
within the deliberative structures and policy instruments, which are needed to give 






This chapter looked at different conceptions of the state within green political 
theory. I argued that the way ecological citizenship is defined and the position informing 
most debates regarding its promotion are related to the evolution of green attitudes towards 
the state, and are indicative of the prominent role that the state system has in contemporary 
green politics, despite claims about a supposed transition from government to governance.  
A more benign view of the state apparatus has led to various developments in the 
green theory of the state. One of these accounts has been explained - Eckersley’s notion of 
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the green state - and the difference between this and the liberal state has been discussed. In 
Chapter 3 I tease out the implications that the distinction between the liberal and the green 
state have for the cultivation of ecological citizenship. The most obvious one is that green 
states will predominantly use deliberative democracy as a vehicle for ecological citizenship 
transformation. Nevertheless, ecological democracy has two components – formal and 
normative - which make it different from liberal democracy. Both components are 
pertinent with a view to assessing the articulation of ecological citizenship within a green 
state. Although it is the normative dimension of ecological democracy that defines 
ecological citizenship within a green state - and what makes this organisation be more 
radically distant from the liberal state – this is articulated through deliberative rule-making 










ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 
 
 
The previous chapter illustrated the consolidated belief that states have a central 
role to play in the process of achieving environmental sustainability. The “reformist 
acceptance of capitalism and liberal democracy” (Carter, 2001: 318) leads many greens to 
argue that states should use their resources and institutions to regulate the market and steer 
citizens’ conducts and habits to secure environmental goals. In this chapter I discuss 
whether these forms of state action contribute to the promotion of ecological citizenship. I 
look at the plethora of mechanisms used by states to engage citizens in the quest for 
sustainability and the different roles they adopt with a view to assessing their 
appropriateness for the cultivation of ecological citizenship. This analysis connects with 
the policy implications of ecological citizenship. A focus on the green state is also 
included. Taking into account the differences between the liberal and the green state, 
explained in Chapter 2, the potential of eco-states for encouraging ecological citizenship is 
examined in the second part of this chapter. The aim is to further determine in which ways 









1. State-sponsored ecological citizenship 
 
Contemporary state-sponsored environmental policy targets the individual to a 
great extent. When environmental issues first hit the public agenda, they were mainly 
framed as the result of economic activity and industrial processes, and thus responsibility 
for solving environmental problems was particularly placed on governments and 
corporations. Several authors have noted that the 1992 Rio Summit – known as the Earth 
Summit - represents a turning point (Matti, 2006: 5-13, 162; Seyfang, 2009: 29)1. For the 
first time, the international consensus was that the main causes of the ecological crisis are 
over-consumption and the lifestyles of individuals in rich countries. Changes in lifestyles 
and consumption patterns were presented as the solution to unsustainable development. 
Post-Rio environmental politics, both in academia and government circles, emphasise the 
way in which the everyday activities of individuals and their choices as consumers, citizens 
and householders, have a great impact on the global state of the environment, and stress the 
role they have to play in the project of building sustainable societies. This trend can be 
observed in documents like Agenda 21.  
Arguably as a result of this framing of environmental problems as a product of 
individual lifestyles, it is widely agreed that effective public policy relies for its success, to 
a large extent, on citizens’ behaviours and practices. It is assumed that the 
individual/household level is the right one for problems to be addressed, since it is 
accepted that efforts made by states as well as measures implemented at higher levels will 
                                                 
1Seyfang argues (2005) that the Rio Summit marks the consolidation of technology and market-based 
approaches to the sustainability issue. In this sense, the Earth Summit could be seen as marking a transition 
from early, radical ecologism towards the emergence of mainstream forms of environmentalism and the birth 
of environmental protection as a policy objective.  
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be pointless unless individuals do their bit2. Diverse mechanisms are used in environmental 
policy worldwide to get citizens to change their lifestyles and behaviours, usually by 
making them assume responsibilities which are translated into “household-related 
activities”, such as waste management and sustainable transport and consumption (Matti, 
2006: 5-13). 
State authorities have a myriad of means and institutions at their disposal in order 
to exercise their functions. In their role as environmental managers, state bodies use a 
variety of instruments to achieve sustainability policy objectives, including changes in 
behaviours and values. These tools were introduced in Chapter 1. The present and the 
following sections investigate whether these mechanisms help consolidate the practice of 
ecological citizenship. For the purposes of our analysis, I focus on four policy tools: 
voluntary action, fiscal incentives, regulation and the establishment of rights.  
Regulations were the most popular environmental policy initiatives in the 1970s 
and 1980s - when most states adopted environmental legislation – and, as outlined in 
Chapter 2, they were favoured by the authoritarian strand of green thought. Although some 
voices still argue for hard regulations to solve the current ecological crisis and to mould 
individual action (Lovelock, 2006), today there is a tendency to conceive markets as the 
most effective and efficient instruments to deliver sustainability. The widespread adoption 
of the ecological modernisation paradigm provides good evidence for this (Carter, 2001: 
285). Market-based tools provide an incentive, usually an economic benefit, for pro-
environmental conduct beyond what is legally required. They work to make some choices 
more attractive than others without the cost of non-compliance that hard regulations 
involve (Shahzeen et. al., 2009). When states choose economic incentives to encourage 
individual behaviour change, they intervene in the market to force the incorporation of 
                                                 
2 Matti suggests that similar reasons have led to the proliferation of proposals that, from different angles and 
using different languages, argue for the assumption of individuals’ responsibility for the environment within 
green political theory (2006: 6).  
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externalities into the price of a good, setting the terms of the tax or the incentive (Carter, 
2001: 295). A first glance at the nature of these two policy mechanisms - regulations and 
monetary incentives - suggests that they may be different paths to sustainability compared 
to the citizenship approach which is the focus of this thesis: they encourage action that 
seeks to avoid punishment or obtain a fiscal reward. However, some scholars have argued 
that they could lead to the cultivation of the virtues and motivation required for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship. Hence it seems appropriate to consider how this may 
happen and to elucidate the difference between these and other arguably more citizen-
focused policy approaches, like rights, informational campaigns and education. 
Unlike regulations and market-based instruments there is no economic incentive, 
legal mandate or sanction in the case of voluntary action. Citizens are free to engage or not. 
States sponsor voluntary action through several means, like the provision of information 
and educational campaigns promoting pro-environmental habits, lifestyles and activities, or 
developing citizens’ rights of information and litigation (Carter, 2001: 292-293). I examine 
these two types of voluntary action – educational campaigns and the expansion of rights – 
separately. Although they both aim at citizens’ voluntary assumption of responsibility for 
the environment and engagement in pro-environmental activities, there is a distinct focus 
respectively on lifestyles and democratisation that suggests a difference in their use as 
tools to promote ecological citizenship.     
Finally, together with these policy instruments, attention is paid in my study to the 







1.1. Voluntary action 
 
Since the 1990s, environmental policy has become more participatory, with an 
increasing focus upon active citizenship involved in practices such as green consumerism 
and community action conceived as the key route to the sustainable society (MacGregor 
and Pardoe, 2005; Seyfang, 2006b)3. Governments know that they cannot achieve 
sustainability on their own and that citizens’ cooperation and active participation is much 
needed. But they are also aware that they will be very unpopular if measures that place an 
excessive economic burden on citizens (such as road taxes) are adopted. So they seek to 
encourage individuals’ voluntary choice to care for the environment.  
The state assumes that citizens are willing to act but that they need more 
information on specific actions and products, and some encouragement. It is assumed that 
more knowledge will produce transformations in lifestyles and behaviours, raise citizens’ 
awareness and lead them to develop a sense of responsibility for the environment and the 
impact of their quotidian actions. To achieve this, the main task of states under this 
approach is to provide citizens with information and education on environmental issues 
and how to change present unsustainable practices by suggesting alternatives that do not 
cause environmental harm, so that they can make the right choices in their everyday life - 
like using public transport instead of private car or consuming water more efficiently at 
home. Often informational campaigns are complemented by mechanisms aimed at making 
information about specific products available and more visible, such as eco-labelling 
schemes. With these instruments, states seek to encourage citizens’ participation in the 
management of environmental issues and to take action on a voluntary basis. Citizens’ 
                                                 
3 The authors of the report argue that this “participatory turn” within environmental policy has to be read in 
the context of a broader move from government to governance (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 4). 
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freedom to choose whether to engage or not in pro-environmental action is stressed (Matti, 
2006; Carter, 2001). 
This was the approach adopted by Canada’s Green Plan (1990) when introducing 
the concept of environmental citizenship as a policy tool. Environment Canada encourages 
adults and children to be environmental citizens as a “personal commitment to learning 
more about the environment and to taking responsible environmental action”
 (Environment 
Canada, 2006: 1). Environmental citizenship encapsulates the view that “self-regulation is 
better than government regulation, and...voluntary action is the most effective way to 
achieve enduring results” (Government of Canada, 1990: 145). Environment Canada 
frames environmental citizenship as a responsibility all citizens have towards the common 
good, a civic duty to be committed to environmental protection and to take personal 
responsible action (Bell, 2005: 25). 
Under this voluntary duty account, ecological citizenship is mostly associated with 
transformations in consumption habits. Consumption is increasingly being seen as a site 
for the practice of citizenship, as the large amount of policy documents and academic 
literature on ethical and sustainable shopping as citizenly activities show (Berglund and 
Matti, 2006; Keat, 1994; McGregor, 2004; Slocum, 2004; Soper, 2007; Soper and 
Trentmann, 2008; Seyfang, 2009, 2005). This seems to be the view endorsed by states 
when they encourage citizens’ voluntary engagement with responsible consumption as a 
means to care for the environment. 
Seyfang notes that sustainable consumption policy adopted by the British state 
relies to a great extent on a voluntary approach (2009, 2005). In order to achieve citizens’ 
behavioural change, the state initially adopted an “information-deficit approach” (Seyfang, 
2009: 34) and favoured informational campaigns to educate citizens about their 
consumption patterns and help them make more informed choices. The present sustainable 
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consumption policy framework relies to a large extent on voluntary actions, like state-
sponsored informational and awareness-raising campaigns - to educate consumers about 
the consequences of their consumption habits and lifestyles and encourage behavioural 
transformation - deliberative forums, and certification and labelling schemes to rate fair-
trade, organic and energy standards (Seyfang, 2009: 35).     
Matti’s analysis of Swedish state-sponsored strategy of sustainable consumption as 
a vehicle for ecological citizenship finds that it is largely based on this informational 
approach. State-sponsored informational campaigns encourage citizens to stop and reflect 
on the consequences of their actions before buying, and stress how citizens can make a 
difference, and enhance sustainable production and consumption with “conscious 
shopping”. Citizens are explained how they can make active choices at the store: they can 
look for sustainably produced products and demand them from producers and retailers 
when these are not available, asking for more eco-labelled goods to be ordered (Matti, 
2006: 137-138).  
Both Matti and Seyfang note that there is increasing awareness by states that 
information and education are not enough to stimulate citizens’ behavioural change 
towards a sustainable consumption model. In this sense, most recent policy is multi-faceted 
and also includes soft and hard regulations, like fiscal incentives and legal provisions – 
which seek to address some of the shortcomings of precedent strategies relying above all 








1.2. Fiscal incentives 
 
Earlier I noted that fiscal incentives can be seen as having little to do with 
enhancing citizenship. Yet some authors include fiscal incentives in the tool-kit of policy 
instruments available to states for the promotion of greener forms of citizenship. It is now 
time to illustrate these two contrasting views. 
 Despite the wide use of voluntary actions, one of the main assumptions in the 
individual-oriented environmental policy is that education and the provision of information 
are not enough to get citizens’ behaviours and habits to change, and sustainable 
consumption policy, as we saw, is a good example. It is argued that citizens are not always 
willing to act according to the common good and engage in pro-environmental action, so 
states adopt other tools to steer citizens’ behaviour from above in other ways. One of these 
mechanisms is monetary incentives. Although these are market-based tools, state 
authorities decide the pollution standards to be achieved and introduce incentives in the 
right place. Examples of this type of initiative include road-pricing systems - to make 
people pay for driving in particular places, like city centres-, levies on plastic carrier bags, 
and returnable deposits on drink containers (Dobson and Bell, 2006; Dobson, 2003a; 
Dobson and Valencia Sáiz, 2005; Carter, 2001). The rationale behind economic incentives 
as policy tools is that, after rewards and penalties are put in place, individuals will make 
the right choices and will be properly motivated to do the right thing without further state 
action. Liberal-capitalist states have widely adopted this strategy, for a fairly 
straightforward reason: citizens self-discipline themselves with minimum government 
intervention (Dobson and Bell, 2006:1). 
It is often argued that market-based instruments will always be part of the range of 
tools available to states for delivering environmental sustainability, since sometimes most 
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of us follow economic motivations. So, the argument goes, states should seek to use them 
to achieve socially accepted aims. There is evidence that economic incentives do work. 
They certainly have an impact: they get citizens do certain things in the short-term (i.e. 
reduce plastic bag consumption or the number of cars in city centres). But this does not 
mean that they are effective in producing the sorts of transformations associated with 
ecological citizenship. In this sense, monetary incentives are less likely to produce long-
term changes in peoples’ values, attitudes and motivations. Getting citizens to contribute to 
the creation of sustainable societies is a deeper, longer-term objective. And for this aim to 
be met there is wide consensus that behavioural change is not enough. Behavioural change 
may disappear once the economic incentive is removed, but one can expect that if shifts in 
values and attitudes occur, then people’s behaviour will change too (Dobson, 2003a; 
Dobson and Valencia, 2005; Dobson and Bell, 2006) - although there is also a well-known 
values-action gap. For these reasons, it is usually argued that fiscal incentives are different 
from the citizenship approach to environmental change. 
However, against these arguments, Connelly maintains that financial punishments 
and rewards can foster ecological citizenship indirectly. Some highly motivated individuals 
do the right thing and what is best for the environment even if it costs them money and 
time (like travelling by train instead of by plane), but Connelly considers that “most of us, 
most of the time, will act only in response to the external motivations of price, punishment, 
or prohibition”; in other words, “[i]f flights are cheap, we will fly; if gas is cheap, we will 
drive” (2006: 49). In Connelly’s view, shifts in individual dispositions and conducts are 
part of sustainability targets of all states and, for him, this requires virtue. He considers that 
states need to promote virtue for ecological citizenship to be articulated. But he argues that 




1.3. Regulation and compulsory duties 
 
Through regulatory mechanisms, states seek citizens’ pro-environmental 
behavioural change as a path to sustainability. While fiscal incentives steer citizens’ 
behavioural change indirectly, compulsory duties enforce action directly under threat of 
punishment. These are command-and-control instruments, that is, legally enforceable 
duties compelling citizens to act in certain ways that restrict individual freedom. Some of 
these can be prohibitions, such as limits to vehicle speed to reduce emissions or congestion 
charges to control the number of cars in city centres; others are duties to be observed, like 
the duty to pay eco-taxes, for instance taxes on petrol, or to sort household waste for 
recycling, as imposed in some municipalities. The nature of these duties is different from 
that of those based on voluntary action, discussed earlier on: voluntary duties are not 
ordered through legislation, nor are they enforceable by state officials, and acknowledge 
freedom to act – although in choosing which information to provide, states may be 
directing citizens in a particular direction, while ruling out others, as indicated below.   
Although John Barry has written on ecological citizenship from many angles, and 
especially in relation to democracy and political debate (1999, 1996), in his most recent 
work on the topic he offers an account of ecological citizenship as activity that can be not 
only encouraged but even mandated by the state (2006)4. Given that we are still far from 
following a sustainable path, despite four decades of ecologism, Barry argues that some 
imposition of ecological behaviour onto citizens is needed, and for him, the only institution 
with the legitimacy and capacity to do so is the state. This view resonates with arguments 
                                                 
4 Although I use Compulsory Sustainability Service in relation to states and to illustrate a hard regulatory 
approach to the promotion of ecological citizenship, Barry associates this measure with a green state strongly 
committed to environmental protection (1999: 232-233). I have chosen to include this initiative here because 
my discussion of the green state revolves around deliberative and ecological democracy for the reasons 
explained in the previous chapter. In any case, the fact that compulsory sustainability service may be related 
to both a state and a green state suggests that in some contexts, especially when it comes to policy tools, to 
draw a line between the state and the green state may be hard to do. 
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in favour of state-based green politics discussed in Chapter 2. Barry explores the idea of a 
strong, virtue and common good-orientated republican state that would encourage 
ecological citizenship through Compulsory Sustainability Service. All citizens would be 
required to devote some of their time to environmental activities, like cleaning up rivers or 
working in community-run recycling schemes. The state would be actively engaged in the 
work towards the sustainability common good by directly stimulating ecological 
citizenship, thus compelling citizens to participate in various forms of ecological 
citizenship activity. Fiscal incentives could be used as a complement, to make compulsory 
ecological citizenship and sustainability service less authoritarian. Thus, the state could 
establish that undergraduate student fees be reduced as a result of the hours spent doing 
sustainability service, or even determine decreases in income taxes (2006: 28-32).  
Another example of a compulsory duty with ecological citizenship elements can be 
found in the work of Jagers (2009)5. If ecological citizenship is about reducing one’s 
ecological footprint in order to do justice, so that others can live well, it is reasonable to 
assume that there must be a compensatory part, that those suffering injustice should be 
compensated for the harm caused to them. Jagers argues that the state could organise this 
compensation by collecting taxes that all citizens would have to pay. Revenues would then 
be used (through state agencies or United Nations organisations) to solve environmental 
problems and help the impoverished societies of the world. In this way, states would be 
encouraging ecological citizenship by making citizens more aware of their over-sized 
footprints and assume responsibility for the environmental harm and the injustice done.  
What the above arguments advanced by Jagers, Barry and Connelly suggest is that 
the promotion of ecological citizenship may require some degree of external motivation in 
the form of financial incentives and compulsory duties, such as eco-taxes and sustainability 
                                                 
5
His research shows that some people’s predisposition to act as ecological citizens is expressed through their 
willingness to pay eco-taxes for the benefit of the environment and for global poverty reduction designed to 
compensate those suffering the consequences of one’s environmental impact (Jagers, 2009). 
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service. Connelly, for instance, concludes that fiscal incentives and legislation can be used 
by states to achieve “the minimum necessary level of environmental compliance while, at 
the same time, making a contribution to the nurturing of citizen virtue” (Connelly, 2006: 
68). His position, introduced earlier, is that the different messages of approval and 
disapproval that the state and society can pass onto citizens through fiscal incentives, 
legislation and taxation can be useful in communicating certain messages to citizens.   This 
indirectly promotes particular ways of thinking and acting that, through repetition, can 
become habits, be internalised by citizens and thus be turned into virtue, as for him 
“without rules there can be no virtues” (2006: 66). In his view, if some people do not act as 
ecological citizens yet, this is not necessarily due to the fact that they are opposed to pro-
environmental action; it may just be the case that their internal motivation to act is too 
weak to lead to action, and thus they need “external forms of incentives for good action 
and punishment for bad action” (2006: 68). Connelly considers that “a framework of 
supporting legislation” (2006: 66) is needed to remind citizens that they have to be virtuous 
and to guide the actions of those citizens who are already virtuous. And those who lack 
motivation, he argues, at least will be forced to act as ecological citizens by law. So, 
according to this position, there will always be a strong role for the state to be played in the 





States could undertake the implementation of ecological citizenship using a 
framework of rights. In Chapter 1 I showed that ecological citizenship can be defined as 
the entitlement to environmental rights and I explained what this implies for the concept 
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(Jelin, 2000; Twine, 1994; van Steenbergen, 1994; Bell, 2005; Hailwood, 2005; Dobson, 
2003a)6. It is now time to think about the promotion of ecological citizenship rights. This 
could be done through both substantive and procedural rights, regulated and enshrined in 
constitutions. When dealing with ecological citizens’ substantive rights most scholars refer 
to the fundamental or human right to enjoy a liveable, healthy, clean or adequate 
environment, and to more specific rights, like the right to clean water. It is not clear how 
states could undertake the promotion of these types of rights and guarantee a clean 
environment to their citizens. For instance, Hayward notes that this could include the 
proclamation of “a right to be free from environmental harm”, to be implemented by the 
state “through the proscription of certain activities which others might otherwise engage 
in” (Hayward, 2002: 244, 250). The state would thus have the correlative duty not to 
“deprive citizens, or allow them to be deprived, of an undegraded environment” (Saward, 
1998, quoted in Hayward, 2002: 250)7.   
In relation to Dobson’s (2003a) concept of ecological citizenship discussed in 
Chapter 1, we could think of rights to have enough ecological space, or rights to a fair 
share of resources, and the state’s duty would be to make sure that citizens are not deprived 
of their due ecological space. We could also interpret ecological citizenship rights as rights 
to choose to act and live sustainably, and thus the role of the state would be to create the 
conditions needed to render ecological citizenship activity possible, whether facilitating 
citizens’ material well-being as a prerequisite for enjoying their rights or implementing the 
adequate mechanisms to encourage citizens’ political participation. 
  For the promotion of ecological citizenship through rights, a strong connection 
between substantive and procedural rights has to be made, as procedural rights are used to 
protect existing substantive rights and to pursue the establishment of new rights, by, for 
                                                 
6Legal scholars have also shown interest in the question of rights of ecological citizenship, although this 
approach is not pursued in this thesis. See Hilson (2001) for an overview and relevant literature.  
7 See also Hayward (2004, 2001, 2000). 
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instance, participating in policy-making8. Procedural rights such as rights of information, 
participation in decision-making, rights of legal redress, and rights to take legal action to 
defend existing rights are already part of some legal and constitutional systems. Green 
writers on citizenship argue that they could be strengthened and improved as paths to 
ecological citizenship (Hayward, 1999, 2000; Eckersley, 1996; Bell, 2005; Jelin, 2000). 
Procedural rights could help ecological citizens to fulfil their duties to promote 
sustainability and justice, either by seeking the adoption of legislation and policy that is 
fair and sustainable or opposing existing unjust and unsustainable policy and practices. If 
substantive environmental rights are included in constitutions, the possibility arises for 
ecological citizens to use procedural rights to claim against the state and other fellow 
citizens to abstain from the causation of any environmental harm (Jelin, 2000: 59).   
Initiatives to promote ecological citizenship through rights should be related to 
issues of democratisation. Interest in green theories of citizenship has emerged together 
with attempts to reform liberal representative institutions, so as to build more participatory 
democracies (Christoff, 1996; Barry, 1999). States seek to encourage active forms of 
citizenship and democracy as part of the objectives of sustainable development, and that is 
why there has been an interest in expanding citizens’ rights of information and 
participation. This trend is related to the green democratic argument or the “ideal of 
sustainability through democratization” (Bell, 2004: 95), based on the assumption that the 
more democratic a society is, the more likely it is to have higher levels of environmental 
                                                 
8 A challenge for the promotion of ecological citizenship through the establishment of substantive rights is 
the difficulty of reaching consensus on the meaning of the goods and values for which protection is being 
sought. For instance, what do we mean by “the environment”? Are there many environments or just one 
environment? How do we define “sustainable development”, “adequate environment”, “liveable 
environment” or “decent environment”? What does it mean to have a right to an environment? Is it the same  
as having a right to a specific environmental good, such as clean air or water? Do we want to protect nature 
for its own sake (for either biocentric, religious, cultural or aesthetic reasons and value), or do we want to 
protect it in so far as humans need an environment as a pre-condition for everything, or for human health and 
well-being related reasons?  Are states the only institutions responsible for the defence of such rights? This is 
not the time or the place to illustrate these complex debates, yet these questions suggest that an effective way 
to protect rights as elusive as environmental substantive rights is to strengthen rights of participation through 
which the meaning of substantive rights may be articulated. 
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protection. Participatory policy-making is said to result in increased environmental 
awareness – and hence its potential to promote ecological citizenship - and more 
sustainable decisions. Yet there are no guarantees that more democracy and participation 
increase the quality of environmental governance.  
Despite the green case for democracy and the international consensus on the 
connection between environmental protection and citizen participation, states only timidly 
endorse democratic tools to achieve sustainability goals. Efforts in this direction have been 
more significant at the local level, where the Agenda 21 process has resulted in a myriad of 
democratic and participatory experiments (Carter, 2001).  
A celebrated example is the 1998 Aarhus Convention9. The Convention - regarded the 
most important legal mechanism for the protection of environmental rights - is an example 
of how ecological citizenship may be instantiated through a framework of rights, and illustrates 
the case for the connection between the promotion of ecological citizenship and 
democratisation. The Aarhus approach to sustainability contains a democratic component. It 
takes as a point of departure the Stockholm Declaration –which proclaims the human right 
to a quality environment - and the Rio Declaration – which establishes the need for 
citizens’ participation in environmental matters - mutually reinforcing both principles 
(Stec, et. al., 2000: 1-4). Aarhus procedural rights are seen as instruments for the creation 
of sustainable societies and the protection of the substantive environmental right that 
present and future generations of human beings have (Article 1). These procedural rights 
are organised around “three pillars”: access to information, public participation in decision-
making, and access to justice in environmental matters (Articles 4 to 9). The Convention 
has triggered an increase in citizens’ participation in environmental issues and has 
                                                 
9 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, adopted in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe framework on 25 
June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark.  
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influenced national environmental regimes (Hayward, 2002: 246)10. However, as Bell 
observes, the Convention simply introduces an element of participatory democracy into 
representative systems. The institutions of representative democracy are still given more 
power than individuals. Citizens have no rights to initiate the process and they are not 
given the capacity to make decisions. Public authorities manage and design the whole 
process; they are not compelled to accept citizens’ views, but just to take them into account 
in the way and to the extent they consider appropriate (Bell, 2004: 97-98). 
Before concluding the discussion about the institutionalisation of an ecological 
citizenship status as a means to achieve its promotion, something needs to be said about the 
subjects of rights. There is a debate whether ecological citizenship duties are owed to 
future generations and non-human nature (as well as fellow citizens). If we accept that they 
are, does this mean that in order to promote ecological citizenship through rights, states 
should grant rights to future generations and non-humans?11 The answer to this question 
depends on whether we consider future generations and non-humans as ecological citizens 
or as beneficiaries of ecological citizenship obligations, and this is a point which falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. Yet regardless of whether they are granted rights, future 
generations and non-human nature - who cannot express their view, vote or discuss in the 
public sphere - should have their interests taken into account and somehow represented. 
This requirement emanates from ecological citizens’ duties towards other species and 
future generations. On the other hand, ecological citizenship is a non-territorial (Dobson, 
2003a) or global type of citizenship (Falk, 1994; van Steenbergen, 1994; Steward, 1991). 
So states should grant transnational citizenship rights allowing both national citizens and 
                                                 
10 For more detailed accounts of the Convention, see: Brady (1998a, 1998b); Petkova and Veit (2000); 
Tuesen and Simonsen (2000). For analysis of the transposition and implementation of the Aarhus Convention 
and case studies in various party states, see: Justice and the Environment (2006a, 2006b).  
11The issue is clearer in relation to future generations. If we think of international treaties such as the 
Stockholm Declaration and the Aarhus Convention just mentioned, the subjects of rights are both present as 
well as future generations. 
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citizens of other states to participate in democratic processes. This would require a cross-
border political process. Aarhus can be taken as a point of departure for the 
institutionalisation of transnational rights of citizenship. The Convention states that people 
should not be excluded from participation due to their citizenship, nationality or domicile 
(Article 3.9). This principle is related to the idea that all those affected by environmental 
problems have the right to participate in decision-making and problem-solving, regardless 
of their origins or place of residence. But, unfortunately, the Convention does not refer to 
how this mode of participation, on the grounds of having an environmental interest, is to be 
articulated. Organisation of participation will unquestionably be a difficult issue for the 
nation-state to deal with, but if states are to encourage ecological citizenship through 
rights, these are inescapable questions they have to tackle.  
Possible answers will lead us to examine whether the existing institutional 
framework is appropriate for the establishment of such global citizenship, or whether a 
new framework is needed. According to Jelin, this effort demands that our conventional 
understanding of rights be dissociated from the liberal tradition which shaped it, as well as 
from the nation state, so as to “frame the rights issue in a wider vision of global systems of 
socio-political relations” (2000: 52). As she observes, first generation human rights – civil 
and political - established individual freedoms in the face of the state, while second 
generation rights – economic, social and cultural - required state intervention aimed at their 
possibility and guarantee. However, third and fourth generation rights are global rights – 
peace, development, environment- and collective rights of peoples; therefore, they force us 
to move toward spaces beyond the nation state for their protection (Jelin, 2000: 53). So the 
promotion of ecological citizenship through rights would perhaps require states to become 
transnational states. I will return to these questions in section 3, as they re-emerge when 
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1.5. School education  
 
The acknowledgment that citizens are not born but produced, as well as the 
introduction of citizenship education in schools in European countries like Britain and 
Spain, suggests that formal education can be another tool available for the state to promote 
ecological citizenship. Other than using citizenship education modules, ecological 
citizenship may be introduced in schools through environmental education programmes. 
Green scholars of citizenship have discussed these possibilities (Goodwin, et. al., 2010; 
Carlsson and Bruun Jensen, 2006; Gough and Scott, 2006; Barry, 2006; Hailwood, 2005; 
Dobson, 2003a). In this debate, it is important to ask what type of education we are 
considering: education for sustainability, civic and citizenship education, or practical forms 
of ecological citizenship. Should ecological citizenship education include the normative 
underpinnings of sustainability and values? If so, can schools in liberal democracies teach 
such education?  
Although education and “abstract knowledge” have contributed to increased 
environmental awareness, there is evidence to suggest that education alone is not likely to 
trigger significant changes in behaviours and attitudes both among young people and adults 
(Goodwin, et. al., 2010; Hawthorne and Alabaster, 1998), let alone nurture the values and 
motivation of a justice-based notion of citizenship like ecological citizenship. As 
Hawthorne and Alabaster put it, this type of education may encourage people to “think 
globally” but not to “act locally” (1998: 40). Other factors interacting with education 
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should be taken into account, and different types of knowledge and forms of learning 
should be introduced. How could states do better? 
Simon Hailwood believes that an educational curriculum could be designed to 
encourage what he defines as “environmentally reasonable citizenship” (2005: 199). This 
incorporates a view of nature in which it is respected for its own sake and independent 
from humans, and a sense of responsibility for the individual and collective impact of 
ecological footprints upon others and upon nature. He claims that education should not 
deal only with wilderness and nature conservation in order to show students how to love 
nature and care for it for its own sake. In most cases, he continues, “the consequences for 
nature of international patterns of inequalities in wealth, power and development, are a 
more appropriate practical focus than wilderness preservation” (2005: 207). Likewise, 
Dobson thinks that states could promote ecological citizenship through formal education. 
This education program would include, according to him, the teaching of rights, of 
international, intergenerational and interspecies obligations and issues of justice (Dobson, 
2003a: 182-183). Yet he contends that encouraging students to actively participate in 
campaigns against injustice and replacing the textbook by environmental campaign should 
be a fundamental part of these ecological citizenship education modules (Dobson, 2003a: 
207).  
However, as Barry argues, states are not showing any signs of being willing to 
include activist accounts of citizenship within school modules. As he asks,  
 
Will non-violent direct action tactics, the ethical and political dimensions of 
civil disobedience, and other dimensions and potentials for citizen activism 
be taught in (environmental) citizenship classes? Will the educative capacity 
of political struggle itself be conveyed? Will students of such citizenship 
89 
 
classes be exposed to ethical arguments highlighting such forms of citizen 
action as positive for democracy? (2006: 34).    
 
Using education as a policy tool to promote civic virtue is a contested topic. It is 
almost an obligation in the civic republican tradition, where the state educates its citizens 
by encouraging civic duty and virtue, as part of its main role of promoting the common 
good. For civic republicans, if the state does not seek to educate citizens, it is not showing 
them due respect but indifference. This perspective contrasts with the liberal view that the 
way by which the state shows respect for its citizens is non-intervention. However, as 
Matti argues, some civic republicans would claim, following Hannah Arendt, that political 
education is a force-free form of coercion, while most liberal theorists would agree today 
that some sort of civic education is needed, because liberal citizens also need to acquire 
some virtues, like respect for liberal procedures and principles, and tolerance. But while for 
liberals education aims at creating free and autonomous citizens who will be able to make 
the right choices according to their freedom and autonomy and their particular conception 
of the good, for republicans it would have the objective of showing that some lifestyles, 
values and choices are morally better than others (Matti 2006: 91-92).  
 
 
2. States, citizens and the environment: greening individual behaviour or 
promoting ecological citizenship?  
 
After having examined several policy tools available to states, the potential for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship encapsulated within each of the initiatives discussed 
will be assessed. My purpose is threefold: first, to investigate the way in which states 
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define ecological citizenship and address citizens when using different policy instruments 
as catalysts for the ecological enlightenment of the citizenry; second, to discuss what the 
role of states is under each approach, and what is the nature of state-individual relations; 
and third, to elucidate how socio-natural relations are conceived. This investigation helps 
identify new functions and roles that states could assume to facilitate ecological citizenship 
in more effective ways. 
 
 
2.1. Citizens and the environment 
 
In Chapter 1 we saw that ecological citizenship is a virtue-based account of 
citizenship, aimed at the materialisation of the common good of society - understood as 
environmental sustainability and justice - through the assumption of non-reciprocal, 
asymmetrical and non-territorial duties. Using the tools available to them, can states 
encourage a conception of citizenship with these elements?  
When education and the provision of information are chosen as policy instruments 
to deliver green forms of citizenship, the assumption is being made that citizens are not 
always self-interested individuals, that they are able to do the right thing even if there is 
not an economic or legal sanction punishing their actions, and that citizens sometimes act 
following motivations related to the common good, for the well-being of others and the 
environment. “Non-enforceable political duties” of this sort can trigger citizens’ 
assumption of responsibility for the consequences of their actions (Bell, 2005: 35-36), 
encourage virtue, a sense of civic duty and internal, common good-related motivation for 
action (Connelly, 2006: 67), thus having the potential to promote ecological citizenship. 
However, when states use economic penalties and rewards as well as regulatory 
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mechanisms they are giving citizens external incentives, motivations and sanctions. In this 
case, a conception of the human being as a “self-interested rational actor” is favoured 
(Dobson and Bell, 2006: 1). Citizens are asked to act as consumers and to react to signals 
(Dobson, 2003a: 4), to consider how much they are willing to pay for sustainability. They 
are encouraged to value the environment and ecological problems in economistic terms. 
Thus, the whole question is reduced to each individual’s cost-benefit analysis (Barry, 1999: 
226-230). When the environment issue is dealt with by asking citizens how much they are 
willing to pay for sustainability class divides are accentuated. Those with higher incomes 
can value, in economistic and instrumental terms, if they want to be ecological citizens, 
while those with fewer resources have less economic freedom to chose to express their 
values through the market. Market-based instruments do not allow for the systematic 
account of the collective interests of the society as sources for human motivation. They 
lack the common good, public spirited element that should characterise ecological 
citizenship (Dobson, 2003a: 1-3; Dobson and Valencia Sáiz, 2005: 157-158; Dobson and 
Bell, 2006: 1-5).   
However, as stated earlier, Connelly and Barry argue that the promotion of 
ecological citizenship requires some sort of external motivation, since they regard it as 
unlikely that citizens will voluntarily undertake the personal and collective changes 
required. So they include sticks-and-carrots as well as command-and-control mechanisms 
in the list of policy tools for the promotion of ecological citizenship. When monetary 
incentives and regulation are favoured by states, it is assumed that citizens act and react to 
signals in order to obtain gains or avoid harm. But there is empirical evidence that when 
engaging in pro-environmental action some people are responding to other motivations 
more closely related to the justice, common-good ideals inspiring ecological citizenship 
(Wolf et. al., 2009; Jagers, 2009; Berglund and Matti, 2006; Matti, 2006). As “crowding-
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out” theorists argue, external intervention through mechanisms such as fiscal incentives 
and regulation may not only be ineffective but, in some cases, can even be counter-
productive, since it crowds-out other internal motivations, particularly, the altruistic, 
citizenship, common-good related type of motivations, and thus reduces citizens’ sense of 
civic duty and virtuous citizenship activity (Berglund and Matti, 2006; Matti, 2006), 
undermining the promotion of ecological citizenship.  
One of the arguments inspiring this thesis is that citizens’ motivation to act, and the 
justifications of pro-environmental behaviours, attitudes and action matter a great deal, 
because ecological citizenship is not about citizens being told what to do, obeying laws or 
responding to other coercive instruments. There might be policy tools and objectives 
seeking to move sustainability and issues of social and environmental justice forward, in 
line with the duties and aims of ecological citizenship. But the means through which those 
ends are arrived at are important, not only because citizens’ commitment to ecological 
citizenship and participation are essential for the very concept of ecological citizenship, but 
also because no institution or authority, not even the state, possesses the right answers as to 
how to deliver sustainability, do justice and, ultimately, determine what ecological 
citizenship should be about.  
As well as being a virtue-based account of citizenship that acknowledges the 
importance of working towards the common good of the society, ecological citizenship is 
also grounded in the assumption of responsibility for one’s acts, and therefore stresses 
duties over rights. These duties have an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal nature, and 
originate in relationships of injustice. Can we see any of these features in state-based 
accounts of ecological citizenship? Attempts to promote ecological citizenship through 
rights would resonate more with a conception of ecological citizenship as an extension of 
the liberal understanding of citizenship so as to include an environmental dimension. As a 
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result, they would lead to the implementation of environmental, rather than ecological, 
citizenship in the terms described in Chapter 1, following Dobson (2003a: 88-90)12. 
Although some of the duty-based policies to promote ecological citizenship that were 
discussed encapsulate a common-good, virtue, civic-duty type of citizen obligation, they 
lack the justice-related element that emerges when there is a reference to common but 
differentiated responsibilities, issues of distribution of public environmental goods and fair 
share of resources. In so far as it is assumed that duties are equally owed by all to all, this 
state-backed form of green citizenship lacks the language of asymmetrical, non-reciprocal, 
non-territorial responsibility.  
One exception to this general trend is highlighted by Matti in his analysis of 
Swedish local policy, where policy documents refer to social justice issues when there is 
an awareness that what is done at the local level has global consequences and that it is the 
Swedish people’s responsibility to make sure that there is a fair distribution of resources 
within each country and between countries. Local policy rhetoric also points at future 
generations and citizens of other societies as included in the sphere of justice13. Since 
social justice motivations are advanced, the idea of asymmetrical obligations is echoed, 
although Matti argues that this is never explicitly mentioned in the documents studied14. 
According to Matti, this can be a “hint” towards the kind of asymmetrical, non-reciprocal, 
non-territorial and justice-based responsibility, although most duties are owed by all to all 
                                                 
12 Rights of participation can also be interpreted outside the liberal framework as citizens’ duties to take part 
in public life and in the definition of the common good, as in the republican ideal. So participation can be 
both understood as a right and as a duty (Matti, 2006: 140).  
13 Matti never mentions any findings regarding the existence of responsibility towards non-human nature. 
14
 In fact Matti, acknowledges that this preoccupation could also be read in terms of the good Samaritan, and 
thus related to charity, and not necessarily in terms of the good citizen and thus related to obligations of 
justice (2006: 167). 
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and are based on a sense of civic duty and responsibility for the common good more than 
on issues of justice (2006: 134-136)15.  
 
 
2.2. States’ roles and state-individual relations  
 
The first part of the chapter looked at the variety of instruments through which  
states may encourage ecological forms of citizenship. States adopt different roles when 
choosing one tool or another. When favouring non-enforceable policy tools such as 
consumer education campaigns or eco-labelling schemes, the role of the state is to provide 
citizens with information about environmental issues and the different ways to engage in 
personal, voluntary, pro-environmental action. In the case of rights, the state’s role is to 
create the conditions for citizens to be able to choose to promote the environment and to 
participate in decision-making processes concerning ecological issues. Rights are then 
another form of voluntary action. Under the fiscal incentive approach, states place sticks-
and-carrots where appropriate and facilitate action through external motivation (i.e. the 
incentive). In other situations, the state chooses command-and-control instruments to 
enforce the fulfilment of duties, such as the obligation to pay eco-taxes or to do a 
compulsory sustainability service. As Connelly argues, when certain behaviours are 
prohibited or enforced through legislation, states are compelling citizens to action through 
the threat of punishment (2006: 67). In a compulsory duty approach to ecological 
citizenship states constantly have to make sure that citizens obey the law, while under the 
sticks-and-carrots approach as well as in the case of education and the provision of 
information they have a more passive role, as these are non-coercive measures – or “soft 
                                                 
15 Matti argues that issues of justice, ecological footprints and ecological citizenship are not the main idea 
inspiring local environmental policy. Other motivations include making the municipality attractive for 
tourists and new businesses or the need to make industry stronger.  
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regulations” (Shahzeen, et. al., 2009) - that do not require any further governmental 
control: the incentive (i.e. economic or informational) is what animates individual action. 
So in the case of compulsory duties, citizens have a more passive role (i.e. obey the law) 
than with fiscal incentives, where they have to make a cost-benefit analysis, and that in the 
case of the provision of information and education, where they have to decide what to do, 
how to act upon the information that has been given to them. Yet making an economic 
valuation and deciding whether to follow abstract environmental information are passive 
forms of individual action when compared with the type of civic engagement that 
ecological citizenship involves. 
The above state functions and forms of state-individual relations can be discussed 
in relation to two main roles for the state: facilitator and educator. The state acts as a 
facilitator when it creates the conditions for citizens to be able to make voluntary choices 
according to their own perceptions of the good life, with the state being neutral as regards 
any conception of the good. Minimal state intervention is justified from a liberal 
perspective: the role of the state is to facilitate and preserve the conditions for autonomy 
and freedom understood as freedom to choose any option and conception of the good. Seen 
in this light, the state is passive in that it refrains from steering citizens in a particular 
direction. When states attempt to promote ecological citizenship through the provision of 
information, fiscal incentives and rights of participation, they are acting as facilitators. 
Citizens are provided with guidelines, knowledge and support so that they can make their 
own informed choices and actions. For Matti, this means that states think that the transition 
to sustainability has to be voluntarily chosen by each citizen, and their duty is just to create 
the conditions without enforcing any behaviours or directing citizens in a given direction 
(Matti, 2006: 114). 
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The state can also act as an educator. Drawing on the classical civic republican 
tradition, it is assumed that the state has the duty to direct its citizens towards the good 
life16. The state embodies certain values; it has a particular conception of the good society 
and gets involved in its materialisation, encouraging an active citizenship and enlightening 
its citizens in the sustainability common good (Matti, 2006: 115-117).   When education 
and legislation are chosen as tools to encourage citizens’ pro-environmental action it is 
assumed that the state knows what has to be done, that it possesses the right knowledge, 
and that it is just a matter of passing this knowledge and information onto citizens so that 
they can start acting in an environmentally conscious manner. It also presupposes that 
citizens do not have a say and that they cannot contribute to the generation of knowledge, 
but learn and internalise the government’s policies in a non-critical and non-reflexive way. 
This implies that the role for the state is to form, educate, enlighten (but we could also read 
indoctrinate, uniform, homogenise) citizens in a particular way, rather than encouraging 
discussion about issues such as the environment, which are complex and surrounded by 
uncertainty. Several authors have argued that these are the assumptions about the role of 
the state and the nature of state-citizen relations underlying Agenda 21, Swedish 
environmental policy (Matti, 2006) and Environment Canada’s Green Plan (Darier, 1996; 
Bell, 2005). Although more in line with the civic republican tradition, this second role of 
the state is also assumed by liberal states. In liberal democracies, the role of the state 
arguably goes beyond simply offering possibilities. Policy seeks to direct citizens in a 
particular way, as the great focus on education that liberal states place on their 
environmental policy documents shows. 
Despite this distinction between the two different roles, states often act both as 
facilitators and educators. This would be the case of what I have described as ecological 
                                                 
16 Some trends within liberalism as well as contemporary republicanism may find these accounts of the 
liberal and republican views of the state oversimplified. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer 
an exhaustive analysis of these rich debates. 
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citizenship through voluntary duties, where it can be accepted that the state is acting as a 
neutral state that provides citizens with relatively objective information needed to make 
their own responsible choices. But a further reading indicates that, in choosing what 
information to give, what actions and values to encourage (i.e recycling, riding a bicycle), 
states are steering citizens in a particular direction, towards the state’s own conception of 
the common good and environmental sustainability. So the state plays an ambiguous role 
in the promotion of ecological citizenship. This evokes the ambivalent perception of the 
state in green political theory and politics as being an obstacle as well as a facilitator in the 
transition towards the sustainable society, as was illustrated in the previous chapter.  
Several authors have noted that neoliberal politics, especially environmental policy, 
approach the citizen as a consumer. Evidence has been found in analysis of Swedish 
environmental policy, the UK and the United States (Berglund and Matti, 2006; Seyfang, 
2009, 2005; Barry, 1999; Slocum, 2004). Portraying individuals as consumers may be the 
direct result of Agenda 21; as noted earlier, this document concludes that one of the 
solutions to environmental problems and key to creating sustainable societies is to change 
individual consumption patterns, so as to minimise the impact that consumption has on the 
environment (Matti, 2006: 116). But sustainable consumption in mainstream policy 
approaches is not treated as citizenly or political, but as a matter of private consumer 
preferences (Seyfang, 2006a: 393). Slocum argues that the citizen-consumer is constructed 
as a passive subject that accepts neoliberal arguments transmitted through state policy. 
This results in the “normalisation” of the citizen-consumer. For instance, environmental 
policy encourages recycling and thus normalises “the integration of personal 
environmental responsibility and cost effectiveness” (Slocum, 2004: 763-765), which 
assists the pursuit of the state’s own interest in environmental protection. But citizens are 
not encouraged to think about reducing waste or avoiding packed food, nor are they told 
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where the sorted garbage they bring to the recycling containers is sent to. They are just 
urged to interiorise some practices and routines in a non-reflective way. The role of 
citizens is reduced to changing behaviours. These forms of environmental citizenship may 
result in citizens voluntarily taking responsibility and assuming individual duties 
coincident with policy goals, and in “an uncritical citizenry who simply follow government 
plans without asking whether they are effective and just” (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 9-
11). In this scenario, the citizen is a passive actor, one that does not participate in the 
definition of sustainability, but reacts to stimuli stemming from external factors, such as 
formal education or informational public campaigns, and other policy instruments, like 
legislation and fiscal incentives (Matti, 2006: 152). This is a top-down approach to the 
production of environmental knowledge, based on a pre-political definition of 
environmental sustainability, in the sense that it has been determined through scientific 
facts and not arrived at in the course of public, political, citizen debate. 
  At this point, we may recall the Foucauldian analysis of state-individual relations, 
introduced in Chapter 1. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of “biopower”, Whitehead et. al. 
argue that “[i]n order to achieve total social-territorial command, the state, at least as a 
centralised bureaucratic locus of power, must disperse so that it can become a behavioural 
principle of the individual” (2007: 49). So other than through the most obvious coercive 
means, states exert power in more diffuse and subtle forms, through wider mechanisms of 
social control. The Foucauldian concept of governmentality, and its green interpretation as 
environmental governmentality or environmentality (Darier 1999; Luke 1999; Bäckstrand 
and Lövbrand, 2006), has proved useful when analysing theories of ecological citizenship, 
and, particularly, when dealing with state-backed initiatives to create ecological citizens 
(Darier, 1996; MacGregor and Szerzynski, 2004). Darier defines Environment Canada’s 
Green Plan as a form of environmental governmentality seeking the control of 
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individuals17. Bio-power emerges in relation to ecological citizenship as the state’s attempt 
to discipline and homogenise individual citizens (encouraging them to be good ecological 
citizens, to do their bit for the environment) in order to achieve its own environmental 
targets. The techniques used by the Canadian government to mobilise its citizens are 
education –based on knowledge generated by environmental science and technology - and 
drills (Darier, 1996). The training and disciplining of the population into environmental 
subjects or environmental citizens would constitute an example of what Foucault referred 
to as a normalisation process. State-backed accounts of ecological citizenship, such as 
Canada’s, result in citizens’ non-critical internalization of environmental policy, without 
thinking whether it is adequate to achieve sustainability goals and what motivates it. From 
a Foucauldian perspective, ecological citizenship is being promoted by states as a 
“disciplinary tool” (MacGregor and Szerzsynski, 2004: 20). 
Similar patterns in state-individual relations have been found when looking at 
rights-based approaches to ecological citizenship. Democratic and participatory tools may 
lead to more pluralistic policy processes but they do not necessarily facilitate the 
promotion of ecological citizenship or result in environmental outcomes. Powerful and 
resourceful interest groups – like industry - often dominate these processes. Dissenting 
views tend to be co-opted. As MacGregor and Szerszynski warn, citizens’ participation in 
policy-making can become “a form of social control”, with citizens being asked to value 
evidence prepared according to the conditions pre-established by public authorities. For the 
authors, this would be an example of a “managed/coercive form of citizenship” that 
maintains the “power relationship between the rulers and the ruled” (MacGregor, and 
Szerszynski, 2003: 19). Objections like these have been raised to the Aarhus Convention 
                                                 
17
Environmental governmentality is “the use of social-engineering techniques to get the attention of the 
population to focus on specific environmental issues and to instill – in a non-openly coercive manner – new 
environmental conducts” (Darier, 1996: 594-601). It is a “process through which citizens come to internalise 
the government’s environmental agenda (i.e. changing their ‘attitudes’) so that they police themselves with 
minimal intervention by the state” (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 9). 
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for being an asymmetrical type of communication intended just to meet the requirements 
about citizen participation set in the Convention itself (Drevensek, 2005: 75). This type of 
participation encourages citizens’ private and individual acts of decision, to be later added 
to those of fellow citizens without further deliberation. As MacGregor and Szerszynski 
note, “citizenly opinions are not the same as private concerns; they are arrived at in 
ongoing interaction in public amongst one’s peers” (2003: 20). Environmental citizenship 
should be grounded in genuine participation, and not in “simulation of participatory 
governance” (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 11); that happens when the outcomes of 
citizens’ deliberations do not influence policy or when participatory mechanisms are 
reduced to providing information to the citizenry without exchange of ideas or further 
debate. This approach holds ecological citizenship back.  
 
 
2.3. The environment, sustainability and socio-natural relations 
 
State-centred notions of ecological citizenship draw on a strictly environmental, 
economistic, individual and private account of environmental issues and socio-natural 
relations. The stress is placed solely on environmental issues, while ignoring the socio-
economic, cultural and political dimensions of sustainability. This view is based on a 
narrow conception of sustainable development that is restricted to environmental 
protection, neglecting other dimensions, like human rights, democracy and equality. The 
environmental debate and the solution to ecological problems seem to be reduced to 
changing the market in order to get environmental outcomes, and hence achieve ecological 
modernisation. As Barry notes, when relying on such weak definitions of sustainable 
development and environmental change, the result is a “narrow conception of 
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environmental citizenship” that limits the transformative promise of citizenship (Barry, 
2006: 21-24, 39). 
Some of the state-centred initiatives to articulate ecological citizenship discussed 
here are grounded in the individualistic notion of citizenship characteristic of political and 
economic liberalism. When related to the environment, such an account of citizenship 
leads to the presupposition that sustainability can be achieved by changes in lifestyles and 
through the aggregation of individual acts of consumption (Seyfang, 2005). As illustrated 
in Seyfang and Matti’s studies, sustainable consumer policy assumes the consumer 
sovereignty doctrine, which is based on the idea that demand or consumption can influence 
the supply or production side of the economy. But, following Sempere (2009), it can be 
argued that this assumption is a myth, since supply is determined by production, 
particularly by big capitalist producers, and consumers’ choices do not have a significant 
impact in the market. While sustainable consumption is just related to changing 
consumptions patterns in favour of greener shopping, and not to reducing consumption, it 
reinforces the green and clean industry, and a conception of the environment and 
sustainability based on ecological efficiency and the cleaning-up of production processes, 
which preserve the capitalist form of socioeconomic relations. In this context, ecological 
citizenship becomes a form of green consumerism. 
Seyfang notes that “top-down ‘ecological modernisation’ strategies” (Seyfang, 
2009: 30) are part of what has become the dominant conception of sustainable 
consumption. In this picture, sustainable consumption means “the consumption of more 
sustainably-produced goods through increased efficiency in production, economic 
instruments to discourage the most polluting technologies and techniques, and provision of 
consumer choice for greener products in the market” (Seyfang, 2009: 30). To achieve such 
a challenge, states intervene to set regulations on the market and educate consumers 
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through public campaigns. The ecological consumer “is a key actor in this model, for 
interpreting environmental information in markets, and sending ‘green’ signals back to 
producers” (Seyfang, 2009: 30). Seyfang’s research shows that the British state has widely 
embraced this mainstream approach as its policy model of sustainable consumption.  
Matti’s analysis of the Swedish state-sponsored strategy of sustainable consumption 
policy as a vehicle for ecological citizenship stresses how this approach to sustainability 
and environmental change shows a belief in the market as being able to solve the problems 
of unsustainable consumption by itself while indicating at the same time that it is 
individuals who should assume the greatest responsibility so as to activate market 
mechanisms and give the market the right signals (2006: 137). There is for Matti an “image 
of the environmentally aware consumer, driving the market towards developing more 
(from an environmental perspective) desirable modes of production” (2006: 138). Both 
Matti and Seyfang note that in consumer policy documents there is no mention at all of 
reducing consumption as a route to sustainability and ecological citizenship. The objective 
is changing consumption patterns as a path to sustainability and to ecological citizenship. 
On the other hand, too singular a focus on individuals suggests that citizens’ 
lifestyles, especially those whose everyday activities have large environmental and social 
impacts, are the main cause of environmental problems. Citizens are therefore regarded as 
the main actors for social and environmental change; they are asked to do their bit for the 
environment, by abandoning certain commodities and bringing about changes in personal 
lifestyles to reduce their impact on the environment. The danger that over-consumption 
represents for nature is emphasised and self-discipline becomes a public virtue. Citizenship 
is here reduced to making sacrifices for the environment. As MacGregor argues, in such 
articulations of ecological citizenship, selfish and irresponsible citizens are understood to 
be at the root of environmental problems (2006a, 2006b). A false dichotomy between the 
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good ecological citizen and the bad citizen is constructed, and the attribute of citizenship is 
made dependent on consumption practices.  Latta has called this “ecological citizenship as 
self-restraint”, where sustainability is perceived as emerging through an “inner revolution” 
(2007: 380). Seyfang’s work shows that this is the case in the UK sustainable consumption 
strategy (2005: 144), while Bell argues that this applies to the account of environmental 
citizenship upheld by Environment Canada (2005: 36). 
State-sponsored ecological citizenship is built on a private and individual notion of 
environmental responsibility. Stress on individual responsibility and personal duty is  
dangerous at a time when neoliberal states have adopted a “new discourse of obligations” 
(Crouch, et. al., 2001: 7), and are withdrawing many of their competences, such as the 
provision of basic services, and downplaying social rights, encouraging citizens to be 
responsible for their own welfare (Skinner and Stråth, 2003). Private ecological 
responsibility can be seen as citizens fulfilling what should be state’s functions, “as 
manipulative and serving the interests of the elites” (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 9).   
As Iris Young argues, the stress on individual responsibility rather than on 
collective responsibility is misleading, as it draws attention to citizens instead of to 
“complex structural processes that [do] connect persons and institutions in very different 
social and geographic positions” (2003: 40). Citizens reproduce unsustainable and unjust 
relationships because they are part of a system with unjust and unsustainable structural 
features. Their choices are shaped by socioeconomic structures which sometimes prevent 
citizens from acting according to their preferences and values, therefore determining who 
can be an active ecological citizen and who cannot. Whether taking part in environmental 
policy-making or engaging in sustainable consumption practices, citizens encounter all 
sorts of barriers to participation: affordability and availability of sustainable goods and 
services, lack of information, knowledge and interest (Seyfang, 2005; MacGregor, 2006b; 
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Luque, 2005), as well as lack of time. Women may not have the time to get involved in 
ecological citizenship practices, due, for example, to gender inequality, an unbalanced 
distribution of socially necessary labour (Philips, 1993; Voet, 1998; MacGregor, 2006a, 
2006b). Citizenship may exclude some people who do not even have the wherewithal to 
live as citizens, because of material inequalities disguised under the formal equality of the 
citizenship status18.  As Plumwood argues, personal change should not be stressed without 
critically questioning all forms of oppression and domination that make it difficult for most 
people (1993: 17).  
 A strictly environmental, individualistic and private conception of ecological 
citizenship can be co-opted by governments and state agencies because it fits well within 
neoliberal attempts to withdraw the state from many dimensions of social provision. 
Precisely due to this lack of a threat to the state and to powerful interest groups in society, 
ecological citizenship is supported by political institutions. Yet this undermines its 
potential for questioning the status quo and bringing about social change (Seyfang, 2005: 
297-298; Barry, 2006: 24)19. 
                                                 
18 Agyeman and Evans (2006) argue that most attempts to promote ecological citizenship, especially those 
emphasizing democratic rights, are grounded on procedural justice and equality, not on material conditions of 
justice. The authors contend that granting citizens procedural rights “do[es] not necessarily imply any real 
changes in levels of social inclusion or social justice” (2006: 196). This view relates to the familiar left 
critique of liberal notions of citizenship: citizens may be equal before the law but they do not have equal 
“capacities (the material and cultural resources)” to choose between different options and types of action 
(Held, 1991: 21). In other words, there is a conflict between “formal” and “substantive” rights. As Hayward 
notes, rights to seek legal redress and to take part in environmental policy and decision-making are mainly 
exercised by mainstream environmental organizations and particular interest groups, due to the time, degree 
of expertise and costs that the different forms of participation involve (2000: 563). Bell argues that in so far 
as powerful stakeholders –like businesses or local governments- are competing in the decision-making 
processes, influential NGOs which represent citizens’ interests can help balance the inequalities of power 
among those competing groups. Nevertheless, in some cases, NGOs representation of citizens’ should be 
questioned, on the grounds that they may seek to influence individuals rather than representing their views. 
As Bell suggests - when discussing the Aarhus Convention - “procedural rights might help rich and poor to 
protect their right to live in an environment adequate to health and well-being but they may help the rich 
(who already live in a better environment) more than they help the poor” (2004: 102).  
19 Barry (2006) opposes this view with what he defines as “sustainability citizenship”, which has a broader 
focus, beyond the environmental and is based on a “wide” and “radical” view of sustainable development 
that includes also social and economic factors. He argues that sustainability citizenship includes the concept 
of environmental citizenship used by states but goes beyond it and encompasses much more. For Barry, states 
are encouraging environmental and not sustainability citizenship.  
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 It may be argued, therefore, that state-centred initiatives to promote ecological 
citizenship not only do not lead to ecological citizenship but are also ineffective routes to 
sustainability and to the creation of more sustainable and just social and socio-natural 
relations. However, as Seyfang contends in relation to mainstream sustainable 
consumption, these forms of state-backed green citizenship can be effective in encouraging 
citizens to think about the social and ecological consequences of their habits, and thus the 
first step towards more comprehensive ecological citizenship education and activism 
(2005: 302; 2009: 44). To resist the problems in mainstream approaches to ecological 
citizenship it is important to emphasise its public, political dimension. What seems to be 
required is a collective, public understanding of citizenship, of ecological problems and 
environmental and political responsibility, as well as a broader definition of sustainability 
and ecological citizenship as encompassing issues of justice. Ecological citizenship should 
not be appropriated or co-opted by states as “volunteer labour”, that is, as citizens 
providing public services, doing what governments should be doing and blindly following 
government’s rules. Being an ecological citizen is as much about debate and citizens’ 
participation in policy making and the definition of what type of society they want and 
which services should be provided by the state, as it is about citizens assuming voluntary 
responsibilities and taking individual action (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 11).  The idea 
of personal change must be linked to a further analysis of relations of power in order to 
provide a social context for ecological citizenship activity. The systemic structures are 
themselves causes of unsustainability and injustice, and represent an obstacle that can only 
be challenged through collective action (Seyfang, 2005: 295-297). It follows, then, that 
ecological citizenship cannot be just a matter of personal behaviour, but must also entail 
collective action aimed at producing social, political and economic conditions where 
citizens choose to act in a sustainable and just way (Dobson, 2003a: 103).  
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Information and awareness rising can be ineffective and futile unless they are 
complemented by public policies that create the material conditions for citizens to be able 
to act upon that information. There is a “values-action gap”: citizens may have the right 
values but cannot act according to them for various reasons. They can feel “a sense of 
futility in acting alone if there is no institutional infrastructure to enable fellow citizens to 
act in the same way”. As MacGregor and Pardoe argue, “[the] scale of environmental 
issues can make individual action seem futile or tokenistic. Individuals need to act with 
others, and citizens often need government to provide the necessary infrastructures”. For 
instance: if people have to drive to find a recycling bin they may not do it and some will 
even argue it is “counter-productive” but if recycling bins are placed everywhere, recycling 
will be seen as the normal thing to do, while not recycling may end up being considered 
antisocial (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 6-10). Similarly, when citizens are told to recycle 
while businesses increase the amount of packaging, they feel a sense of injustice. So it 
would be more legitimate for states to regulate businesses in the same direction as they try 
to steer citizens' behaviour; this would send more coherent messages to citizens.  From this 
point of view, it could be argued that the role of states should be to encourage ecological 
citizenship indirectly by creating infrastructure, rather than directly focusing on changing 
individual behaviour and prescribing particular pro-environmental actions - which seems to 
be the main purpose of state action in the examples and approaches discussed above.  
 Can states provide the infrastructures needed? What could be the role of states in 
promoting more just and socially oriented forms of ecological citizenship? To start with, 
more public policy is needed (and, arguably, fewer fiscal incentives and campaigns of 
information) to extend the spaces and material possibilities for the practice of ecological 
citizenship and to remove obstacles hindering ecological citizenship (some of which have 
been briefly discussed) so as to overcome all sorts of inequalities. This could be aimed at 
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making sustainable forms of living more available to all, and securing socio-environmental 
well-being for the most disadvantaged groups, so that they can be freed from the most 
mundane yet urgent constraints and be more likely to think about the common good in 
their daily acts. Specific policies in which these aims could be achieved are, for instance, 
the provision of more bike lanes, accessible and affordable networks of public transport, 
incentives for sustainable production, subsidies for electrical cars, solar panels and organic 
agriculture, to render these practices cheaper and more accessible to everyone. Other 
problems or barriers are related to the lack of time to participate in public life, as pointed 
out earlier. For ecological citizenship to be more widespread, people should work a certain 
amount of hours that would allow them to do some activities outside work, and benefit 
from affordable child-care (MacGregor and Pardoe, 2005: 6-10).  
On the other hand, the state could facilitate ecological citizenship by encouraging 
deliberation about values and goals and the best way to achieve them. Bell argues that 
when state-sponsored, private, personal duties are not the result of democratic deliberation 
they become simply governments telling people what to do and how to live their lives. In 
his words, “Environment Canada, like other governmental institutions, simply tells people 
what they should do” (2005: 36). When discussion and action are removed from the public 
sphere, he argues, environmental and political responsibility are depoliticised and 
privatised. If ecological citizenship duties were the result of public deliberation, they 
would be less likely to be seen as impositions by the state on citizens and, arguably, they 
would not lead to the privatisation of environmental responsibility in the same way as the 





3. Ecological citizenship and the green state 
 
 Liberal democracies have embraced sustainability objectives. But although they 
have adopted measures seeking the greening of citizenship, these are not producing 
significant changes in human-nature relations, nor are they resulting in the promotion of 
ecological citizenship. The argument so far has stressed that the engagement of states in 
the promotion of ecological citizenship should go beyond downloading responsibilities 
onto citizens, putting fiscal incentives in place, and providing citizens with information. 
The previous analysis suggests that for the problems in state-centred accounts of ecological 
citizenship to be overcome, a deeper understanding of ecological citizenship and 
environmental issues is needed. This includes allowing citizens’ participation in decision-
making and fostering public debate about social goals and values, as well as creating the 
conditions for the practice of ecological citizenship, either through public policy that seeks 
to provide the adequate infrastructure, or by removing those barriers hindering ecological 
citizenship. Considering the analysis carried out in Chapter 2, it could be argued that those 
states encouraging this alternative route to ecological citizenship would approximate to the 
ideal of the green state.  
Drawing on Eckersley, I argued that the difference between a green state and a 
liberal state is not to be found exclusively in the form of institutions and processes but in 
the values that these embody and the aims they seek to achieve. As we have seen, the green 
state implements a deliberative democracy. Deliberative mechanisms have been adopted 
by liberal states to produce more participatory policy. However, it is not just the 
deliberative nature of the institutions of the green state that makes it different from the 
liberal state but the fact that it is an ecological democracy inspired by postliberal 
principles. This results – according to the discussion in the previous chapter – in the 
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democratic inclusion of non-human nature, future generations and citizens of other states, 
new definitions of environmental risks and new roles and functions for the state in 
accordance with its duty to promote environmental justice. 
To further examine these concerns, the final section of this chapter analyses the 
way ecological citizenship is constructed in the literature on the green state, and 
investigates how ecological citizenship would be encouraged within the institutions of the 
eco-state, with a particular focus on Eckersley’s theory of the green state discussed in 
Chapter 2. The key questions are: how could ecological citizens contribute to the 
emergence of a green state? How is ecological citizenship conceived by a green state? And 
how would a green state promote ecological citizenship? Through these questions, and 
drawing on the difference between the green state and the liberal state delineated in the 
previous chapter, the potential of the green state as an agent for ecological citizenship 
transformation is assessed, with particular reference to the way it may help overcome the 




3.1. Ecological citizens and the greening of the state system 
 
In previous chapters I referred to the view that the move towards greener states 
requires the active involvement of the green movement and ecological citizens acting 
together to trigger changes within state institutions, societies and their economies (Dryzek 
et. al., 2003; Eckersley: 2004; Barry, 2006). Ecological citizens are the key agents in the 
project of creating a green state; they have to “take responsibility for their state as their 
creation” (Eckersley, 2004: 245, emphasis in the original), both opposing ecologically 
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destructive and socially oppressive state policies, practices and institutions, and being 
vigilant in ensuring that states promote sustainability and justice.  
Ecological citizens are to foster the reforms that will further democratise the state 
and culminate in the adoption of a green constitution, and make sure that the right 
deliberative mechanisms are implemented and used to generate environmental and socially 
just decisions. In Eckersley’s view, the success of the green state depends, partly, on the 
degree to which citizens accept and commit to the new procedures that constitute the 
institutional structure of the green state (2004: 197). Ecological citizenship is therefore a 
means to achieve ecological democracy: through the exercise of transboundary rights, 
citizens would be enacting and maintaining ecological democracy. Furthermore, green 
citizens and groups can contribute to the greening and strengthening of the public sphere 
through debates about environmental issues, especially with activity seeking the inclusion 
of traditionally marginalised groups (i.e. non-humans, future generation and citizens of 
other states) in processes of will and opinion formation, and pointing out the limitations of 
neoliberal democracy. Eckersley contends that the project of creating a green state is 
ongoing, since it requires a constant search for new forms of recognition, participation and 
representation of excluded others with a view to delivering environmental justice 
(Eckersley, 2004: 169). It seems thus that a green state needs ecological citizens as much 
as ecological citizens may need a green state.  
 
 
3.2. The promotion of ecological citizenship within a green state 
 
The main objective and one of the key functions of the green state is the 
articulation of an ecological democracy that renders the implementation of ecological 
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citizenship possible (Eckersley, 2004: 171). In Chapter 2 we saw that in an ecological 
democracy the “relevant moral community” is regarded as the “affected community or 
community at risk”, no longer united by territory, nationality, ethnicity or religion. For 
Eckersley, this makes ecological citizenship a transnational form of citizenship that does 
not displace problems onto future generations, other species and non-national citizens 
(2004: 195-196).   
The transnational dimension of ecological citizenship in Eckersley’s theory of the 
green state is taken from Habermas’ notion of “constitutional patriotism” - or citizens’ 
common agreement on and commitment to shared democratic rules and procedures.  
Eckersley seeks to transnationalise constitutional patriotism, restricted to the nation state in 
the Habermasian account20. To do so, she looks at the kind of social bond or social 
solidarity that unites activists in transnational social movements, and she finds it in a 
“shared commitment to addressing collective problems by means of democratic 
procedures” (2004: 183). Hence what gives rise to the political and moral community of 
citizens is a “common ecological embeddedness” and the “common capacity to suffer 
serious ecological or biological harm” (Eckersley, 2004: 196). This results in 
“environmental patriotism”, understood as the deepening of local knowledge and 
attachment as the basis for knowledge and concern for the interests of strangers, including 
future generations, non-fellow citizens and other species21.  
                                                 
20 Habermas' public sphere is transnational, but when it comes to the institutionalisation of deliberative 
processes of rule making, it necessarily becomes nation-based. Eckersley goes beyond Habermasian theory 
by integrating the liberal cosmopolitan principle of “affectedness” and the civic republican, communitarian 
principle of “belonginess” or “membership”. The transnationality of the green state is a cosmopolitan ideal, 
but it is different from the cosmopolitan state and cosmopolitan accounts of democracy in that it 
acknowledges that the attachment to particular places and communities, and local knowledge, are the ground 
of solidarity and responsibility towards others.  Eckersley’s green theory of the state can be thus located 
between those who argue that the nation state is the main locus for politics and cosmopolitan theory, with its 
stress on a global law that can be applied anytime, anywhere, regardless of specific circumstances.   
21 For Eckersley, the cultivation of environmental patriotism would be best achieved through the creation of a 
green public sphere. 
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Environmental patriotism is to be implemented through the inclusion of 
“symbolic/aspirational statements of obligations to humankind and the global environment 
in state constitutions” (Eckersley, 2004: 196). Once the constitutional norm establishes the 
transnationalisation of citizenship and enforces “ecological responsibility” (Eckersley, 
2004: 245) on the basis of environmental patriotism and the existence of common risks, the 
next step is to provide the green state with democratic mechanisms and decision-making 
processes that take into account the existence of such social bonds beyond its territory. In 
other words, the next step is to implement the ecological democracy that would facilitate 
the promotion of ecological citizenship within and beyond the state territory (2004: 172-
185). 
From the above theoretical edifice, it can be inferred that first, the promotion of 
ecological citizenship in a green state is a constitutional mandate. And, second, that the 
promotion of ecological citizenship takes place through deliberative mechanisms 
connecting the local and the global. In this picture, ecological citizenship is to be 
encouraged at the local level, as engagement in community problems and decision- making 
about local issues, while being at the same time a type of transnational citizenship with 
international duties and rooted in a sense of responsibility towards strangers and citizens of 
others states. 
Eckersley argues that in her scheme ecological citizenship is conceived as a “shared 
activity, united around collective problems” (2004: 184). Yet the green state defines 
ecological citizenship as a status within a framework of rights and duties. The green 
constitution establishes a human environmental right including “a right to environmental 
information (and a corresponding duty on the part of the state to provide regular state of 
the environment reports), the right to be informed of risk-generating proposals, third-party 
litigation rights, a right to participate in environmental impact assessment processes, and 
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the right to environmental remedies when harm is suffered” (Eckersley, 2004: 137). 
Ecological citizenship is also encouraged through the incorporation into laws and 
constitutions of the precautionary principle, in a way that it can also be extended to include 
non-humans (2004: 135-136). All these constitutional provisions would promote ecological 
citizenship understood as the assumption of environmental responsibility. At the same 
time, these are measures to redress injustice (to ensure that decisions about environmental 
issues do not represent only the interests of a few, a way to avoid antiecological and unjust 
policies), which is the general duty of ecological citizens, and to institutionalise 
environmental justice, thus being a constant incentive and reminder for citizens to act as 
ecological citizens. 
The key challenge for a green state seeking to implement an ecological democracy 
is to find the right mechanisms to enable ecological citizenship both within and beyond its 
borders and to give expression to the cosmopolitan principle of affected interests 
(Eckersley, 2004: 190). This principle encourages ecological citizenship obligations: when 
engaging in democratic debate, citizens should incorporate in their deliberations and 
decisions the interests and possible objections of those absent but affected by the risk or 
question being debated, whether these are citizens of other states, future generations or 
non-human animals (Eckersley, 2004: 112)22.  
                                                 
22Ecological democracy will always have a representative element, since the community of the affected 
includes non-humans and yet-to-be-born humans, who cannot speak. The instantiation of ecological 
democracy raises some epistemological problems; for instance, how do we know what the interests of others 
are, especially of those very different from us, like non-humans? Who is to speak in the name of nature and 
future generations: citizens, scientific experts, policy makers? How is the relevant knowledge going to be 
produced? The solution offered by Eckersley is “intersubjective verification”: the only way to generate 
knowledge claims about nature beyond particular interests is to engage in critical discourse with others. This 
is, in her view, the closest to objective knowledge about the non-human world that humans can expect to get. 
For Eckersley, intersubjectivity is the only way to acknowledge that nature has value on its own, independent 
from human agency and that what we know about nature is mediated by our social background. This is 
different from defending a socially constructed account of nature that denies the existence of independent 
nature outside human valuation and perceptions: it is to argue that all shared knowledge about nature is 




So, how to organise effectively the participation or representation (in the case, for 
instance, of non-humans and future generations) of all those potentially affected by a risk? 
Addressing this issue means deciding who and what is to be included and how 
representation is to be articulated. States affected by common ecological problems would 
have to agree upon a framework to establish the rules for transboundary democratic 
mechanisms of participation, and, with them, for the articulation of ecological citizenship. 
Particular mechanisms for institutionalising ecological democracy and promoting 
ecological citizenship include unilateral initiatives complemented by multilateral 
cooperative agreements between states establishing both reciprocal rights and duties 
between states and transnational citizenship rights and duties (Eckersley, 2004: 178, 
196)23. 
Unilateral mechanisms could be tribunes for non-citizens, where members of the 
local or national community are responsible for speaking in the name of non-citizens; the 
constitution of assemblies where members of environmental groups would be responsible 
for the proxy representation of non-humans and future generations; and the enactment of 
environmental defenders offices that would be devoted to “environmental monitoring, 
political advocacy, and legal representation” (Eckersley, 2004: 134). These forms of 
political representation would ensure that the interests of future generations and non-
humans were taken into account. Together with these institutional designs that allow for 
the inclusion of non-national citizens, and the constitutional rights earlier indicated, other 
deliberative mechanisms incorporated by the green state would serve as vehicles for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship; these are statutory policy advisory committees, 
citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and public environmental enquiries. On the other 
hand, it is necessary to envisage new rights and procedures that favour the disadvantaged 
                                                 
23Some of these institutional designs have been adopted by existing liberal democratic states; this would 
indicate, once more, that it is difficult to distinguish between a liberal democratic state that has adopted green 
institutional reforms and a green state. 
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(to avoid those with more resources imposing their views upon others, as happens with 
liberal democracy) and to ensure that decisions concerning risk production do not represent 
just the interest of a few. These forms of environmental injustice could be avoided with the 
constitutional establishment of the precautionary principle. Finally – Eckersley argues - it 
could be legally established that the judges and magistrates take into account how their 
decisions would impact on the environment, future generations and non-national citizens 
(2004: 194-196). 
As examples of multilateral mechanisms, Eckersley refers to strengthening the 
application of the existing Aarhus Convention and the transboundary rights of ecological 
citizenship it grants (2004: 194), establishing deliberative forums with representatives of 
all the affected communities and cross-border referenda24. Ecological citizenship requires 
reciprocity between states. If there is not a Kantian international order, it is difficult to 
imagine how transnational citizenship rights and duties could be effectively protected and 
enjoyed25.  
 If both unilateral and multilateral initiatives were implemented in the state 
apparatus, ecological citizenship would be institutionalised, and citizens would have both 
transnational and national citizenship rights, “multiple loyalties” (Eckersley, 2004: 197) 




                                                 
24 Eckersley acknowledges that despite the fact that opinion and will formation would be transnational, it 
would be the national parliaments and states agents the one responsible for guaranteeing the application, use 
and functioning of these mechanisms. So the state remains the first and primary unit of government, although 
democracy is transnationalised and the principle of the affected applied using deliberative mechanisms 
(Eckersley, 2004: 195). 
25 A transnational state acting as a facilitator of ecological citizenship means, for Eckersley, that the state 
itself should act as an ecological citizen in the international society of states (Eckersley, 2004: 13), assuming, 
as an institution, responsibility for the consequences its own policies, decisions and legislation may have on 
other non-national citizens, and acting in ways such as to minimise the negative impact of its decisions within 
and beyond its territorial borders. 
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3.3. Assessing the potential of green states as facilitators of ecological citizenship  
 
Our analysis of the state-ecological citizenship relation concludes with a critical 
examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the promotion of ecological citizenship by 
green states, especially when compared with the liberal state approach discussed in the first 
part of this chapter. The analysis in the previous chapter indicated that there are two 
aspects of the green state relevant for the promotion of ecological citizenship, especially in 
comparison with the liberal state. One is the fact that an ecological democracy is a 
deliberative democracy. This democratic model offers the right setting for a deliberative 
understanding of citizenship and environmental issues, lacking in state-centred accounts, as 
I argued in previous sections26. The second is the normative dimension of ecological 
democracy, embodied in deliberative mechanisms and processes; this aspect crystallises in 
a deeper treatment of environmental issues and socio-natural relations with respect to the 
liberal state, as we shall see. 
The duties of ecological citizenship aim at the materialisation of the common good 
of the society, as related to ecological sustainability. Yet these duties are not self-evident; 
their specific content and definition as well as the means to achieve sustainability have to 
be determined, and this is a matter of conflict. Environmental knowledge can be produced 
and passed on to citizens via a top-down approach, drawing on scientific and technocratic 
information as in the state-backed examples discussed in the first part of this chapter. Or it 
can be generated by citizens’ themselves, and this is where deliberative democracy - 
                                                 
26 Deliberative democracy as a means to promote ecological citizenship is not exclusively related to the green 
state. There are some examples of deliberative designs backed by actually existing states, particularly in the 
UK, where deliberative experiments have taken place in relation to GM crops and wind power. A good 
summary can be found in Smith (2005b). Despite this fact, I discuss deliberative democracy in relation to the 
green state because, as explained in Chapter 2, an ecological – defined as deliberative - democracy is one of 
the most distinctive features of a green state, at least in relation to citizenship, which is the topic of our study. 
In addition, as will be reiterated in the next chapter, a deliberative understanding of ecological citizenship is 
also related to the green public sphere. This indicates that there is an overlap between our concepts of 
analysis, and that the distinction between a state and a green state, and between a green state with a 
deliberative democracy and a public sphere outside the state realm is not clearcut.  
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characterised by “unconstrained dialogue”, “inclusiveness” and “social learning” 
(Eckersley, 2004: 116-117) - becomes relevant. As Connelly argues, the general duty of 
reducing one’s ecological footprint can be investigated and defined through deliberation, 
by reflecting in the course of political debate on one’s place in the world and the use of 
resources each of us makes. Citizens also need to learn the virtues needed to act according 
to motivations to do justice and taking into account the interests of others (2006: 66). From 
this perspective, ecological citizenship is a learning process about its own meaning: “a 
process for learning as well as a potential outcome of learning” (MacGregor and Pardoe, 
2005: 10). It is deliberative democracy’s educative potential that makes it appropriate for 
the cultivation of ecological citizenship. A communicative understanding of sustainability, 
the common good and citizenship contrasts with individualist, top-down accounts of socio-
natural and state-individual relations upheld by the liberal state, which, as I have argued, 
inspire state-centric attempts to promote ecological citizenship.  
Ideally, when citizens take part in democratic debate, they are open and ready to 
have their preferences and values changed; this happens by virtue of the “force of the most 
appropriately reasoned argument” (Eckersley, 2004: 117) and not due to external coercion 
and motivation, as in the case of the promotion of ecological citizenship through regulation 
and monetary incentives. In the face of new information, arguments and circumstances, 
participants in democratic debate can amend their own opinions and perceptions. 
Deliberative structures do not assume citizens’ values and preferences as self-evident but 
take into account the institutions and contexts where these are formed. If the social 
environment is made visible, it becomes possible to consider that citizens’ actions are 
moulded by the wider institutions, and that this restriction can be an obstacle to the practice 
of ecological citizenship. This radicalisation of value pluralism was explained in the 
previous chapter and contrasted with the way in which the liberal democratic state 
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encourages the aggregation of individual preferences that are conceptualised as private, 
pre-political (in the sense that they cannot be formed and transformed in the course of 
political debate but rather precede political debate)  and fixed.  
A deliberative framework such as that constituted by the green state’s ecological 
democracy challenges the assumption that all citizens have the same opportunities to 
choose to act as ecological citizens. Time, knowledge, information, wealth and gender 
relations can sometimes be barriers to the transition toward ecological citizenship. But 
these limitations can be made visible in a deliberative setting. From this point of view, 
through the implementation of a deliberative democracy, the green state would be both 
removing obstacles to ecological citizenship and facilitating the internalisation of 
ecological citizenship motivations for action. It seems reasonable to argue that the 
deliberative dimension of ecological democracy would render the promotion of ecological 
citizenship less vulnerable to some of the limitations of initiatives encouraged by the 
liberal state.  
Advocates of green deliberative democracy argue that discursive mechanisms may 
result in more sustainable and just decisions. Although accepting that concern for the 
common good cannot be taken for granted, they stress the way in which the deliberative 
ecological ideal invites us to take into account a multiplicity of points of view and to 
acknowledge the interests of those not present in debates, including future generations and 
non-humans, so that decisions detrimental to their interests can be anticipated and 
prevented. And we saw how this is to be achieved in an ecological democracy within a 
green state: with the constitutional entrenchment of the all-affected principle.  
Similarly, it is believed that if environmentally dangerous and risk-generating 
activities are subject to debate, it will be easier to identify possible harms and avoid them 
prior to their implementation. Drawing on Eckersley, I explained how this operates within 
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the constitutional system of the green state. In a deliberative milieu, policy makers, interest 
groups and individual citizens have to justify their own positions and therefore these can be 
subject to public scrutiny. This requirement allows for the detection of policies and 
decisions that represent only the interests of minority groups and therefore cannot be 
generalised. So from this point of view, the promotion of ecological citizenship through 
deliberation goes hand-in-hand with attempts to design more environmentally sustainable, 
just and legitimate policy. However, these are contingent claims and there is no definitive 
evidence or guarantee that deliberation and participation will lead to forms of dealing with 
socio-natural relations more sustainable and risk-averse than those favoured under 
(representative) liberal democracies, and this is accepted by advocates of deliberative 
democracy themselves (Barry, 1999; Smith, 2003; Christoff, 1996). This uncertainty about 
outcomes is inherent to the idea of democracy (Carter, 2001: 280-281)27  
So regardless of the sustainability of outcomes and despite changes in individual 
preferences and values, what is clear is that in an ecological democracy state agencies are 
directly made responsible and accountable for environmental harm. Ecological citizens can 
directly ask them to answer or to pay for the consequences of their anti-ecological 
behaviour. In this respect, the green state is more inclusive - it facilitates more genuine, 
authentic and less biased citizen input that the participatory policies of the liberal state. 
And this arguably leads to more effective ecological citizenship. 
As noted earlier, if the state is to engage actively in the promotion of ecological 
citizenship, its role cannot be reduced to establishing the deliberative mechanisms that will 
enable citizens’ democratic participation and reflexive learning. The state should create the 
conditions for and remove obstacles to the practice of ecological citizenship. This task goes 
beyond the implementation of a deliberative democracy: states have to use all their 
                                                 
27
 Hence it cannot be argued that the contingent relationship between green values and democracy gives 
ecologism a particularly ambiguous relation with democracy. Rather this problematic relation arises 
whenever any movement seeks to achieve its objectives through democratic means. 
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institutions and means to facilitate ecological citizenship. From this position, it is argued 
that ecological citizens need green states to remind them that they have to be virtuous, do 
justice and fulfil their duties, particularly in those situations where conflicts may arise 
between personal, economic interests and ecological citizenship responsibilities (Barry, 
2006: 39). This suggests a green state closer to the republican ideal, mentioned earlier. 
According to the civic republican tradition, the state embodies certain values  and has the 
duty to preserve the common good and thus to educate its citizens so that they will take 
part in public life in order to protect and materialise those values associated with the 
common good. The green state is not neutral and upholds values related to its objectives of 
achieving social, environmental and communicative justice. And, for these aims and values 
to be achieved, the green state – evoking the republican ideal state - has the duty to educate 
its citizens to be active ecological citizens seeking the materialisation of the common good 
understood as environmental and social justice28. In this way, besides deliberation, a green 
state would use other means to remind its citizens that they have to be ecological citizens. 
Thus a green state could employ constitutional provisions if necessary, to set limits on 
property rights, restrict some individual freedoms – especially those concerning 
production, consumption, investment and mobility - and reduce the number of goods 
available to citizens (Eckersley, 2004: 95). These measures would be the result of the 
reinterpretation of the liberal notion of autonomy and the liberal ontology of the self and 
would be justified on the grounds that the state has to set controls on economic freedoms to 
get socially and environmentally good outcomes, as outlined in Chapter 2.  
In a way, such limitation and redefinition of autonomy is a recognition of the 
importance of consumption in the transition towards sustainability and the role individuals 
can play with their choices in restructuring the market and greening production. However 
                                                 




these choices should never be made by individuals in their private roles as consumers, but 
acting as citizens. As discussed earlier, green consumerism as a form of ecological 
citizenship has been widely embraced by states. And although it can be a starting point for 
ecological citizenship, as I explained following Seyfang, it should never replace citizenship 
and political debate in the public arena. This is another way in which green states could do 
better than actually existing states. Earlier I argued that liberal democracies encourage a 
type of citizenship understood as green consumerism that reduces citizenship to private 
consumption choices, in the absence of public debate about issues of production and 
distribution of goods. A green state that implemented an ecological democracy would 
foster citizens’ debate, including debate about economic issues, and a more political, 
public conception of ecological citizenship.  
Sure enough liberal thinkers will claim that the promotion of ecological citizenship 
by the state in the terms described here will pose serious challenges to value neutrality – if 
not to democracy itself. Yet we saw in Chapter 2 that the liberal notion of autonomy is 
biased; the liberal state endorses a non-neutral neutrality that favours some values while 
jeopardising others, like ecological ones29. A postliberal reading of autonomy à-la-
Eckersley is another key aspect where the green state is better equipped for the promotion 
of ecological citizenship than its liberal counterpart. 
What makes the green state democratic besides being green is that, ideally, these 
limitations on freedoms would have to be collectively agreed and constitutionally 
entrenched. In this sense, the role of the state is to foster democratic debate about the 
                                                 
29
This claim does not mean that the promotion of ecological citizenship is incompatible with a liberal state. 
Green theorists, amongst others, have long argued not only that the promotion of environmental 
sustainability is not in contradiction with the neutrality and value pluralism of the liberal state but also that by 
not securing a healthy environment, a just sustainability, and by systematically privileging values like 
instrumentalism or anthropocentrism over other more ecocentric or biocentric ones, the state is failing to 
address its commitment to liberal neutrality. If these arguments are accepted and applied to the green defence 
of state-centred accounts of ecological citizenship, then the state would be legitimised to promote ecological 
citizenship, and, moreover, it would be failing to address its legitimisation imperative if it did not do so (in so 
far as it would be prioritizing certain values and conceptions of the good life over others with no justification, 
so it would not be a value-neutral state). 
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conditions for ecological sustainability so as to encourage citizens to voluntarily decide to 
self-regulate and restrict their freedoms. Only if agreed to be necessary, the green state 
would impose regulations and establish sanctions that would represent attacks against a 
liberal notion of personal autonomy in those cases where economic interests could 
undermine environmental protection (Eckersley, 2004: 95). Following the discussion about 
the different roles of the state, earlier introduced, it appears that a green state – other than 
acting in some cases as a facilitator and educator in ways similar to liberal states - would 
endorse a third role: to put in place the deliberative mechanisms that guarantee citizens’ 
participation in the definition of environmental justice and ecological citizenship. This role 
for the green state is, as indicated in Chapter 2, a constitutional imperative and emanates 
from the new rationale of the state.  
So the green state has a strong potential to promote ecological citizenship. 
However, if one goes back to Eckersley’s scheme and to her arguments about how green 
states are to emerge, one finds that this potential may not be fully realised. The discussion 
of Eckersley’s green theory of the state exposed in Chapter 2 that a green state will emerge 
from a reform of liberal democratic institutions and procedures. Such reform accepts, 
rather than rejects, what Eckersley believes to be the positive achievements of liberalism so 
that they can be shaped in an ecological direction. From these claims and her methodology, 
explained in Chapter 2 (i.e. looking for “emancipatory opportunities” in current state and 
international structures), one could maintain that, for Eckersley, building a green state is 
reduced to finding the right spots where changes in current institutions can be introduced. 
This method is not much different from reforming an existing liberal state. Eckersley’s 
eco-reformist strategy may be an obstacle for the values and objectives of the green state - 
promising for the promotion of ecological citizenship - to unfold. Insofar as many of the 
formal aspects of the liberal state stay in place – because the green state is built of the 
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foundations of the liberal state - those values are not likely to be realised since they may be 
neutralised by the anti-ecological structure of the liberal state, and with this the 
possibilities for the cultivation of ecological citizenship by the green state will decrease.  
In order to further elaborate this claim, Dryzek’s analysis of different deliberative 
democratic models is insightful. Dryzek alludes to a constitutionalist deliberative 
democratic trend that seeks to instantiate deliberative processes within liberal democratic 
institutions. According to Dryzek, this position manifests itself in at least three different - 
but compatible and mutually reinforcing - approaches. The first one consists in using 
deliberative democracy’s guiding principles to justify the existence of individual rights, 
particularly those rights needed for the exercise of democratic citizenship, and thus needed 
to sustain deliberative democracy itself. A second perspective seeks to use liberal 
constitutions to create a public space for deliberation. In this view, constitutions should 
establish that one of the new functions and goals for the state is to promote deliberative 
democracy, and thus establish new rules and mechanisms that consolidate deliberation. 
Finally, the constitution itself can be made through a deliberative process (Dryzek, 2000: 
10-17; Dryzek, 1994: 190).  
It is not difficult to see Eckersley’s conception of ecological democracy mirrored in 
this constitutionalist trend. The use of constitutional provisions to secure political 
communication and implement ecological democracy defines, as we have seen, 
Eckersley’s theory of the green state. Eckersley stresses the importance of constitution-
making. For her, the constitution establishes the state’s responsibilities, functions and 
objectives. And one of these objectives is precisely to facilitate ecological democracy. On 
the other hand, Eckersley uses deliberative democracy to justify rights of participation and 
political equality, that is, of those rights needed as a precondition to maintain deliberative 
democracy itself. That is, rights and obligations of ecological citizens are, in her account, 
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defined in deliberative terms: they are realised within the deliberative process and aim at 
articulating ecological democracy. This is so also in the case of the assumption of 
responsibility for the environment, which for Eckersley implies taking into account, in the 
course of deliberation, the impact of risk-generating decisions on others. Eckersley 
conceives ecological citizenship as the assumption of responsibility for the impact that 
risk-generating activities have on others. However, in her picture, this responsibility is 
expressed in the course of debate, and results in the consideration of interests of groups 
excluded from political processes. So it can be argued that the deliberative and democratic 
dimension of ecological citizenship is emphasized over other aspects of the concept, such 
as daily practices of sustainable living. Such a view distances itself from accounts of 
ecological citizens’ duties understood as the requirement to decrease one’s ecological 
footprint by living more sustainably, such as that of Dobson (2003a) explained in Chapter 
1. This more practical, everyday life dimension of ecological citizenship duties is neglected 
in her theory. So it could be argued that just like liberal constitutional democrats, Eckersley 
uses the constitution (also made through a deliberative process) in order to implement 
deliberative mechanisms and ecological citizenship rights that make a green and 
deliberative democracy possible. 
  For Dryzek, attempts to implement deliberative democracy through constitutional 
means result in the assimilation of deliberative democracy by liberalism. As indicated in 
Chapter 1, his position is that the state is constrained by a series of imperatives that 
condition its functions. In a capitalist economy, he argues, the health of liberal democracy 
relies on economic growth so that social and political inequalities remain hidden. If 
inequalities become more visible, social instability arises and threatens the very existence 
of liberal democracy. Dryzek contends that the fear of this scenario renders liberal 
democracies “imprisoned by the market’s growth imperative” (1994: 180). The 
125 
 
accumulation imperative restricts public policy and becomes an obstacle for the 
democratisation of the state, and for effective deliberation (1994: 190, 2000: 29). Dryzek 
introduces a distinction between discursive democracy and deliberative democracy, where 
deliberative democracy corresponds with the constitutionalist trend described above, while 
discursive democracy questions liberal democracy and the political economy of liberalism 
(Dryzek, 2000). This more oppositional tendency focuses on spaces alternative to state 
institutions where deliberative democracy can be articulated, such as civil society, the 
public sphere and workplace democracy (Dryzek, 2000: 27). Yet a double focus on civil 
society and the public sphere are not enough – Dryzek argues - to confront liberalism. The 
celebration of civil society and the public sphere is common amongst liberal scholars of 
deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000: 55), and as we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
both civil society and the public sphere have a liberal reading. In fact, scholars of 
deliberative constitutionalism believe that one of the main purposes of the constitution is to 
establish the necessary means for a public sphere for debate to be maintained. 
 So if the presence and inclusion of civil society and the public sphere are not 
enough for deliberative democracy to be critical, and to address the shortcomings of liberal 
democracy, what else is needed? The answer is that for deliberative democracy not to be 
undermined by state imperatives, it should be located in oppositional public spheres. 
According to Dryzek, the public sphere has to remain autonomous, so that there is a sharp 
distinction between the public sphere and the state. Opinion should move from the public 
sphere toward the state (but not the other way round) (2000: 55-56). For Dryzek, 
discourses can and should affect public policy (2000: 79). The only condition is that the 
public sphere where such discourses are generated remains autonomous and completely 
separated from the state, to avoid discourses being assimilated and co-opted by the state 
(which is different from discourses having an impact on state policy). As a result, political 
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activity in civil society must seek the “democratic exercise of power over the state”, while 
being vigilant to avoid “the inclusion of civil society within the state” (2000: 102-103). 
Eckersley’s account of ecological democracy is also critical of capitalism. Her aim 
is to use democratic institutions to control capitalism, and make it fairer and sustainable - 
as remarked in Chapter 2. But insofar as her democratic model is postliberal and departs 
from liberal institutions, those further steps – ecological democracy and reflexive 
ecological modernisation – that will lead to controlling capitalism may not be taken30. 
Before this is accomplished, the emancipatory potential of deliberation may be neutralised. 
Let me explain how this may occur. 
Recall Eckersley’s dual focus on reforming the liberal state and strengthening civil 
society and the public sphere. Despite her emphasis on the state and its formal institutions, 
Eckersley believes that deliberative settings and ecological citizenship are to be 
encouraged also in the public sphere. Indeed, she thinks that without ecological citizens 
maintaining a vibrant public sphere ecological democracy is not likely to survive, since one 
of the preconditions of ecological democracy is, in her view, a “new ecological sensibility” 
produced as a result of a cultural shift. And this cultural shift can only take place in the 
public sphere (2004: 245). That is why in Eckersley’s theory, the constitution, although 
necessary, is not enough, and this was made clear in the previous chapter, where I 
explained the dynamics of her virtuous circle of change. However, it is the state and the 
constitution that are entrusted with the promotion of ecological democracy, citizenship and 
the public sphere through mechanisms that seek to secure the availability of information 
about risk-generating activities, citizens’ participation in deliberations and access to 
                                                 
30 This is how Eckersley would respond to sceptics about the potential of the state to bring about 
sustainability due to the contradictions of the liberal capitalist state. To those who argue that the state cannot 
be reformed to serve the interests of ecologism, since it is caught up within a capitalist dynamics that needs 
resource exploitation for private capital accumulation, Eckersley would reply that if the functions and 
rationale of the state changes, then it is possible to change the policies and instruments that currently allow 
such environmentally damaging activities. Yet it is citizens’ debates that will trigger discussion about new 
state roles and functions. And, as I seek to stress here, these may be co-opted. If this happens, further 
transformations that could result in a green state may not occur. 
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environmental justice. So, unlike Dryzek’s, Eckersley’s public sphere where deliberative 
democracy and the learning of ecological citizenship take place, is part of the state and it is 
encouraged by the state itself, lacking the sort of autonomy needed to retain its critical 
force. If the public sphere is included within the state, it is likely to be eroded and lose its 
vitality and oppositional nature (this will be further discussed in next chapter). In relation 
to Eckersley’s model, such an account of the public sphere may result in the co-option of 
ecological democracy - and, consequently, of those mechanisms required to foster 
ecological citizenship - by the liberal democratic state. What is more, in so far as 
ecological democracy and, with it, ecological citizenship, are placed within a theory of the 
state and institutionalised by constitutional means, they run the risk of being assimilated 
and neutralised by the liberal state, and thus not lead to the kinds of transformations needed 
to originate a green state. So my point is that despite Eckersley’s explicit postliberalism, 
her constitutionalism and state-centred democracy bring her back to liberalism.    
In the light of Dryzek’s typology of different state-civil society relations (Dryzek, 
2000; Dryzek et. al., 2003), a civil society with a myriad of contested discourses will be 
more likely to be maintained when interacting with an “exclusive” state, since an 
“inclusive” state can absorb and erode diversity (2000: 113-14). Hence it could be argued 
that Eckersley’s green state is inclusive, open and receptive to civil society and ecological 
citizenship deliberations, to the extent that the state acts as a facilitator of such 
deliberations, providing the available information for debate to take place and facilitating 
the mechanisms for citizen participation. A green state that incorporates civil society into 
its own political and constitutional structures would absorb and neutralise civil society, not 
in the same way as authoritarian states do, but in a way that may compromise its critical 




Despite her statism, Eckersley also acknowledges deliberation in civil society. 
However, while for Eckersley the state is entrusted with the coordination of deliberation 
that takes place in both spaces - state and civil society - for Dryzek coordination is 
entrusted to spontaneous networks in civil society. This spontaneous system is similar to 
the way international organisations and movements are organised. It is related to 
transnational discourses in the public sphere, placed outside spatial and temporal 
boundaries (2000: 159-160). This suggests that we look at forms of coordination and 
promotion of ecological citizenship activity outside the state in an autonomous public 





I have discussed the different ways in which states could actively perform the roles 
of educators and facilitators of ecological citizenship: for instance, creating infrastructures 
(like more bicycle lanes and recycling facilities), removing obstacles (i.e. more social 
policy to build more egalitarian societies), imposing some behaviours and banning certain 
practices (through, for instance, legislation to control the market and some individual 
freedoms), installing external incentives to steer citizens in particular directions (i.e. fiscal 
incentives) and facilitating citizens’ learning and voluntary transition towards ecological 
citizenship (through formal education or implementing deliberative mechanisms). Some of 
these approaches require more active involvement by the state in the promotion of those 
activities and practices leading to ecological citizenship and the making of more 
sustainable societies. The analysis of these initiatives has illustrated one of the tensions 
inherent in the relationship between ecological citizenship and the state, namely that it 
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seems to both depend on, and be threatened by, the state. Held argues that a common 
strategy on the left to resolve this tension - which, in his view, underlies all notions of 
citizenship - is to advocate collective decision making. This “democratic solution” (Held, 
1991: 23) has been examined, particularly the claim that ecological citizenship requires a 
deliberative, ecological democracy for its protection and promotion. The focus of this 
chapter has been, though, deliberation within the institutions of the green state.   
 Some of the shortcomings of the state-centred approach considered in the first part 
of the chapter could be overcome by a green state informed by an ecological democracy. A 
deliberative ecological democracy will offer more possibilities for the promotion of 
ecological citizenship than an aggregative liberal democracy, since a deliberative 
framework acknowledges the process of formation and transformation of citizens’ values, 
preferences and motivations to act, as well as the structures that constrain and shape 
citizens’ choices and behaviours. Moreover, the ecological – i.e. normative - dimension of 
this particular view of deliberative democracy, which renders possible the inclusion of 
traditionally excluded groups, is central to the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
Ecological citizens assume responsibility for the way their daily activities impact on fellow 
citizens, citizens of other states, future generations and non-human nature as a means to 
achieve sustainability and justice. They take into account how their decisions and acts have 
impact on others and on the environment. In this sense, a state whose political system is an 
ecological democracy that implements decision-making mechanisms inclusive of those 
groups excluded in conventional policy processes, will be using its institutions to facilitate 
ecological citizenship.  
However, the fact that the new values and principles that constitute ecological 
democracy are embodied in state structures suggests that they may be co-opted by the 
liberal state. As Dryzek puts it, “liberalism is the most effective vacuum cleaner in the 
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history of political thought, capable of sucking up all the doctrines that appear to challenge 
it, be they critical theory, environmentalism, feminism, or socialism” (2000: 27). What 
makes the green state potentially different from the liberal state - and a better candidate to 
promote ecological citizenship - are its values, new functions and aims. But changes to 
start creating a green state originate in the public sphere. If deliberations are neutralised 
and co-opted by the constitutional system of the liberal state, those transformations will not 
take place. So the oppositional element needed in Eckersley’s theory for the chain of 
transformations resulting in a green state to get started, may be co-opted. And hence the 
potential for the promotion of ecological citizenship may remain “asleep”. This is what 
happens in the case of inclusive states that facilitate deliberation in the public sphere and 
the incorporation of public opinion into policy (Dryzek, et. al., 2003), where there is less 
democratic vitality and more social homogenisation.  
These claims witness my argument in Chapter 2 that the distance between the 
liberal and the green state may not be so great after all. Furthermore, a green state, like any 
other state, is constrained by imperatives, relies on political parties and parliamentary 
mechanisms, is endowed with sovereignty and legitimate power, and uses formal 
institutions, like constitutions and the rule of law, to achieve its objectives. 
Notwithstanding the differences between them, both state and green state approaches to 
ecological citizenship are concerned with using the institutional apparatus of the state to 
green citizenship. So the next and final two chapters will look at spaces outside the state 
where there may be less risk of cooption and where there may be more opportunities for 











In Chapter 3 I argued that ecological citizenship can be thought of as a learning 
process regarding its own meaning and the different ways of fulfilling the duties associated 
with it. This learning process has two dimensions: discourse and practice. The previous 
chapter considered the discursive element of ecological citizenship in relation to its 
promotion by a green state. In this chapter, I explore the idea that ecological citizenship 
may be learnt and promoted in the course of deliberation outside the state.  
To this end, I look at the green public sphere as the space where the knowledge 
leading to the practice of ecological citizenship activity is generated, where the meaning of 
ecological citizenship, its duties and the virtues required, are discussed, where ecological 
citizens’ identities are formed, but also where obstacles to ecological citizenship can be 
challenged. I focus on Douglas Torgerson’s specifically green instantiation of the public 
sphere. The connection between the green public sphere and ecological citizenship is 
explored, with attention being paid to the way ecological citizenship is conceived and 
promoted in the green public sphere. I argue that this connection prompts us to rethink 
Torgerson’s conception of environmental politics and the green public sphere. In order to 
redefine this sphere I take into account Habermas’ notion and the further reactions and 
developments it provoked. Thus I first discuss those aspects of public sphere analyses that 
will be relevant for my inquiry into the potential of the green public sphere for the 
cultivation of ecological citizenship and for my assessment of Torgerson’s account.  
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1. Classic public sphere theory: the bourgeois public sphere and beyond 
 
Although the idea of the public sphere has its origins in classical and modern 
distinctions between the private and the public realms, it has been revitalised by readings 
of Hannah Arendt, contemporary feminist theory, and especially by the writings of Jürgen 
Habermas (Calhoun, 1993: 268). The contemporary concept was developed by Habermas 
in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, published in 1962. In this seminal work, he deals with the origins and 
meaning of a specific public sphere, the liberal, early bourgeois public sphere, and its 
transformation prompted by the constitution of the social welfare state and the rise of the 
mass media. Habermas defined the public sphere as “a domain of our social life in which 
such a thing as public opinion can be formed”, open to all citizens “to assemble and unite 
freely, and express and publicize their opinions freely” (1989: 231). This communicative 
sphere presupposes freedom and equality amongst participants. According to Calhoun, the 
central question for Habermas was: “to what extent can the wills or opinions guiding 
political action be formed on the basis of rational-critical discourse?” (2001: 1899). 
Communicative rationality and the ideal speech situation – which establishes the 
norms of communication - can be observed in different aspects of life; whenever they take 
place in politics, a public sphere arises (Dryzek, 1990a: 37). When individuals “assemble 
to interrogate both their own interactions and the wider relations of social and political 
power within which they are always and already embedded” a public spheres emerges. 
Hence, “[t]rough this autonomous association, members of public spheres consider what 
they are doing, settle how they will live together, and determine...how they might 
collectively act” (Keane, 1984: 2-3, cited in Dryzek, 1990a: 37).  
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Habermas initially placed the public sphere in the realm of civil society, outside the 
state and the economy (1992). This view stressed the public sphere’s independence from 
the state apparatus. Later on, in Between Facts and Norms (1996), the public sphere is 
located between the political system and the private domains of the lifeworld, that is, 
between the state and civil society. As a result, Habermas was interested in the 
incorporation of deliberation into policy-making and constitutions. This turn implies for 
Eckersley that although the type of free and unconstrained communication that Habermas 
relates to the public sphere is more likely to be found in civil society outside the state, 
emerging public spheres can also be observed within the state machinery, in legislatures, 
judiciaries and bureaucracies where more formalised deliberation takes place. For her, 
public spheres and policy-making structures are not exclusive but “overlapping and 
mutually constitutive” (2005b: 17). And the previous chapter illustrated that this 
interpretation led Eckersley to focus on the link between the public sphere and the 
constitutional state. Yet we shall see that state institutions are not the only ways in which 
political opinions can influence will formation and decision-making (differentiated from 
policy-making).   
The public sphere can designate both a counterfactual ideal of free communication 
and an existing situation defining a communicative interaction between individuals 
(Dryzek, 1990a: 37; Eckersley, 2005b: 17). As Calhoun highlights, Habermas was 
interested in the emancipatory strength of free and rational debate about the common good 
– excluding private, particular interests. Participants in this collective discourse share a 
commitment to “the temporary egalitarianism of an intellectual argument”, ignoring status 
differences (Calhoun, 2001: 1899). This form of action – “communicative action” - seeks 
agreement amongst individuals, socialisation and the coordination of action through 
discussion. Dryzek notes that for Habermas communicative rationality refers to “the extent 
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to which this action is characterized by the reflective understanding of competent actors”; 
it constitutes a form of discourse and interaction that is “free from deception, self-
deception, strategic behaviour, and domination through the exercise of power”, where the 
only valid form of authority is that grounded on the force of a good argument (Dryzek, 
1990a: 14-15). Conceived in this way, communicative rationality works as a counterfactual 
ideal against which democratic institutions and public spaces can be compared.  
When considering existing or real public spheres, Habermas thought of the early 
bourgeois public sphere that arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth century to challenge 
non democratic authority through public opinion. The bourgeois public sphere was for 
Habermas the realm of private people getting together to discuss issues of common 
concern through the public exercise of their reason. The newly emerged associations in 
civil society – i.e. businesses, newspapers and coffee houses - set the ground for this public 
debate, while social institutions like private property empowered citizens and made their 
access to the public space possible. As the public sphere expanded after property and other 
requirements for participation were suppressed, previously excluded nonbourgeois 
individuals and groups could enter. This originated social fragmentation and class struggle 
and the division of the public space into opposing interest groups. Consequently, in 
Habermas’ view, the quality of discourse decreased (1962).  
Together with this, the bourgeois public sphere eroded due to the success of newly 
emerged powers to manipulate public opinion, according to the Habermasian analysis. 
Rational-critical discourse was replaced by public relation agents and public opinion polls. 
State agencies and corporate rule compromised the public-private distinction, leading to 
social “refeudalization” (Calhoun, 2001: 1899-1900; Fraser, 1992: 113).  Benhabib’s study 
of Habermas’ work suggests that this early public sphere eroded and disappeared with the 
generalisation of a mass press, the rise of capitalism and the entry of the bourgeoisie into 
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the state, no longer its foe but its ally. Under these new conditions, public-spirited 
discourse was replaced by private interest and political power. Gradually, with the 
consolidation of the welfare state and the rise of the global information societies, the 
autonomous citizen that once sustained the public sphere became “the ‘citizen-consumer’ 
of packaged images and messages” and the target of lobbying organisations (Benhabib, 
1992: 93).  Discourse as a form of social interaction and coordination was eclipsed by 
systems of money, and bureaucratic power emerged in the processes of modernisation. 
This led to the domination of the lifeworld by the administrative state and capitalism, 
accentuating the divide between administrative and corporate elites, and citizens 
(Habermas, 1987).  
Yet Habermas believes that associations and movements in civil society have the 
potential to reinvigorate free discourse in today’s public sphere, since they are engaged in 
communicative rationality and have a freely discursive form of organisation; they carry a 
hope to awaken “a public sphere at rest” (1996: 379, emphasis in the original) and “shift 
the entire system’s mode of problem solving” (1996: 381). In this respect, Dryzek observes 
that new social movements like ecologism and feminism, often in opposition rather than 
accommodation within the liberal capitalist state, evoke the bourgeois public sphere that 
confronted the antidemocratic authority of the feudal state (2000: 23)1. 
The public sphere can perform several functions in a normative theory of 
democracy, but this issue is not addressed by Torgerson in his account of the green public 
sphere. However, I argue that this question is relevant for green politics in general and 
when thinking through the promotion of ecological citizenship in particular. So it is helpful 
                                                 
1 Habermas has been criticised for his focus on progressive social movements while ignoring the existence of 
public spheres that house far-right and fundamentalist groups, like anti-abortion associations. How to treat 
oppressive identities and discourses in communicative terms? Dryzek offers a possible solution: the public 
sphere of contested discourses and a deliberative democratic model able to accommodate debate across a 
variety of oppressive and emancipatory discourses (2000: 23, 74-75). 
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to examine those positions animating my analysis of the green public sphere in the 
following pages.  
Inherent to the idea of the public sphere is the aim of challenging authority. As 
Dryzek notes, the Habermasian early bourgeois public sphere emerged as an opposition to 
the absolutist state by an incipient bourgeoisie in eighteenth century Europe (Dryzek, 
2000: 22; 1996: 48-49; Dryzek et. al., 2003: 15). Public spheres are shaped by their 
relations of inclusion and/or exclusion with the state. The bourgeoisie was excluded from 
the state and had to create an alternative political space. This public sphere eroded in the 
nineteenth century when the bourgeoisie was invited to a share of state power.  
In The Theory of Communicative Action (1984/1987), Habermas explains that, as a 
result of the evolution and disappearance of the community life that characterises 
premodernity, two different realities emerge with modernity: the “system”, which is the 
world of anonymous market exchange relations and administrative power, and the 
“lifeworld” or the sphere of recognition and understanding between humans. One of the 
distinctive modern features is the domination of the lifeworld by the system. For 
Habermas, communicative action in the public sphere can exert some influence in the 
system from outside, although it cannot make the system disappear, going back to 
premodern community-type of relationships.  
Dryzek notes that a multiplicity of public spheres has emerged to challenge the 
power of the contemporary capitalist state, particularly as an opposition to the way states 
follow market imperatives, against the wishes of a significant segment of the citizenry. In 
his view, “[t]he state so acting is a capitalist state, but hardly a democratic one, and so 
democracy is displaced onto the public sphere” (1996: 48-49). Following Habermas, he 
argues that the main actors in contemporary public spheres are social movements opposing 
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systemic powers in the context of a lifeworld threatened by the state and capitalism (1990: 
49).  
Habermas’ work on the public sphere soon provoked many critiques
2. Some of 
them are relevant for the arguments I seek to advance in this chapter. As Calhoun 
indicates, for example, the Habermasian account was attacked for using the bourgeois 
public sphere as a model while neglecting the existence of other nonbourgeois public 
spaces like the proletarian one, and for overstressing the emancipatory possibilities of an 
utterly idealised notion of the public space (1992: 5)3. The early critique also focused on 
issues of diversity and difference, pointing at inequalities underlying Habermas’ stress on 
democratisation and inclusion and his utopian vision of a politically equal citizenry, while 
certain subjects were excluded or downgraded: women, propertyless workers, the poor, and 
racial minorities (Benhabib, 1992; Fraser, 1992). Insofar as their interests were considered 
private or related to the good life - as opposed to public issues of justice - their experiences 
and demands were ignored and relegated to the private realm and to the socio-economic 
sphere (Benhabib, 1992: 88-92). The creation of a public sphere was accompanied by the 
bourgeois class-formation process, which was male-dominated, and sought to distinguish 
the bourgeoisie from both the aristocratic strata that it was trying to confront, and the 
workers, the populace, that it intended to oppress. This process was based on a strong 
separation between the private and the public, the domestic and the political, and a 
celebration of “feminine domesticity”; this conferred on the bourgeois public sphere its 
sexist character (Fraser, 1992: 113-115). As Fraser notes, “[a] discourse of publicity 
                                                 
2 Some of these criticisms are acknowledged and discussed by Habermas himself. See Habermas (1992). 
3 Fraser notes the existence of coetaneous nonliberal and nonbourgeois public spheres, like nationalist, 
peasant, elite women or working class publics which objected to the exclusionary character of the bourgeois 
public sphere and developed alternative forms of public space and political communication. In Fraser’s view 
the bourgeois public sphere deliberately sought to neutralise and leave out these other public spaces (1992: 
115-116). As a response to critiques like this, Habermas acknowledged that a plebeian public sphere took 
shape next to and interrelated with “the hegemonic public sphere” (1992: 426).  
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touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed 
as a strategy of distinction” and as new form of political domination (1992: 115-116).   
The early bourgeois public sphere included only educated, male, propertied 
individuals whose discourse was not only exclusive of other groups but detrimental to the 
interests of those excluded. The transformation of the public sphere represented a process 
of inclusion of some of the excluded groups, which for Habermas determined the end of 
the bourgeois public sphere, as it weakened the quality of public discourse (Calhoun, 1992: 
3). Later on, Habermas accepted that in contemporary democratic and socially complex 
societies it is not possible to sustain an elitist and uniform account of the public sphere 
(1992)4. The tasks for contemporary public sphere theory have been the accommodation of 
deliberation across difference, contestation and plurality (Fraser, 1992; Dryzek, 2000), the 
redefinition of the public-private divide, and the politicisation of the concerns of 
traditionally excluded groups, showing that confining their interests to the private realm 
was part of a strategy of domination and oppression (Benhabib, 1992; Fraser, 1992). In 
Fraser’s terms, the challenge is to delineate a postbourgeois public sphere theory that 
retains its critical capacities, but that is best suited to serve the emancipatory aspirations of 
today’s democratic theory, to highlight the limits and contradictions of actually existing 
democracies (1992)5. In a very influential article, Fraser undertook this task of redefining 
the public sphere and developed a critique of the Habermasian “liberal model of the 
bourgeois public sphere”. Some of these objections should be taken into account when 
analysing the issue of the promotion of ecological citizenship within a green public sphere, 
so I will return to them below.  
                                                 
4 His initial position, as Fraser highlights, was to regard the public sphere as “the public arena, in the 
singular”; he considered the emergence of a variety of public spaces as a sign of the erosion of the public 
sphere (Fraser, 1992: 122).   
5 As Fraser notes, Habermas studied the transformation of the bourgeois model of the public sphere, which 
led to its erosion, but failed to propose an alternative model best suited for the “welfare state’s mass 
democracy” that triggered such decline (1992: 111) 
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In this sense, Fraser argued that, first, it is not enough for participants in the public 
sphere to assume their equality when they are not equals, therefore social equality, insofar 
as a precondition for political equality, must be eliminated, and not simply “bracketed”. 
Second, a proliferation of public spheres is not a sign of decline but of democratisation, 
therefore a plurality of public spheres is better than a single one. Third, deliberation does 
not have to be restricted to the common good, but can include private issues. And, fourth, a 
public sphere does not require a strict distinction between the state and civil society 
(Fraser, 1992). More recently, the public sphere has been problematised in the light of 
contemporary transnational processes that challenge the Westphalian character of classic 
public sphere theory (Eckersley, 2005b; Fraser, 2005). 
   
  
2. The green public sphere 
 
Environmental thought and practice adds a novel dimension to contemporary public 
sphere theory. The ongoing process of inclusion of previously excluded concerns has 
reached ecological issues. A “green public sphere” has entered the constellation of public 
spaces, strengthening the idea of debate across difference. Research on the public sphere 
and the environment unavoidably leads to The promise of green politics. Environmentalism 
and the public sphere (1999), where Douglas Torgerson develops the notion of the “green 
public sphere”
 6. Since this is the most specifically environmental instantiation of the 
public sphere, it seems appropriate to take it as a point of departure for our study.  
Torgerson explains that amidst a plurality of public spheres, the green public sphere 
rose with the emergence of ecologism in the 1960s and 1970s. Ecologism triggered 
                                                 
6 A summary of the main arguments developed in the book can be found in Torgerson (2000). 
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changes in discourses, in societies and in the political culture outside the state. Particularly, 
it posed a challenge to the industrialist presuppositions that pervade public discourse and to 
the administrative sphere7. Although Torgerson locates the green public sphere in the 
realm of civil society, he argues that there will be situations in which the green public 
sphere interacts with the administrative sphere. Due to the multiplicity and diversity of 
both public and administrative spheres, sub-spheres located half way between civil society 
and the administrative sphere will appear, for instance, in the space inhabited by 
mainstream environmental organisations employing a large number of experts trained in 
lobbying decision-makers (1999: 10-11, 140-141).  
Most of those who have embraced the notion of the public sphere from a green 
politico-theoretical perspective celebrate the essential role it plays in accommodating 
different values and conciliate disparate ideological positions within the green movement 
(Yang and Calhoun, 2007; Doyle and Doherty, 2006; Eckersley, 2004, 2005b; Smith, 
2003; Dryzek et. al., 2003; Brulle, 2000). Torgerson is especially concerned about respect 
for pluralism. The ecological critique of modernity includes a rejection of instrumentalism; 
but given the high levels of environmental destruction, “desperate green concerns” result in 
an instrumental attitude towards politics that, in Torgerson’s view, has come to dominate 
ecopolitical thought and practice. He laments that “[t]he point of political action is success 
in achieving green goals” (Torgerson, 1999: x). For him, ecologists appeal to scientific 
facts about the environment to justify the implementation of urgent measures to the 
detriment of democratic debate. In this context, he argues, the potential of green politics 
for transcending strategic political action remains constrained.  
                                                 
7 The administrative sphere is also a discursive sphere inhabited by the “administrative mind”, which 
pervades technocratic administrative communication. It is not limited to state institutions but comprises 
corporations and non-governmental organizations welcomed by states to take part in the policy processes. 
Torgerson argues that deliberation in the administrative sphere takes place in the form of negotiations 
between government representatives and business elites. This is the “most imperfect kind of discursive 
design”, where not all discourses and views are accepted (1999: 10). 
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Torgerson finds a way out of ends-oriented green theory in Hannah Aredt’s concept 
of politics8. In The Human Condition (1958) and Between Past and Future (1968) the 
German philosopher accomplishes a non-strategic redefinition of political action as debate 
with intrinsic value, as a performing art which has value in its performance, like playing an 
instrument or drama (1999: 14-15). So the value of politics is not to be found in its 
outcomes but in political action itself. Following Arendt’s non-instrumental account of 
politics, Torgerson defines the green public sphere as a “space of appearance” (1999: 157), 
a site to carry on performative political action formulated in terms of debate aimed at 
sustaining itself9. Thus the green public sphere is depicted as a “realm of public discourse” 
(1999: 124), “a forum for debate” (1999: 161). The green public sphere is not a physical 
location, like a gathering or assembly, or an institution, but a network or interconnection of 
spaces for discourse. It is not restricted to a given country or territory, in line with the 
globalisation of economic and political relations (1999: 161-162)10. A variety of 
interrelated places where people join together for the sole purpose of speaking and 
listening, to practise a green discourse, gives rise to a green public sphere. According to 
Torgerson, it is irrelevant whether this interaction involves only a few people and happens 
in a private house, around a table, or whether it takes place at higher levels, closer to 
political authorities and power (1999: 161-162). 
                                                 
8 Torgerson does not undertake a reading of the political thought of Hannah Arendt from an environmental 
perspective. For such analysis, see Whiteside (1994; 1998), Szerzsinski (2003), MacGregor and Szerszinski 
(2004) and Macauley (1996). 
9 As Calhoun (2001) notes, Arendt generally uses the term “public space”. 
10 Although this concept is not mentioned in the book, Torgerson’s green public sphere could be defined as a 
“transnational public sphere” according to some of the theoretical developments of this notion. In this aspect, 
Torgerson’s account differs from classic public sphere theory, which is nation-state based. However, as 
Eckersley notes, despite the fact that Habermas originally conceived the public sphere as a point of 
connection between the state and civil society at the domestic level, in his later work he has accepted the 
existence of public spheres in the international arena. Similarly, in an article published in 2006, Torgerson 
explicitly focuses on the global dimension of the green public sphere (Torgerson, 2006). See Fraser (2009: 
Chapter 5) and Eckersley (2004: Chapter 7; 2005b) for conceptions of a transnational public sphere and 
overview of debates about its possibility. 
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In The Human Condition, Arendt draws a contrast between the “active life” and the 
“contemplative life”. The active life comprises “labor”, as the economic activity resulting 
from humans necessary exchange with nature, from the socionatural metabolism; “work” - 
or the making of artifacts, of civilisation, the non natural aspects of human life; and 
“action”. While labor and work have extrinsic ends, action is non-strategic, “self-
contained”; it is human conduct, in the form of speech, through which individuals manifest 
themselves, perceive each other, and represent their different identities and their shared 
humanity. As Torgerson notes, Arendt regards action conceived as debate to be the key 
aspect of politics (1999: 17). Using Arendt’s  tripartite scheme of the active life, Torgerson 
distinguishes three dimensions of politics: “functional politics” – related to labor - devoted 
to the creation and preservation of the social and economic system; “constitutive politics” 
– corresponding to work - aimed at building “the cultural artifice of a civilization”, 
including its institutions, the identities of its inhabitants and the features of their discourse; 
and “performative politics” – action - theatrical and oriented to itself, to the value inherent 
to politics (1999: 18). Torgerson’s theory is a celebration of the performative conception of 
politics. However, although he favours non-instrumental political action, and despite the 
fact that he envisages the green public sphere as a space for discourse, all three forms of 
politics – functional, constitutive and performative – are taken into account in his 
reassessment of green thought as an attempt to acknowledge at the same time the value of 
politics both as a process and as a product, as I will explain briefly.  
For Torgerson, the “promise of green politics” perceived as the project of building 
and maintaining a green public sphere lies in its liberating the potential of green thought 
for going beyond instrumentalism. The green public sphere offers an alternative to 
discussions about the identity and unity of the green movement, the definition of its ends 
and strategies to achieve them. In Torgerson’s view, most green political theory is 
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concerned with blueprints for transformative change and the construction of the collective 
subject that will bring it about. This, he argues, leads to the endeavour of shaping a “we”, a 
green identity that allows for the distinction between “us” and “them” (1999: 14, 18-20). 
Torgerson sees the “metaphor of the movement” as problematic because it stresses 
concerns about identity and direction or ends, and it is usually deployed to advance radical 
strategies for change.  
Rejecting a conception of green politics and the environmental movement in 
exclusively instrumental terms, Torgerson suggests a redefinition of political action. To do 
so, he focuses on the green public sphere understood as a common place11. He suggests 
that the green movement could construct itself as a public sphere, mixing the metaphor of 
the movement with that of the green public sphere. According to Torgerson, if debate 
within the green movement is valued for its own sake, the movement will construct itself 
as a public sphere. The metaphor of a green public sphere does not indicate the path that a 
movement has to cover to achieve certain aims, but “the space of a discourse”, “activity 
emerging within a place”. Therefore the identity and unity derives, not from a set of shared 
values, goals and strategies, but from dwelling in a collective space (1999: 14-19, 49, 
162)12.  
Consequently, the green public sphere is decentered; no single group takes the lead 
and determines the direction of debate. There is no unified agent but a plurality of agents 
interacting and representing their identities in the public space. Enacting a green public 
sphere - projected as an arena enabling an interchange of opinions and disagreement - 
                                                 
11 From an ecofeminist perspective, Chaone Mallory defends a similar conception of the green public sphere 
as a correction to what she defines as an instrumental green political theory that is oblivious to the fact that “a 
radical, green democratic project involves questions of not just how to ‘green’ existing political structures 
and practices but how to transform the political and the subject of politics” (2009). 
12 In an article published shortly after the book, Torgerson wonders if we have to say “farewell to the green 
movement” in order to abandon instrumentalism, but he admits that although this would seem the logical 
consequence of his argumentation, it is not a necessary step as long as one accepts that we are talking about 




would allow the green movement and green theory to be described in their own internal 
terms, rather than in terms of exclusion and opposition to external elements (1999: 126).  
On this account, “the we would not be an instrument, but a space of appearance, a common 
world” 
 (1999: 20, emphasis in the original). Departing from Habermas’ early formulation, 
feminist and postmodern theorists – wary of the unitary nature of the public sphere – have 
envisaged a plurality of public spheres that allows difference. Following this standpoint, 
Torgerson claims that there is not a unitary and uniform green public sphere but rather a 
plurality of green public spheres. Such public space is informed by an ecological and 
discursive ethos that provides a terrain for discussion where industrialist presuppositions 
are challenged. 
Debate has a foundational role in Torgerson’s scheme. It is also the form that the 
green public sphere adopts and the main political activity, the essence of politics itself. But 
debate is not viewed in terms of reaching a conclusion that might help to solve a problem 
and thus lead to the end of debate. By contrast, it is aimed at sustaining a communicative 
process in which participants are committed to keep on playing indefinitely, as debate is 
valued for its own sake (1999: 156-161)13. Deploying Arendt’s theatrical understanding of 
politics where political action is not judged according to its results, but valued as a 
performance, Torgerson argues that when goals are introduced in debate the theatrical and 
performative vanishes. Without the celebration of the intrinsic value of politics, once 
objectives have been achieved there is no more need for debate (1999: 154-155). 
In order to debate, a language is needed. In the green public sphere, “the language 
of the environment” (1999: 161) is spoken. Although the green discourse was developed 
by the green movement in civil society, it is spoken in diverse places with “different 
accents”, sometimes even as a “foreign tongue” (1999: 161), especially when spoken by 
                                                 
13 Torgerson employs several metaphors to exemplify the never-ending nature of debate. For instance, he 
evokes a dance in which the goal is to learn how to dance properly in order to keep on dancing indefinitely, 
and an infinite game which players cannot stop playing (1999: 156-157). 
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state institutions and business corporations in the administrative sphere. As Torgerson 
notes, the variety of green discourses represents a cultural challenge: the industrialist and 
colonialist assumptions of the conquest over the earth and nature, embedded in dominant 
discourses, are questioned (1999: 162-166)14. The green discourse is the basis of the green 
public sphere to the extent that, according to Torgerson, it is possible to recognize that a 
green public sphere exists because of a debate conducted in the language of the 
environment. Most characteristic of Torgerson’s theory is the idea that green discourse 
needs to include a comic dimension, laughter that is not intended to offend but rather to 
express ambiguity and tolerance, thus showing the absence of right answers.  
Torgerson explains that the background of crisis in which environmental thought 
and politics emerged denotes a sense of tragedy that is accentuated by the moralism and 
desperation of some forms of green discourse. An “aura of tragic seriousness”, fatalism, 
urgency and catastrophe surrounds the movement and has led greens to prioritise 
discussions about identity, and to favour dramatic, tragic measures like authoritarian 
solutions or radical transformations to reverse the current state of affairs (1999: 83-85). In 
Torgerson’s view, part of this serious attitude is due to a focus on strategy in green politics 
and to the fact that politics in general requires conviction and certainty. He believes that 
most environmentalists are anxiously concerned “to get things rights, to be consistent and 
coherent” (1999: 95); they would be inclined to think that “[s]trategy is serious business. 
We must be constantly vigilant, heroically tragic in our outlook. Comedy is out of the 
question” (1999: 21).  
For Torgerson, the metaphor of the green public sphere allows for an ironic, comic 
disruption of the tragic dimension of the green movement (1999: 49). Influenced by Joseph 
Merkel’s The Comedy of Survival (1974 and 1997), Torgerson wants to stress the 
                                                 
14 The “voices from the so-called underdeveloped countries” are also included in the green public sphere, 
particularly the voices of first peoples (Torgerson, 1999: xv), yet Torgerson’s discussion focuses on changes 
in discourses produced in Western industrialised countries. 
146 
 
importance of the comic for a politics that refuses to end discourse and that it is not 
obsessively concerned with ends. A politics of irony and comedy suggests for Torgerson 
the lack of purpose of action and points at the idea of intrinsic aims. Tragedy conceives 
humans as heroes while comedy stresses human limits, “cutting humanity down to size and 
dispelling human delusions of grandeur” (Torgerson, 1999: 87). Torgerson argues that 
environmental issues are framed within a cultural tradition that favours tragedy. But 
tragedy, he goes on, is the problem not the solution: human attempts to dominate nature are 
based on the tragic assumption that humanity is the privileged species on earth. Comedy is 
required if more respectful socio-natural relations are to be developed, to laugh about “the 
arrogant [human] pretensions of power and moralistic self-righteousness” (Torgerson, 
1999: 87). Following Bakhtin, Torgerson contends that seriousness is incomplete and has 
to be confronted with laughter. Just as antique tragedy did not exclude comedy, since a 
satyr would follow the tragedy to complement it, green politics has to correct its own 
seriousness with parody (Torgerson, 1999: 165).  
In Torgerson’s view, there is hope for green politics to be conceived as a comedy, 
since there is a comic, carnivalesque element to green politics, deployed with different 
languages and diverse contexts to expose its own tragic dimension and to caricature the 
arrogant decisions of the administrative mind; he brings our attention to citizens 
representing the funeral of a river and to the activities of groups like Greenpeace (1999: 
95). Torgerson argues that green politics often represses its comic features, but he 
encourages greens to promote the carnivalesque as the key to a form of green politics with 
intrinsic value. Torgerson paradigmatically refers to the Australian EAAAC 
(EcoAnarchoAbsurdistAdelaideCell), a network of groups that have humour, the fun, the 
absurd as their hallmarks. Their slogan is “You’ve got to be funny” and their view is that 
the only path for environmental change is “through uncoordinated, diverse, and absurd 
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political actions” (Torgerson, 1999: 93). This repertoire of actions embody an “idiom of 
the carnivalesque” that is crucial for the development of the green public sphere 
(Torgerson, 1999: 94). Hence the notion of rational discourse is expanded so as to include 
a variety of voices, laughter, the comic, the fun, tragedy. Situationist performances, 
carnivals, the absurd, the spiritual, meditation, play, passion, dancing and music, are 
privileged forms of communication in the green public sphere. 
Torgerson advances “playfulness” as necessary for a conception of politics 
characterised by a never-ending speech and as a prominent feature of the discourse of the 
green public sphere (1999: 103). Drawing on Meeker’s advocacy of a “play ethic”, 
Torgerson argues that if political debate is oriented towards extrinsic ends, its playfulness 
vanishes away. So debate has to be “played” for its own sake and conceived as a never-
ending game where players are committed to sustain debate indefinitely. As Torgerson 
puts it, “[i]n a context of political theatre, instrumentalism is often attenuated, at least 
momentarily displaced by a joy of performance” (1999: 155). The comic capacity of 
ecologism and an environmental politics based on comedy help Torgerson to build a 
conception of action as lacking any ends and to imagine what a performative green politics 
may be about.  
The green discourse has a communicative dimension and presupposes a discursive 
ethics. It is not aimed at reaching definitive conclusions but at sustaining a process of open 
and free discussion, thus making disagreement possible. The importance of sustaining a 
communicative discourse within the green public sphere lies in the unavoidable 
requirement of recognizing all different positions as a condition for the survival of the 
green public sphere. Rather than to substantive issues, communicative reason informing 
the green discourse is applied to the creation and maintenance of the conditions necessary 
to communicate with rational arguments, that is, to sustain, itself (Torgerson, 1999: 112-
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115). Rational discourse demands a “communication-community” grounded in a 
“collective commitment to a process of inquiry and discussion that is free and open” 
(Torgerson, 1999: 114). The communication-community is neither a given institution nor a 
physical place, but “the conditions we necessarily suppose to be adequately in place 
whenever we seek to communicate in the mode of rational argument”. It is a domain where 
relations of domination are excluded, a utopian community “out of place in an imperfect 
world” (Torgerson, 1999: 118). 
Creating a green public sphere requires an ecological ethos. In Torgerson’s view, 
this includes questions about the moral standing of non-humans, but it does not mean being 
committed to ecocentrism; rather, problematising ecocentrism would be key to the green 
public sphere, which does not privilege any moral or philosophical position (1999: 162-
163). The green public sphere has an anthropocentric membership15. Humans engaged in 
deliberations might possibly endorse ecocentric values and therefore widen the moral 
community, although the discursive community has to remain, by definition, human 
centred. Torgerson advances a green public sphere open to and inclusive of all strands of 
green thought. For him, ecological ethics is a communicative ethics able to accommodate 
all moral positions. This moral pluralism is the pedestal on which the green public sphere 
is built (1999: 105-106).  
Torgerson suggests that green politics should be conceived as the project of 
creating a green public sphere. But given how he understands the green public sphere, this 
seems too metaphorical and intangible a task. So a final question remains: how is the green 
public sphere going to be strengthened? Although Torgerson draws on Arendt’s conception 
of political action and on her idea that the value of politics lies in debate, he goes beyond 
her approach in that, for him, discourse is to be found not only in the performative aspect 
                                                 




of politics but also in the functional and constitutive. Torgerson argues that the three 
dimensions of green politics – functional, constitutive and performative - are needed for 
the creation of the green public sphere (1999: 132). He identifies green functional politics 
with reformist tendencies that operate within existing systems to make them more 
ecologically rational by influencing policy processes, while green constitutive politics is 
related to radical social change.  
In Torgerson’s view, both radical and reformist green approaches are instrumental 
and often neglect debate, but green performative politics appreciates political action as 
debate for its own sake. When focusing on performative politics, the categories of 
radicalism and reformism no longer apply, since there is no instrumental action, Torgerson 
argues. Insofar as Torgerson is interested in celebrating the intrinsic value of politics as 
debate, he identifies discourse in both functional and constitutive politics in order to assess 
the role that these two dimensions can play for green political thought and action, and in 
view of enhancing the green public sphere. Hence he refers to a discursive trend in policy 
professionalism, open to non-expert and citizen participation, characterised by debate.  
For Torgerson, this approach democratises functional politics, challenging the 
technocratic orientation to policy making (1999: 141). He contends that there is no space 
for such policy reform within green constitutive politics, committed to radical 
transformation. Torgerson believes that both green reformism and radicalism tend towards 
totalising postures, since they are devoted to either accepting or rejecting the existing 
order. He instead advocates an in-between position, “incremental radicalism”. This is a 
decentred account that allows difference, including a variety of groups, networks and 
orientations – accommodating both reform and radicalism, and fostering debate. In 
Torgerson’s view, this is not a strategy since it does not indicate a direction to be followed, 
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what it is to be done or the aims to be pursued. There is room for building alliances and 
working on joined projects but nothing points at unity and coherence, at one direction.  
As an example of this type of decentred strategy, Torgerson refers to the 
environmental justice movement which does not have a centralised organization and 
common principles, and covers a wide range of issues (1999: 150). Torgerson states that 
more than any other type of environmental politics, incremental radicalism highlights the 
limitations of instrumental action and of rigid standpoints, therefore enhancing the 
prospects for a green public sphere characterised by debate, diversity and disagreement. 
The focus is on a combination of both functional and constitutive politics: the functional 
dimension of politics is the immediate locus for action but it ultimately seeks to affect 
constitutive politics in the long-term, without prescribing a true, unique path for change as, 
in his view, most constitutive politics does. It is, thus, coherent with the openness and 
inclusivity that the green public sphere requires. Torgerson contends that radical strategies 
emphasising constitutive politics are oblivious to functional and incremental measures that 
could strengthen the green public sphere, such as policies seeking citizens’ access to 
information and participation as well as socioeconomic arrangements like basic income 
schemes with the potential of removing citizens’ insecurities and fears that prevent them 
from directing attention to environmental concerns.  From Torgerson’s perspective, with 
more free time and less need for constant paid work people would have more chances to 
participate in debate in the green public sphere (1999: 135-154, 160) 16.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Feminists would warn Torgerson than more free time for all is likely to result into women spending more 
time on household related activities while men engage in public speech. As MacGregor notes, proposals like 
Torgerson’s lack any consideration of how socially necessary work is to be distributed. In her view, there is 
an assumption of “a gender-neutral citizen and a gender-neutral model of citizenship practice that mask the 
realities and specificities of gender inequality while depending on a division of labour that frees autonomous 
citizens to participate in the public domain” (2006: 106). Although this is a very pertinent critique, and 
certainly one that should be taken into account, its adequate analysis exceeds the purposes of this thesis. 
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3. Ecological citizens and the green public sphere  
 
After having looked at Torgerson’s account in detail, it is now time to examine the 
opportunities for the promotion of ecological citizenship in a green public sphere. Perhaps 
the first implication from Torgerson’s scheme refers to the conception of ecological 
citizenship. The green public sphere is the place where a myriad of green discourses 
coexist. We may think of the green public sphere as the space where an ecological 
citizenship discourse – together with other ecologically informed discourses, like 
“ecological footprint”, “ecological debt” and “environmental justice” - has emerged.  
Emilio Luque’s conception of ecological citizenship is insightful when thinking 
about the promotion of ecological citizenship as a discourse in the green public sphere. His 
account is grounded in a definition of citizenship as a “speech location, an imaginary 
ground on which and from which one speaks ‘as a citizen’ in concrete places and 
moments” (2005: 211). Ecological citizenship is described as the “capacity of people 
around the world” to imagine that we live in a shared world, where global issues are 
interconnected and are susceptible of being dealt with jointly by all (2005: 212-213). Here 
citizenship is considered as the capacity to create “publics”, that is, the awareness that 
people are commonly affected by actions with consequences that go beyond the private 
realm and beyond those taking part in such actions, and the belief that shared regulation of 
those actions is needed.  
As Luque suggests, when applied to ecological citizenship this approach results in 
the idea that an ecological citizen considers herself part of a “we” or a community that 
shares ecological space, where everyone generates ecological footprints, and where the 
reduction of space is a shared responsibility. For Luque, in turn, this means that the 
ecological citizen acknowledges that common problems are the result of injustices and that 
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demands for collective regulation are claims for justice made in the name of other 
members of this imagined community. In his words, an ecological citizen will seek to 
construct a ‘we’ “with an obligation to act to redress the unjust situation considered” 
(2005: 213). As in Dobson’s conception, which Luque follows, ecological citizens are 
committed to do justice. For Luque, the purpose of the creation of a shared space for 
understanding and dialogue where injustice can be addressed is to bring about socio-
political change. 
Now, it is obvious that the practice of ecological citizenship is based on knowledge 
beyond that which is scientifically produced. It is a type of knowledge different from that 
which is facilitated through state-sponsored information campaigns. It became obvious in 
Chapter 3 that ecological citizenship presupposes a kind of knowledge and a discourse that 
contextualise environmental problems within a system encompassing social, economic and 
political issues and help citizens to identify injustice - not only environmental threats - and 
relate it to social structures. As Luque notes, gathering knowledge that relates personal acts 
to injustice, and injustice to the features of contemporary societies, is not an easy task. In 
this sense, ecological citizenship can be thought of as a process of “knowledge-seeking” 
(Luque, 2005: 214). Following Luque, it can be argued that this learning process is aimed 
at the search of knowledge constitutive of the awareness that: first, our acts as individuals 
and as part of a community have effects on other people and on the environment and 
therefore our everyday practices have harmful consequences for a collective; second, that 
those acts are social and structural environmental injustices, related to the way industrial 
societies are organised; and, third, that justice requires that the acts and relations causing 
harm be stopped and the harm compensated. In Luque’s view, when individuals speak in 
these terms, we can recognise “citizenship talk” (2005: 214). When individuals place 
themselves in this “speech position” (2005: 212) they enter the public sphere as citizens, 
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enabling “the public-spirited talk” (2005: 214). Following Iris Young, Luque adduces that 
this talk in the public sphere is aimed at persuading others and discussing collective action 
leading to social change (2005: 216)17.  
Both Torgerson and Luque refer to citizenship as the creation of a “we”. For 
Togerson, to act as a citizen means to “enact an identity in which narrow interests and 
perspectives – the centerpiece of liberal politics – become marginalized”. This identity is 
constructed in the course of debate, which “fosters an imaginative interplay of identities, 
interests, and perspectives that encourages evaluations and judgments from an enlarged 
viewpoint” (Torgerson, 1999: 129). So, for Torgerson, citizenship is also a speech act. The 
difference between the two approaches is that Luque’s citizens are not just committed to 
the value of politics and debate for its own sake; they are not simply devoted to learn to 
dance, to keep on playing for the only fun of dancing and playing, for the game not to end. 
Luque conceives citizens as “the necessary actors of global political change” (2005: 212), 
with their activity being oriented to redressing injustice. For Luque citizens are to form the 
“we” that will talk, persuade one another, disagree about the means to bring about change, 
while for Torgerson the “we” is devoted to an ongoing discourse that celebrates the value 
of debate. Luque’s vision of citizenship and the public space is a more appropriate focus to 
move forward a justice-based and ends-oriented notion of ecological citizenship within a 
green public sphere.  
Although acknowledging the intrinsic value of citizenship and accepting that it 
necessitates the making of a space for debate where people can speak as citizens, I seek to 
emphasise the strategic dimension of citizenship action as leading to progressive, 
                                                 
17 As Luque laments, there is very little of this type of talk that should lead to collective knowledge in the 
present public sphere, dominated by mass media (2005: 218-219). So a further topic of inquiry should be: 
how can this collective knowledge be generated? What are the conditions needed for this type of knowledge 
to arise and be spread? Fostering more debate about socio-environmental issues may be one answer. Another 
answer may be engaging in activity with fellow citizens that produces the result of generating collective 
knowledge amongst the people engaged in such practices. This is a central question in my next chapter. 
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emancipatory aims. Even when ecological citizenship is conceived predominantly as a 
discourse, a commitment to justice as a social and political objective – and not simply as 
an instrument to secure debate – is required. Ecological citizenship also presupposes a 
particular conception of justice, as giving to every individual what is due to them, what 
they need - for instance, ecological space. Such a discourse is related to the fact that 
injustice and inequalities are not the isolated product of individuals’ behavioural patterns, 
but rather they are part of a broader context, namely the way industrial societies are 
organised. As Luque notes, when justice is the source of citizens’ motivation, he argues, 
they will be encouraged to pursue structural transformation (2005: 215). Consequently, 
ecological citizenship activity, beyond the transformation of individual behaviours and 
attitudes, beyond encouraging debate, has to question unjust and antiecological institutions 
of contemporary societies that thwart ecological citizenship. The critical assessment of the 
role of the state as an agent for ecological citizenship transformation (in Chapter 1) 
suggested this structural approach. 
The above understanding of ecological citizenship would be problematised by some 
green writers of citizenship. In Chapter 1 I alluded to critiques of the concept of ecological 
citizenship in this vein; let me take them up here. Endorsing Torgerson’s criticism of the 
instrumentalism inherent to environmental thought and politics, Latta suggests that the 
“crisis-oriented construction of imperatives” also affects green theories of citizenship, 
where ecological citizenship is treated as “a normative and institutional tool for promoting 
a greener future” (2007: 379). In his view, this approach reduces the “democratic 
sensibility” that citizenship can add to green politics (2007: 381). Similarly, MacGregor 
and Szerszynski contend that most literature on ecological citizenship conceives 
citizenship as an instrument for the realisation of the environmental common good. For 
them, in most understandings of ecological citizenship individuals are put to the service of 
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the environment, and citizenship “is performed not as an end in itself, but in terms of its 
functionality in the maintenance of biological life, thus turning the political from a realm 
of freedom to a realm of necessity” (2003: 14). Ecological citizens, they contend, are 
“reduced to the status of the Fordist worker, ‘doing their bit’ as part of a larger process that 
they can perceive only dimly, and which is unable to grant meaning on their activity” 
(2003: 14-15). The authors believe that when ecological citizenship activity is not granted 
intrinsic value but seen as a mere means, there is a risk of being co-opted and used in a 
manipulative way by governments to achieve their own objectives, and we saw in Chapter 
3 how this may occur18. They join Torgerson and Arendt in their celebration of the intrinsic 
value of citizenship and suggest that citizenship should entail an ongoing deliberation 
about its own meaning (2003: 15-16).  
The previous chapter introduced a conception of ecological citizenship as a 
learning process and including a deliberative dimension. Far from dismissing the intrinsic 
value of citizenship, I argued that ecological citizenship requires public discussion about 
its meaning, its practical forms and the concrete ends that its practice seeks to achieve, 
including the definition of the type of just sustainability that ecological citizens would 
want to pursue. In fact, I contended that perhaps the most effective way to overcome some 
of the limitations and obstacles of certain forms of state-sponsored ecological citizenship 
illustrated in Chapter 3 is through democratic debate.  
Yet I do not think that a conception of ecological citizenship as having intrinsic 
value is necessarily inconsistent with an account of ecological citizenship as being aimed 
at social change. I endorse the view that political action - including democratic debate - 
and ecological citizenship lose their emancipatory potential if the focus is placed on their 
                                                 
18 The risk of co-option of ecological citizenship by state bodies was noted in the previous chapter. But I do 
not think that the co-option of ecological citizenship is the result of a conception of citizenship as a means to 
an end – instead of something valuable for its own sake – as MacGregor and Szerzinski imply, but the result 
of an individualistic account of citizenship that stresses individual lifestyle change over collective 
responsibility and systemic injustice, as I argued.  
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intrinsic value rather than on the way they can contribute to much needed structural change 
to redress all forms of injustice. Ongoing and open-ended debate can lead to reflexive 
learning and to knowledge that, perhaps, is a precondition for practice. In this sense, green 
public spheres are crucial for the practice of ecological citizenship. But it is dangerous to 
emphasise debate that has no purpose, that seeks no conclusions and that is kept going for 
fun, as Torgerson does. While virtuous citizens debate, capitalism and neoliberal practices 
destructive for the environment and for humans expand and strengthen.  
To suggest that because there is no objective environmental knowledge but rather 
ignorance, uncertainty and complexity, we should abandon purposive action - and focus 
instead on stressing these contradictions by virtue of favouring a form of action that is 
performative, theatrical, fun and absurd - is a type of argument that can be appropriated by 
ecosceptics and pseudo-greens who deny the existence of the ecological crisis and urge 
ecologists to forget about their principles and focus on formal democratic procedures. It is 
also at risk of being co-opted by governments and businesses to pursue their own anti-
ecological interests. These arguments suggest that despite being “the promise of green 
politics”, Torgerson’s green public sphere is not very promising for the cultivation of 
ecological citizenship as outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. A closer examination of the 
dominant conception of the green public sphere in the eco-political literature is thus needed 
so as to further analyse its limitations and explore the way its potential for the promotion of 








4. In search of a telos: a critique of the green public sphere  
 
The study of the notion of the green public sphere as mapped by Torgerson prompts 
some teleological questions which connect with my concerns in this inquiry about the 
place of strategy in green political thought and the aims of political action, particularly, 
citizen activity. In this section, I first undertake a critique of Torgerson’s account aimed at 
showing that perhaps it is more instrumental than he intended. Then I move onto a 
problematisation of the main feature of his theory, namely his celebration of the intrinsic 
value of debate and a politics for its own sake. I argue that this conception is detrimental 
for both a green theory of the public sphere and the promotion of ecological citizenship.  
Despite his critique of strategic politics and ends-oriented green theory, Torgerson 
falls into a form of instrumentalism. He argues that although Habermas attempted to break 
“the circle of instrumentality” his public sphere in the end “rejoins” it insofar as it has clear 
aims, namely to discuss and assess a direction for social development (2000: 5) and to 
influence decisions made by authority (1999: 15-16). Torgerson seeks to correct the 
Habermasian view using Arendt’s perception of politics as having intrinsic ends and value. 
But notwithstanding this move, Torgerson also rejoins the circle of instrumentality in 
various ways, as I will try to illustrate.  
The green public sphere is aimed at securing and maintaining a “process of 
ecologically informed discourse” (1999: 20) that questions the prevailing assumptions of 
industrialism. In conceiving debate as both a precondition and an end, the green public 
sphere is committed to sustaining debate in order to survive. The end of debate would 
mean the end of the green public sphere itself, as Torgerson acknowledges (1999: 161). By 
encouraging a never-ending, comic, fun, intrinsically valuable discursive process, 
Torgerson believes that the green public sphere would contribute to the strengthening of 
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democratic practices, to the rethinking of Nature-human relationships and to the 
affirmation of the value of human creativity and imagination in politics (1999: 20, 129-
130). These are all objectives and ends of the green public sphere. 
Torgerson’s picture is rather ambiguous in that, on the one hand, he argues that 
“debate is a language game” and that “any game pressed into the service of external goals 
tends to lose its playful quality; it ceases to be fun” (1999: 155).  And, on the other hand, 
he states that green discourse can and should sometimes influence “agenda setting, 
problem definition and epistemological criteria in the policy process” (1999: 161-162). So, 
in this case, Torgerson seems to be indicating that debate is not only performative action 
but also an instrument to affect policy, although this conception of debate is clearly 
marginalised in his account. 
Furthermore, Torgerson suggests that the strengthening of a green public sphere 
could advance the creation of a shared identity within ecologism (1999: 18-19). He 
believes that there is a “highly personalistic notion of ethics in green moralism” (1999: 
106) that emphasises “personal consciousness” (1999: 105). This “individualistic posture” 
neglects the common dimension, “denies the we - the shared context of understanding and 
value – that makes for meaningful discourse” (1999: 106). For Torgerson this unveils “the 
antipolitical character of a green ethical discourse that focuses on individual sensibility and 
decision” and praises “individual restraint and sacrifice” (1999: 131). This position was 
discussed in Chapter 3, in relation to the way it informs state-centred initiatives to 
implement ecological citizenship. It was indicated that a focus on structures could work to 
counteract the individualistic tendencies of some green accounts of politics and citizenship. 
Torgerson’s solution is different: the creation of a common space or a “we for ethical 
debate and deliberation” (1999: 106, emphasis in the original) in which green politics can 
be pursued. So despite his explicit rejection of a “we” as a collective subject (i.e. the 
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Marxian historical agent), there is in fact a “we” in his account: a shared context for 
understanding, a common space of appearance, a place for debate. Torgerson distinguishes 
between “an idealized we that can prepare for the journey ahead” and a “partially existing 
we, capable of shared meaning” (1999: 49, emphases in the original). It could be argued 
that Torgerson replaces a form of instrumentalism (i.e. debate oriented to goals, values and 
policies) with another which asks us to accept that the end of environmental political 
theory should be the creation of a space for debate, and that other issues like pursuing 
social equality should be oriented to the creation of such a “we”.   
Some may contend that Torgerson never intended to reject instrumentalism 
altogether, and this is true. In fact, he states that “the intrinsic value of politics as 
performative artistry” (1999: 154) praised by Arendt can be embraced without neglecting 
the role that functional and constitutive politics may play for certain objectives to be 
accomplished. Torgerson endorses Arendt’s view that if the intrinsic value of politics is not 
acknowledged, once the ends are achieved, there is no further rationale for functional and 
constitutive political activity (1999: 154). But he suggests that the green public sphere 
“cannot be an arena of pure performativity – just a theatre appreciated for its own sake – 
but must also be concerned with outcomes relevant to its own construction and protection: 
to the project of building and shaping a green public sphere” (1999: 20, emphasis added).  
Torgerson attempts to go beyond Arendt and to embrace some form of strategic 
political action when he claims that “action as performance cannot stand alone” and that 
performative politics should not be made “into some pure, independent form entirely 
detached from instrumental aspects” (1999: 157). He seems to concede a significant role to 
constitutive politics as, in his view, “constituting ‘a space of appearance’ is a necessary 
condition for action; in our terms, performative politics depends on constitutive politics” 
(1999: 157). But for him constitutive politics is reduced to “the creation of a we for public 
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discourse” (1999: 157, emphasis in the original), which, in Arendtian terms, can only be 
achieved through “promises”. As Torgerson puts it “the we of a public sphere presupposes 
implicit or explicit mutual promising among the actors who comprise it…the promises 
immanent to a green public sphere provide a meaningful context for debate” (1999: 157-
158, emphasis in the original). Creating a “we” is constitutive, instrumental politics; but it 
is built on a vague conception of strategic action for the aims are only intrinsic to debate 
and politics as performance. In other words, Torgerson accepts the value of goal-directed 
action but for him this is mainly related to the elusive task of creating a “we”.  
In addition, Torgerson also differs from Arendt in that, unlike her, he finds value in 
the functional and constitutive dimensions of politics; but, as I explained earlier, in order to 
do so, he has to identify debate within these two dimensions of politics. This indicates that 
for these two types of action to be taken into account in Torgerson’s scheme they have to 
be considered either as including debate for its own sake – so that they do not have 
extrinsic but  intrinsic aims - or as being an instrument for the creation of the space of 
appearance that forms the green public sphere. Certainly functional and constitutive 
practices have a role to play in Torgerson’s scheme of politics and in his theory of the 
green public sphere. But it would be misleading to stress this element of his position and 
overlook what is most characteristic and distinctive: the celebration of the intrinsic value of 
politics and a conception of political action as comic, fun, theatrical, playful and non-
purposive. This is the singularity of his approach, which is what I want to problematise in 
this inquiry. 
A further implication of Torgerson’s stress on the intrinsic value of politics is the 
instrumental, peripheral role that he concedes to social issues. Once more, the influence 
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that the work of Hannah Arendt exerts in Torgerson’s theorisation is highly visible
19. 
Torgerson notes that, for Arendt, political action as “artful performance” with intrinsic 
value emerges when there is a public domain constituted for this purpose. Arendt believed 
that modern politics - unlike the Greek polis - lacks such an account of public space and of 
the political and, in this sense, has no significance (Torgerson, 1999: 132). She was 
concerned with the modern emancipation of economic affairs from the private realm 
produced as a result of market relations and capitalism, which resulted in the “socialization 
of the economy” and the erosion of subsistence household economies. With this 
transformation, economic issues became public concerns, putting into question the 
distinction between the public and the private realms. For Arendt this process marked the 
erosion of public discourse, the decline of the political and “the rise of the social”; it 
triggered the transformation of the public domain of politics into an arena where citizens 
become consumers and producers. In line with the republican tradition, she laments 
citizens’ disconnection from politics and unconcern for the common good, together with 
the decline of public space due to the rise of private interests (Benhabib, 1992; Calhoun, 
2001).  Arendt therefore makes a clear distinction between the political - or the realm of 
free speech about issues of principle like freedom, participation and institutional 
organisation - and the social - the arena for collective problems, inequality, poverty and 
environmental degradation (Dryzek, 1990a: 19).  
According to Arendt, politics has a key opportunity to affirm its intrinsic value 
during revolutionary stages, when free debate is most likely to arise. However, looking 
back at the historical experiences of the French and Russian revolutions, she argues that 
such a hope evaporates whenever “the social question” is raised and brought into the public 
realm. For her, the lack of satisfaction of human needs and poverty leads to desperate 
                                                 
19 For the analysis of the role of socioeconomic issues in the thought of Hannah Arendt, Torgerson draws on 




situations in which people cannot act freely and respectfully in the public sphere. 
Whenever the domain of necessity bursts into the free kingdom of political debate, a threat 
of collapse of the public arena emerges – insofar as politics is reduced to means - and the 
equal exchange of opinions in a shared space is confronted. In converting the public realm 
into a terrain of means and thus reducing it to an instrument, the public space for 
discussion is threatened and totalitarianisms, which are a main concern in Arendt’s 
thought, have a free hand. As Torgerson argues, Arendt believed that the reduction of 
politics to means resulted in “the collapse of the public space, the abolition of politics in 
favour of authoritarian governance”. Therefore, in her account, the social is excluded from 
what is truly political - in as much as technocracy and policy-making (functional politics) 
are left outside (Torgerson, 1999: 132-135).  
Torgerson points out that Arendt’s exaltation of performative politics “ultimately 
seems empty, form without substance, a politics without political content” (1999: 134). 
Since the substance of debates does not matter to performative politics, Torgerson notes 
that Arendt’s account was soon criticised on the grounds that it is not clear what those 
engaged in debates are talking about, for she rules out most of the common topics in 
political debate, like the social question and social policy. For Arendt, taking part in public 
life results in “public happiness”; it is fun. But, as Torgerson notes, she would not regard 
functional politics as fun but as management and administration seeking the provision of 
basic needs. Torgerson stresses that on the one hand, Arendt conceives administration as 
an evil responsible for the lack of meaningful, true politics; on the other hand, she 
welcomes the capacity of the state to provide for the satisfaction of everyone’s needs and 
create opportunities for political action. In Arendt’s view, basic needs and issues of social 
policy concern governments; they are not a matter of public debate, of opinion, but have to 
be dealt with by experts and bureaucrats, because there is nothing to argue or disagree 
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about: they must be guaranteed. In placing socioeconomic decisions within the 
administrative sphere, Arendt confines them to the arena of functional politics (Torgerson, 
1999: 131-135). For her, social and collective problems can only be solved through 
instrumental rationality; therefore, if the public sphere of politics is to be preserved as a 
sphere for communicative rationality, then there is no room in it for social problem-
solving20. Dryzek believes that for Arendt “there should be no more to politics than talk” 
(Dryzek, 1990a: 53). According to Torgerson, in Arendt’s account, functional politics are 
an instrument to secure a world of performative politics. Similarly, she would argue that 
performative politics depends on constitutive politics, on the creation of a space of 
appearance.  As Torgerson notes, her understanding of politics assumes functional and 
constitutive purposes, in so far as she would accept that performance relies both on basic 
needs being guaranteed (functional dimension) and an artifice or cultural space of 
institutions and identities that support political action (constitutive politics). But the fact 
that these instrumental dimensions are a prerequisite for performative action cannot be 
taken to mean that for Arendt, they are part of politics. Torgerson believes that Arendt is 
not clear about that, but his own purpose is to argue that they can be part of politics 
without compromising the idea of politics as being non-instrumental (2000: 4), as 
illustrated above. 
Following Benhabib (1992) and Dryzek (1990a), it can be objected that Arendt’s 
account of politics and the public space is based on three related misconceptions: the 
social-political dichotomy in modern democratic life, the consideration of issues of justice 
                                                 
20 Dryzek notes that Arendt’s dichotomy also pervades Habermas’ theory. His distinction between the 
“lifeworld” and the “system” is grounded on the idea that the lifeworld is the realm of communicative 
rationality, “where individuals construct and interpret the identities of themselves and others, their morality, 
aesthetic sensibilities, and common culture”, while the system is home to “strategizing, technical 
manipulation, cost efficiency, and instrumental rationality” deployed by the state (Dryzek, 1990a: 20), the 
economy and in the satisfaction of the needs of the social system. The difference between the two 
philosophers is that the Habermasian lifeworld is not essentially political. The work of Dryzek on the 
contrary represents an attempt to apply communicative rationality to social problem solving, on the grounds 




as private matters, and the opposition between communicative and instrumental forms of 
rationality. I suggest that these three issues influence Torgerson’s model of the green 
public sphere, so I will briefly examine each of them. 
Benhabib states that, under conditions of modernity, the distinction between the 
social and the political no longer applies. This is not because the administrative sphere 
pervades the public sphere, replacing politics with economic relations - as Arendt would 
seem to suggest - but because as formerly excluded groups (like women, workers and 
racial minorities) gain access to the public space, their concerns are politicised and 
incorporated into the public space. The Ancient model of the public space and politics that 
Arendt praises was based on the exclusion of large groups (including women, children, 
non-Greeks and slaves) whose labour made it possible for privileged citizens to devote to 
the “leisure for politics”. Since the emancipation of these groups from the private domain 
led to the rise of the social, in Arendtian terms, her exclusion of the social may be taken, 
according to Benhabib, as a neglect of political universalism. So the project of building a 
public space under conditions of modernity appears as an “elitist and antidemocratic 
project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for political emancipation and the 
universal extension of citizenship rights…” (Benhabib, 1992: 75). Dryzek reaches the 
same conclusion when he argues that Arendt’s account of politics is discursive but “hardly 
democratic”, since, like in ancient Athens, politics is left for “a self-selected elite” 
(Dryzek, 1990a: 19-20). 
On the other hand, Arendt fails to acknowledge that “the struggle to make 
something public is a struggle for justice” (Benhabib, 1992: 79). The emancipation of 
workers that brought issues of property onto the public agenda, and the emancipation of 
women that made household relations enter the political arena, were struggles to bring 
those previously considered social and private issues into the public domain of politics. 
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Insofar as they are mediated by power relations, these issues and struggles are not a matter 
of private preference but a question of public justice. According to Benhabib, “[t]o make 
issues of common concern public...means making them accessible to discursive will 
formation, it means to democratize them” (1992: 94).  
Due to these two misconstructions, Benhabib argues that Arendt holds an 
“essentialist” conception of the public space as a site for one particular form of activity - 
action (excluding labour and work) - and only one distinct content of debate - politics 
understood in narrow terms (1992: 80). An essentialist view of the public sphere that 
excludes labour and work (including economic relations and technology) and confines 
them to the private sphere of preferences or to the instrumental administrative sphere has to 
be resisted. As Benhabib notes, both types of activity can and should become issues of 
public discussion in the political public sphere, and be “reflexively challenged and placed 
into question from the standpoint of the asymmetrical power relations governing them” 
(1992: 80). 
Finally, Dryzek observes that Arendt assumes a clear separation between 
instrumental and communicative forms of rationality. But - he argues - these two forms of 
reason are not necessarily divided and do not always stand in opposition to each other; 
indeed they can coexist. Communicative rationality and discursive democracy can be 
found within the domain of what Arendt would define as instrumental rationality, like 
problem solving and certain forms of policy making (Dryzek, 1990a: 20). Although 
communicative rationality deals with interpersonal discourse and can be used to arrive at 
normative principles beyond a narrow focus on means, it also refers to “coordination of 
actions”, and therefore cannot completely displace instrumental rationality (Dryzek, 1990a: 
14). In Dryzek’s view, “[i]f problems can only be solved through purely instrumental 
action, then clearly problem solving has no place in the critical theory program” (Dryzek, 
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1990a: 53). Arendt would share this claim; in fact, she opposed social problem-solving on 
the grounds that it pertains to the terrain of instrumental reason. However, following 
Dryzek, it can be argued that problem-solving cannot be reduced to instrumental 
rationality, and that communicative rationality can help in the search of solutions.  
Torgerson acknowledges that communicative rationality can be found in the 
domain of instrumental rationality. He identifies situations in which debate and politics 
with intrinsic value can be found in functional and constitutive political action. However, 
his account of socio-economic issues is still highly influenced by Arendt’s conception of 
the political. He does not reject Arendt’s social-political dualism, which underpins her 
distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality, since he is concerned with 
affirming the intrinsic value of politics as debate about itself. The use of an Arendtian 
framework limits Torgerson’s green theory of the public sphere, especially due to the 
misconceptions outlined. First and foremost, Torgerson’s account is characterised by a 
general exclusion of social and economic aspects on the grounds that they are strategic 
and, when included, a functional conception defines them as means to the ends of 
communicative rationality and the expansion of the green public sphere. The role 
Torgerson assigns to social and economic concerns is to create the conditions needed for 
rational discourse to flourish and “to make the community-communication something more 
than a vague hope” (1999: 124). On the one hand - he would argue - basic social and 
economic needs ought to be met as a precondition for one’s engagement in the vita activa; 
on the other hand, those suffering basic shortages are more likely to violate the postulates 
of the communication process. As part of the incremental radicalism he endorses, 
Torgerson contemplates the design of economic and social policy, like the basic income, 
aimed at reducing citizens’ vulnerabilities and fears that prevent them to focus on 
environmental issues (2000: 15). These types of measures would, in his view, contribute to 
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the enhancement of the green public sphere, since they could encourage citizens’ 
engagement in public spirited talk about environmental issues.  
Yet this approach suggests that social and economic wellbeing do not have intrinsic 
value as social objectives, and that they can be accepted as valid topics of debate only 
insofar as they are means to realise the performative value of politics. Consequently, 
Torgerson fails to acknowledge that what he regards as instrumental are issues of public 
justice, of power; therefore, they have to be democratized and made subject of collective 
debate in the green public sphere - not so much because they contribute to the expansion of 
the green public sphere, as Torgerson may accept, but because they are collective, social 
aims. So achieving social equality has to be included and addressed in the green public 
sphere as a way of confronting power and engaging in a struggle against those institutions 
that perpetuate relations of domination and injustice. 
For Torgerson, as for Arendt, politics is reduced to talk. This results in an 
essentialist conception of the green public sphere, as a site for only one type of political 
activity, debate, and only self-referential debate, about its own conditions and the intrinsic 
value of politics. Fraser distinguishes between a proceduralist account of the public sphere 
that conceives it as a locus for “certain types of discourse interaction”, and a substantive 
definition focusing on the public sphere as a space for discussion about particular problems 
and issues (1992: 142, footnote 33). Following this distinction, it could be argued that 
Torgerson understands the green public sphere in procedural terms, in the sense that what 
matters for him is that debate be conducted in a particular fashion, that is, focused on itself, 
following the rules of communicative ethics and spoken in the language of the 
environment, regardless of outcomes. The lack of concern for social equality, justice and 
other extrinsic goals like empowerment as valuable ends - and not just means to achieve 
communicative rationality or to celebrate the value of politics - reduces the scope of debate 
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in Torgerson’s green public sphere to political issues understood in a narrow sense. This, in 
turn, leads to a neglect of the transformative potential of the green public sphere for 
bringing about social and environmental change. Despite Torgerson’s concern for 
diversity, participation and inclusion, if issues of power and ends-oriented action are not 
brought into the public realm, the green public sphere risks becoming a club for a selected 
elite, like the ancient Greek polis and the Arendtian public space.  
Despite the above assertions, the position of socio-economic issues in Torgerson’s 
theory can be interpreted differently. He contends that we would recognise that a green 
public sphere has emerged, amongst other possible signs, when the media were promoting 
sustainability rather than consumption. Another indicator of the rise of the green public 
sphere would be the displacement of privileged industrialism by discourses such as the 
unequal distribution of environmental costs according to race, class and gender, and the 
real environmental impact of every product. This clearly indicates that Torgerson is 
concerned about discourses with a social and environmental justice dimension. However, 
even if one accepts that social, economic, and justice related issues are taken into account 
as aims of debate in the green public sphere, for Torgerson these are simply discourses. 
And, unfortunately, he does not seek to encourage ways to make these discourses lead to 
transformative action, because this would result in the end of the green public sphere, 
according to his Arendtian understanding of political space.  
This is the second major limitation in Torgerson’s theory (the first is the neglect of 
ends-oriented action with all its implications discussed so far): the lack of practical and 
political orientation. Two points have to be stressed. First, Torgerson does not entertain the 
idea that discourse and debate may lead to practice and to collective, transformative socio-
environmental action. And, second, his scepticism towards strategic action leads him to 
ignore the reverse possibility: that certain ends-oriented practices create new forms of 
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knowledge and green discourses that will then enter the green public sphere, giving rise to 
more green public spheres and maintaining them through those activities that generate 
knowledge, virtue, values and identities (but this will be illustrated in my next chapter). In 
Torgerson’s view maintaining a green public sphere should be prioritised over the green 
movement’s activity. But if a green public sphere is founded on different flows of green 
discourses that emerged as a result of ecological activism, then the importance of pro-
environmental citizen, community and social movement activity cannot be underestimated. 
Let me explain the second limitation in Torgerson’s account: the lack of practical and 
political orientation. To do so, it is useful to reintroduce in our discussion the issue of 
functions of a public sphere in relation to democracy, mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter. 
Following Habermas, Calhoun explains that the merits of the public sphere have to 
be assessed in the light of the extent to which it facilitates discourse about social issues that 
is “rational-critical” and “influential” (Calhoun, 1993: 276). If this is accepted, it follows 
then that the green public sphere cannot be judged only in terms of the value of its intrinsic 
processes and the quality of debates, as Torgerson would seem to contend. It also has to be 
assessed according to the results achieved. Besides following the rules of communicative 
rationality, discourse has to be critical and influential. A critical discourse is that which 
challenges all forms of power and domination. The inclusion of social and economic issues 
in the green public sphere is not just a matter of broadening the terms of discourse; it is a 
question of justice (both environmental and social). And, as such, through this inclusion, 
the green public sphere becomes an arena for struggles for justice, power, equality, that is, 
an arena for action aimed at achieving certain aims. Torgerson’s overemphasis on the value 
of debate for its own sake makes him blind to the fact that “the struggle over what gets 
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included in the public agenda is itself a struggle for justice and freedom”, to put it in 
Benhabib’s words (1992: 79) and not simply a way to change the terms of a discourse.  
Torgerson focuses on shifts in discourse, but he does not go far enough as he 
neglects that such transformation in discourse has aims, and that fulfilling those aims is 
what a politics of the green public sphere should consist of, if the green public sphere is to 
be part of a normative theory that seeks to democratise society. Green public spheres could 
be thought of as vehicles for emancipation, inclusion, empowerment, and as means to 
challenge all forms of domination in late-capitalist democracies. If the green public sphere 
is not critical, oppositional, confrontational, if it does not challenge the state and the 
economic institutions that perpetuate injustice and limit further democratisation, it loses its 
transformative and emancipatory potential to bring about social change. The  neglect of 
strategic action not only means the end of the metaphor of the movement celebrated by 
Torgerson, but also the end of all social struggle aimed at challenging privileges by 
democratic means. 
 As Eckersley suggests, dismissing instrumental action aimed at realising more just 
societies would be “naïve”, given the amount of people favoured by the preservation of 
those institutions that cause environmental and social injustice; as long as power is not 
democratic, instrumental action is needed (2004: 157-158)21. In her view, Torgerson is 
aware of this; that is why she believes that he welcomes strategic action that seeks to 
include excluded voices. It is true that Torgerson’s emphasis in inclusion and diversity 
compels him to accept purposive activity aimed at strengthening the green public sphere. 
                                                 
21 Although Eckersley is more explicit than Torgerson about the importance of strategic action, she shares 
with Torgerson the idea that acceptable instrumental activity has to seek to “establish the conditions for fair 
and free deliberation” (2004: 158). She claims that goal-directed activity can only be justified when it is 
directed at making communicative rationality possible. For Eckersely, these arguments justify not only state 
intervention to regulate the market and powerful interest groups, but also social movement activity targeting 
economic and political institutions that contribute to environmental degradation and injustice. Although these 
activities, she argues, seem to oppose the ideal of unconstrained communication, they are in fact serving this 
ideal, in so far as they challenge inequalities that act as obstacles to free and equal communication.  
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But it does not lead him to embrace collective objectives or social change. His ends-
oriented activity has the aim of expanding and maintaining the green public sphere for its 
own sake and promoting the intrinsic value of politics as debate. This cannot prompt us to 
affirm – as Eckersley does - that Torgerson accepts debate about aims and collective 
decisions; rather, he welcomes those activities that have the aim of broadening the 
representation of views in the green public sphere. Although he champions diversity, and 
despite the fact that his account of the green public sphere seeks inclusion, for him the 
possible range of objects of debate is restricted to its narrowest, to its own conditions; it is 
not about decision-making. This point is missing in Eckersley’s brief discussion of 
Torgerson’s theory. 
Other than being rational and critical, discourse in the green public sphere should 
be influential and avoid “too much thought at the expense of action” (Connelly, 2006: 66). 
As Dryzek notes, the concept of the public sphere can inspire an account of politics based 
on free and open discourse amongst citizens, mainly concerned with mutual understanding 
and reflexive learning. But the idea of the public sphere can also motivate an account of 
politics rooted in collective action and the (discursive) resolution of social problems 
(Dryzek, 1990a: 38-39). With a focus on the first aspect noted by Dryzek, the accounts of 
both Torgerson and Arendt omit the second one. Torgerson justifies deliberation because 
of the intrinsic value of the communicative process as well as for the way it allows 
difference. This proceduralist approach contrasts with what Dryzek refers to as “the 
epistemic argument for deliberation” that looks at the increased rationality of outcomes as 
the justification of discursive politics. For Dryzek, if deliberation is to be related to 
collective problem-solving it needs to incorporate this epistemic justification (2000: 173-
174). According to Przeworski, an orientation towards the making of decisions that are 
“binding on a community” and that deals with “how to act collectively” is what makes 
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deliberation “political” (1998: 140). From this point of view, it may be argued that 
Torgerson’s characterisation of the green public sphere and the types of deliberation that 
take place in it would be nonpolitical. 
But for discourse to be influential – as well as rational and critical – it is not enough 
that it is aimed at collective decision-making and social problem-solving – or that it is 
political, in Przeworski’s terms; deliberations have to be given practical form. As Calhoun 
observes, a public sphere carries the “potential for the people organised in civil society to 
alter their own conditions of existence by means of rational-critical discourse”, but the 
public sphere represents only a “potential, because its agreements must be brought to 
fruition, or at least brought into struggle, in a world of practical affairs where power still 
matters…” (1993: 279, emphasis in the original). 
Fraser notes that the public sphere, beyond the mere explanation of how 
communication happens, should serve to develop “a normative political theory of 
democracy”. To this end, a public sphere understood as “a space for the communicative 
generation of public opinion” should be valid and effective. A public sphere is morally and 
politically valid when all those who are legitimately allowed to participate (i.e. all those 
affected) are included, when participation is accomplished under conditions of equality and 
freedom, and when public opinion thus generated represents the interests of citizens about 
their common life. On the other hand, a public sphere is effective when the public opinion 
that it produces is able to constrain political power. This happens when public opinion is 
deployed as a “political force”, particularly, to empower citizens versus private powers, to 
secure the accountability of the state, and facilitate influence over state authority in order 
to rationalise domination. Fraser argues that if these two elements, moral and political 
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validity and citizen empowerment, are missing in a notion of the public sphere, “the 
concept loses its critical force and its political point” (2005: 1-3)22.  
In the light of these arguments, one should ask whether Torgerson’s concept of the 
green public sphere is morally and politically valid as well as capable of achieving the 
goals of rationalisation of domination and a challenge to private power that a public sphere 
may be related to. The answer seems to be negative if the focus remains on speech that is 
an end in itself. For Torgerson, the green public sphere depends on the quality and form of 
discourse and on openness to citizens’ participation. The idea that there is purposive debate 
in the public sphere aimed at generating “communicative power” that rationalises state 
authority and represses private power is neglected. His green public sphere observes the 
condition of procedural validity (yet only to a certain extent, since for him deliberation is 
not always about issues of common concern, rather it is mostly about its own conditions 
and intrinsic value) but loosens the nexus between validity, legitimacy and effectiveness, 
and thus, in Fraser’s terms, it is at the risk of being depoliticised. 
Earlier I said that the practical orientation of the green public sphere implies 
accepting, on the one hand, that debate leads to collective action and, on the other hand, 
that ends-oriented practices produce new discourses and forms of knowledge that will then 
enter and strengthen the green public sphere. This more instrumental, practical dimension 
that is to sustain the green public sphere is almost neglected in Torgerson’s 1999 book 
(note that the radical incrementalism he advocates is a nonstrategic, noninstrumental type 
of activity). However, in a subsequent article (2006), he is more attentive to the importance 
                                                 
22 When making these observations Fraser’s aim is different from mine. She is interested in stressing the way 
several transnational processes are precipitating the depoliticisation of the public sphere. Public sphere theory 
was thought of to explain a Westphalian order of sovereign nation states, so in the face of contemporary 
issues such as multiculturalism or globalisation it has been depoliticised since it is no longer able to observe 
on national grounds the conditions of empowerment over state authority and valid participation. In her view, 
the risk of depoliticisation can be avoided if the traditional concept of the public sphere is reworked to 
accommodate those transnational phenomena. My aim is to point at the potential depoliticisation arising 
when the public sphere loses its critical and transformative potential due to an emphasis on the intrinsic value 
of debate and a lack of concern for the way it can be used to bring about change.  
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of purposive action in changing discourses and addresses, although perhaps not 
satisfactorily, some of the above-mentioned weaknesses of his book.  
In my view, his later work further develops the notion of the green public sphere in 
three ways. First, the scope and themes of green discourse are broadened so as to include 
challenges to colonialism that, together with industrialism, fuelled the dreams of 
nineteenth-century Western civilization: the conquest of the earth and the domination of 
the natural world23. The rise of “post-colonial environmentalism” adds to the diversity of 
ethical, philosophical and strategic orientations within the green movement as a 
justification for the need of a plural and decentred green public sphere for a “divided 
planet”
24
. “Post colonial connections” and North-South relations reinforce Torgerson’s 
view of the green public sphere as being fragmented and fluid. Second, the green public 
sphere is specifically articulated as transnational; it is defined as “a space – or network of 
spaces – for public communication where the local and the global intersect” (2006: 724). 
And third, there is a greater awareness of the importance of strategic action. The activities 
of post-colonial environmental groups aimed at defending their livelihoods and stopping 
development projects have changed the terms of green discourse, adding a post-colonial 
dimension to it.  
Particularly relevant to my arguments here is Torgerson’s awareness that purposive 
action leads to changes in discourse and therefore that the green public sphere cannot 
survive not only without debate but also without some forms of ends-oriented activity. 
Moreover, he seems to accept that strategy can be a topic of debate (while originally his 
                                                 
23 For Torgerson the range of issues covered by debate in the green public sphere has extended to include 
also “green critiques of racism, patriarchy, sexism, heterosexism, homophobia and class exploitation” (2006: 
716), although in his piece he exclusively focuses on colonialism. 
24 By “post-colonial environmentalism” Torgerson refers to the diverse environmental groups recently 
emerged in those parts of the world that were under Western colonial rule. These groups create networks with 
other environmental organisations worldwide, giving rise to “emerging practices of post-colonial 
environmentalism”. In line with Torgerson’s decentred vision of green politics, these groups collaborate and 




claim was that discussion about ends would trigger the end of debate), and that it is crucial 
to pay attention to improving the opportunities that a group has for successful – therefore 
strategic – action, but as long as the intrinsic value of debate is acknowledged by those 
engaged in the communicative process. The importance of purposive action is 
acknowledged insofar as it broadens the geographical scope and themes of the green 
discourse. So it could be argued that Torgerson accepts strategic action because this is seen 
as the catalyst of shifts in discourse that strengthen the green public sphere. In short, the 
role of instrumental politics in his theory is still to foster the conditions for discussion in 
the green public sphere.     
 
 
5. The green public sphere: a reconstruction 
 
Torgerson offers an idealised notion of the green public sphere that ignores power 
and downgrades socio-economic relations. Due to its neglect of ends-oriented activity and 
collective action, this approach is not effective for the promotion of ecological citizenship 
defined in terms of obligations of justice - although it is more inclusive of difference and 
disagreement than Arendt’s account. A performative and carnivalesque green politics can 
be useful in changing discourses and raising awareness about the contradictions of modern 
societies, but it does not suggest different practices constitutive of an environmentally just 
social order. The green public sphere needs to have progressive and emancipatory aims and 
involve social change25. Therefore, it could be reconsidered so as to encompass the 
possibility of purposive debate aimed at discussing and reaching collective decisions about 
                                                 
25 Bringing about emancipatory alternatives would be a way to counterbalance the tragic tendency in the 
green movement that Torgerson laments, because the alternative practices, institutions and relations are not 
drastic and austere measures. Rather they suggest that the world can be a more just and liveable place. I will 
discuss this further in my next chapter. 
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matters of common concern, including issues of self-organisation, as well as questions of 
environmental justice, equality and democratisation of all spheres of life.  
The aim of this alternative model is to question power as well as all forms of 
domination and oppression that are both cause and consequence of socio-environmental 
problems. This definition of the green public sphere is inspired by the classic Habermasian 
account of the public sphere, conceived as “a body of ‘private persons’ assembled to 
discuss matters of ‘public concern’ or ‘common interest’ ” (Fraser, 1992: 112). Following 
Fraser, I explained that this conception of the public sphere is functional to challenging 
power, like the bourgeois public sphere that arose in opposition to the absolutist regime 
(1992: 112). This account is crucial to overcome the limitations of Torgerson’s theory 
insofar as deliberation is not restricted to its own conditions, but aimed at making 
collective decisions. Despite the exclusion of certain groups and the lack of attention to 
economic and family relations, the Habermasian concept is more compatible than that 
inspired by the work of Arendt in view of accommodating the different struggles for 
emancipation in contemporary societies, as Benhabib notes (1992: 95). Yet the green 
public sphere should go beyond Habermas’ formulation to avoid its problems, some of 
which have only been mentioned throughout this chapter26.  
Fraser’s alternative postbourgeois conception mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter is constructive to start rethinking the green public sphere in the direction indicated 
here, since it is characterised by an awareness that social inequality must be eliminated, the 
                                                 
26 The Habermasian picture of the public sphere is also vulnerable to green objections, not discussed in detail 
in this text because it goes beyond a critique and reconstruction of Torgerson’s notion of the green public 
sphere. The main problem in Habermas is that his communicative ethics excludes nature. As a result, green 
writers like Whitebook (1996) have noted that the human superiority over the non- human world is accepted 
and domination justified. Although Habermas’ account has been defended on the grounds that it allows the 
incorporation of ecological concerns (Brulle, 2000), there have been attempts to correct the Habermasian 
antiecological bias by developing an environmental communicative ethics that extends communication so as 
to include human relations with non-humans, particularly Eckersley (2004, 1990, 1992a, 1992b) and Dryzek 
(1990b, 1996b).  Perhaps Habermas would reply to Eckersley and Whitebook that debate cannot be 
predetermined by the acceptance of given principles – like an ecological ethos - that would steer the dialogue 
in a particular direction, but has to remain open-ended (Valdivielso, 2007: 19). 
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inclusion of issues traditionally thought of as private and socio-economic (and thus 
nonpolitical or prepolitical), and the promotion of both weak (aimed at opinion formation) 
and strong publics (focused on decision-making as well as opinion formation) (1992). On 
the other hand, Torgerson’s theory of the green public sphere should be expanded so as to 
include practical activity beyond discourse and speech. As Benhabib puts it, taking part “in 
a citizens’ initiative to clean up a polluted harbour is no less political than debating in 
cultural journals the pejorative presentation of certain groups in terms of stereotypical 
images (combating sexism and racism in the media)” (1999: 86).  
Purposive action is necessary because existing conditions are very different from 
the deliberative ideal. Precisely because there is injustice and social inequality, political 
action should aim at redressing these situations so that democratic participation and 
citizenship, both intrinsically valuable, can somehow be realised. At this point, 
Torgerson’s account could be turned around. The learning process and public debate in the 
green public sphere may be oriented to protecting the natural world and building 
egalitarian, just societies. From this point of view, debate is not self-referential but 
instrumental to democratically discussing and accomplishing particular ways of achieving 
justice and ecological sustainability, where equality and justice are valued for their own 
sake and not in terms of the extent to which they can serve the aim of communicative 
rationality. Yet whatever “just”, “egalitarian” and “ecologically sustainable” may mean 
should be a matter of collective debate. By engaging in different ends-oriented discourses 
and practices a myriad of meanings can arise and diverse paths can be tried. 
What would be the main elements of the re-conceptualisation of the green public 
sphere sketched out in this chapter? First, the green public sphere could be thought of as a 
vehicle for democratisation as well as a site for bringing about emancipatory aims, like 
justice and equality. Stress on deliberation among politically equal citizens implies 
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ignoring social inequalities that do actually exist. Following Mansbridge, Fraser articulates 
a common feminist critique of deliberation, namely that the transformation of the “I” into a 
“we” that takes place with deliberation in the public sphere can hide forms of domination 
and control, and favor one particular worldview at the expense of others (1992: 119-120). 
A green public sphere should make visible the fact that social inequalities pervade 
deliberative practices and constrain democracy, since they give rise to relations mediated 
by power, exclusion and subordination. Political relations in a public sphere require 
egalitarian societies. Earlier I pointed at Fraser’s critique of the liberal bourgeois model of 
the public. Her analysis suggests that it is necessary to “unbracket” inequalities and be 
skeptical about the possibilities of conceiving a space for debate under alleged conditions 
of equality. Discursive spheres are always situated in a broader social frame “pervaded by 
structural relations of dominance and subordination” (1992: 120)
27. Substantive social 
equality, she argues, is a condition for political democracy, so structural inequality must be 
eliminated. The green public sphere has to deal with those power relations that have 
traditionally been relegated to the private sphere, to the economic sphere, to labour 
relations and in general to the social and cultural domains of life. This would be, following 
Benhabib, a way to renegotiate the meaning of the public sphere, as well as the divides 
between the public and the private, and questions of justice and the good life (Benhabib 
1992: 92).  
Dryzek’s oppositional public spheres mentioned at the beginning of the chapter and 
in Chapter 3 may be taken as a point of departure for a green public sphere conceived as a 
site for struggle against power (1990a, 2000; Dryzek et. al., 2003). This is not a 
                                                 
27 As Fraser highlights, it is typical of liberalism to conceive the political world as autonomous and 
independent from other spheres of life, like the social or the economic, and as such it is characterised by the 
belief that a fair political system can be enacted and made to function despite institutions and relations that 
generate social inequality and economic constraints. One of the main tasks of liberal thinking is precisely to 
devise democratic institutions that isolate political processes from those socio-economic and private, 
“nonpolitical or prepolitical processes” (1992: 121).  
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particularly green account of the public sphere but it is similar to the vision I seek to 
encourage here. For Dryzek, public spheres are arenas for strategic as well as 
communicative action. An opposition to the status quo - particularly, to state imperatives - 
in order to find possibilities for democratisation defines Dryzek’s notion of the public 
sphere. In his view “one possible democratic future for industrial societies would consist of 
public spheres and movements in permanent confrontation with the capitalist state” (1996: 
52). For Dryzek “discursive designs”28 should “avoid complicity in state administration” 
and thus deliberations shall take place in and contribute to the creation of the public sphere, 
a space where “citizens associate and confront the state” (1990: 43). 
Second, the green public sphere has to involve collective decisions. The public 
sphere is not just a means for the rationalisation of domination; it is also a form of social 
interaction (Fraser, 1992: 112-113). Its strategic function implies both taming authority and 
reaching collective decisions. As noted above, Fraser distinguishes between “weak 
publics”, whose deliberation is concerned with opinion formation, and “strong publics”, 
devoted to decision-making other than opinion formation (1992: 134). Torgerson’s green 
public sphere only deals with opinion formation. Indeed he argues that debate about ends 
and decision-making would be the end of the green public sphere. However, as Fraser 
notes, a weak conception of the public sphere that focuses on discourse and opinion, 
neglecting issues of collective decision making “denudes ‘public opinion’ of practical 
force” (1992: 137). The type of self-referential debate that Torgerson favours has to be 
complemented with what Habermas defined as a “pragmatic discourse about what should 
be done in terms of translating consensus into binding decisions capable of 
                                                 
28 A “discursive design” is “a form of social institution around which the expectations of a number of actors 
converge. It therefore has a place in their conscious awareness as a site for recurrent communicative 
interaction among them” (Dryzek, 1990a: 43). Examples of already existing discursive designs are mediation, 
regulatory negotiation and problem-solving workshops in international conflict resolution, among others. 
180 
 
implementation, and negotiations concerning what to do when values and interests 
irreducibly conflict” (Dryzek, 2000: 24-25).  
What issues should be the subject of collective decisions in the green public 
sphere? I agree with Fraser in that no matters should be ruled out a priori from debate 
(Fraser, 1992: 129). Just as Habermas defined the public sphere as a locus where private 
issues are excluded, Torgerson and Arendt envisage the public sphere as a site where there 
is no space for ends-oriented action, and social issues (for Torgerson to a lesser extent than 
for Arendt). Just as Habermas thought that the inclusion of private issues and interests led 
to the collapse of the bourgeois public sphere, Arendt and Torgerson believe that the rise of 
the social and discussions about objectives would mean the end of the public sphere. Yet 
only those engaged in public discourse can determine, in the course of deliberation, what 
matters of common interest and collective problems are.  
It is important to stress that the fact that deliberation should encompass collective 
decisions does not mean that it should be restricted to the common good and collective 
needs. As it stems from some of the arguments made throughout this chapter, deliberation 
should also refer to individual needs, as well as private interests and issues. On the other 
hand, as Fraser (1992) and Benhabib (1992) stress taking distance from Habermas, dealing 
with collective matters does not mean that consensus need to be the necessary outcome of 
deliberation. Following Dryzek, consensus can be defined as a “unanimous agreement not 
just on a course of action, but also on the reasons for it” (2000: 170). Consensus is not a 
prerequisite for purposive action of the kind advocated in this chapter; indeed, consensus 
can overshadow spontaneity and difference. As Dryzek observes, “[in] a pluralistic world, 
consensus in unattainable, unnecessary, and undesirable. More feasible and attractive are 
workable agreements in which participants agree on a course of action, but for different 
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reasons”, as long as these reasons can be justified in the course of public deliberation 
(2000: 48, 170).  
The pursuit of collective aims, the idea of the common good and the possibilities of 
collective action are not at odds with respect for difference due in contemporary societies. 
Torgerson draws our attention to the environmental justice movement as a paradigm of 
decentred organisation, with no clear leadership and direction but encompassing a variety 
of strategies and identities, and thus promoting the kind of respect for difference and lack 
of unity that he champions. However, following Dryzek, it may be argued that beyond 
respect, recognition and the internal relations across difference (i.e. race, class, ethnicity, to 
name but a few) characteristic to the movement, there is a common aim that provides in 
fact unity and direction: the shared goal of challenging environmental risks that fall onto 
them (2000: 74). For Dryzek, more than respect for difference and tolerance, what is 
central to the movement is the way it has sought to oppose both mainstream 
environmentalist discourses that do not take into account the differences in risk 
distribution, and industrialist discourses that neglect environmental hazards or emphasise 
the possibility to manage them for the sake of economic growth, as well as the way it has 
influenced public policy (2000: 77-78). This indicates that “the recognition of difference 
can coexist with an orientation to collective decision”. In his view, the environmental 
justice movement illustrates a way to satisfactorily address the question that deliberative 
democracy does not allow for collective choice: “we deliberate and then what?” (2000: 78) 
– or, as we could ask Torgerson: we play, dance, performe, laugh and then what? As 
Dryzek states, “democratic life is not just the endless interplay of discourses. There have to 
be moments of decisive collective action…” (2000: 78-79). 
Now, for the green public sphere to be effective, it is not enough that it be 
oppositional and pursue social and environmental change; collective decisions have to be 
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brought to fruition and somehow implemented. The implementation stage is as important 
as the deliberative process, since it is what confers on the green public sphere its political 
and critical character. There are different ways in which a green public sphere could be 
effective and influential. Following Habermas’ classic characterisation, most theorists of 
the public sphere whose work I have discussed in this chapter, including Eckersley, Dryzek 
and Fraser, are interested in the way public opinion can have an impact on state policy – or 
in how “communicative power” may affect “administrative power”. From this point of 
view, public spheres serve as a nexus between society and the state. For Habermas the 
most important tools for transmission of public opinion from the public sphere to the state 
are elections29. Dryzek points to other mechanisms. He is concerned about the way public 
opinion is created through “the contestation of discourses” that are then transmitted to the 
state through different channels. The public sphere is seen as a place where a variety of 
discourses emerges and develops; some of these discourses are in opposition to each other. 
Through rhetoric given discourses are made more visible or successful than others and thus 
have a greater impact on public policy. This is, Dryzek argues, a discursive mechanism for 
the transmission of public opinion different from elections (2000: 50-56). For Dryzek 
“both an orientation to the state and discursive mechanisms for the transmission of public 
opinion to the state are required, so long as the state is the main (though far from exclusive 
locus) of collective decision” (2000: 162). In his view, this requires a neat distinction 
between the state and the public sphere for the sake of democratic vitality and innovation 
(2000: 79), as indicated in the previous chapter30.  
                                                 
29 Habermas accepts the liberal state channels, like elections, law-making and policy processes. Dryzek 
criticises this approach for being “old-fashioned” and not facing the “empirical realities” or “empirical 
political science” that suggest extra-constitutional forms of influence, like boycotts, demonstrations, or media 
and information campaigns (2000: 25-27).  
30 This approach contrasts with that of Eckersley for whom one of the state’s functions is to maintain 
deliberation in the public sphere. In this picture – as we saw in Chapter 3 - the public sphere lacks autonomy 
to the extent that the state can impede the development of the most oppositional discourses. 
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Fraser believes that if the public sphere does not seek to influence state power and 
authority, it loses its political force and effectiveness. In her view, overcoming the 
obstacles that prevent the opinions generated in the public sphere from having an 
influence, and thus putting the public sphere at risk of being depoliticised, requires 
“institutional renovation” (2005: 6). In this sense, she refers to the configuration of 
transnational institutions that regulate already transnationalised private power - which can 
be confronted, held accountable and influenced by public opinion - and to global 
citizenship rights to guarantee participation beyond the nation state borders. She argues 
that without this institutional renovation, transnational public spheres and social 
movements cannot succeed because they need an institution they can aim at, direct their 
counterpower at, seek to influence and democratise, otherwise they cannot “assume the 
emancipatory democratizing functions that are the whole point of public sphere theory” 
(2005: 7). Chapters 2 and 3 explored Eckersley’s theory of the green state as an example of 
the kind of institutional renovation advocated by Fraser, aimed at transnationalising the 
public sphere and democracy. The main function of the green public sphere in Eckersley’s 
account is, as we saw, to foster transformations within state institutions and state 
imperatives to give shape to a green state. 
But the state is not the only institution capable of organising collective action and 
the implementation of decisions. This can be done in a more spontaneous and decentralised 
way by civil society organisations - and hence the difference between my approach and 
that of theorists of the green state. As Calhoun indicates, “communication in the public 
sphere may address the state or may seek to influence civil society and even private life 
directly” (2001: 1897). A focus on civil society as a site for collective self-organisation 
would be an alternative way of encouraging strong publics oriented to decision-making 
outside the state. Fraser refers to “self-managing institutions” like “self-managed 
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workplaces, child-care centres, or residential communities” as strong publics whose 
“internal institutional public spheres could be arenas both of opinion formation and 
decision making”. This would bring about the articulation of spaces of direct democracy or 
quasi-direct democracy (combined with some form of representation), “wherein all those 
engaged in a collective undertaking would participate in deliberations to determine its 
design and operation” (1992: 135). What Fraser’s account shows is that decision-making 
can be institutionalised in ways that are not constitutionally determined but internally and 
autonomously established by members of the public sphere itself. This will be the topic of 
my next chapter, where I look at civil society-based examples of ecological citizenship that 
seek to influence societies and their economies without trying to affect state policy 
(although the idea is that changes in society and the economy may trigger changes in the 
state apparatus). So I will not linger in these thoughts here.  
 
 
6.  From the green public sphere to civil society 
 
Ecological citizenship needs a green public sphere for discourse to be spread, for 
debates about its meaning and the ends of its duties to take place, for the knowledge 
leading to its practice to be generated and for obstacles hindering its exercise to be 
challenged. But at the same time ecological citizenship activity helps sustain the green 
public sphere, which requires a variety of green discourses and practices in order to exist. 
Furthermore, as Torgerson argues, the green public sphere depends on individuals enacting 
the identity of the citizen, acting as a “we”, and not individually as consumers (1999:129-
130). So the green public sphere requires ecological citizens as much as these need a green 
public sphere.  
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As I explained above, ecological citizenship should be related to a conception of 
public space where inequalities are made visible. At the same time, ecological citizenship 
has the potential to contribute to making such inequalities explicit through activity aimed 
at doing justice.  If issues related to challenging systemic injustice and inequalities that 
prevent some citizens from being ecological citizens are ignored, if questions concerning 
how to decrease the impact of larger ecological footprints on the environment and on 
fellow citizens are excluded from the green public sphere for being questions of ends, then 
those powerful and resourceful groups that continue to benefit from environmental and 
social injustice are reaffirmed and unjust and unsustainable systemic relations are 
reproduced. From the arguments presented throughout this chapter, it is clear that the 
validity and effectiveness of the green public sphere should be evaluated not just by 
looking at whether it fosters communicative justice, but also in the light of how effective it 
is in bringing about social change.  
I do not want to underestimate the democratic relevance of the green public sphere, 
but I find Torgerson’s account limited on various grounds. In this chapter I offered a 
critique and reconstruction of his model. Drawing predominantly on the insights of 
contemporary critical theory, a more emancipatory, practical and politicised account has 
been advanced. To be sure, green politics cannot dismiss deliberation and discussion, 
especially if we think about the transformation of preferences, the desirability of values 
and solutions agreed rather than imposed, giving voice to the excluded, and collective 
decision-making. And although I understand citizenship to be a learning process, I believe 
that there are other ways of transforming preferences and values, gaining knowledge and 
empowering citizens, which is different from “just talk” and politics for its own sake. This 
alternative way is practice and activity. Environmental political theory should be 
concerned about both means and ends, beyond current trends emphasising procedures over 
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outcomes. Through direct involvement in practical ecological activity, citizens can learn, 
produce knowledge, test that knowledge and share experiences with others.  
 Ecological citizenship is worth cultivating for its own sake and ecological citizens 
are bound to recognise the value of debate in the green public sphere. Yet ecological 
citizenship is more than a “speech location”, to use Luque’s term (2005: 212), and more 
than a green discourse. As noted earlier, the conception of ecological citizenship inspiring 
this thesis is about redressing injustice and, in this sense at least, it is indeed goal-oriented. 
So ecological citizenship has intrinsic value but it is also a path for social and 
environmental change. To fully analyse the potential of ecological citizenship for the 
politics of sustainability, we need to move beyond Torgerson’s scheme - where citizenship 
is deprived of its emancipatory potential - and envisage a different conception of political 
action and the green public sphere. Key to transcending the discursive and performative 
framework is the distinction between civil society and the public sphere. Civil society is 
the agent of communication that takes place in the public sphere, but it is also an agent 
involved in ends-oriented action. 
Although the notion of civil society is not developed in Torgerson’s theory, he 
refers to “the public spheres of civil society” on various occasions. He argues that the 
public sphere is associated with the emergence of social movements in civil society 
(Torgerson, 1999: 9)31. Despite the fact that he often uses both notions – public sphere and 
civil society - more or less interchangeably, from his arguments we may infer that civil 
society designates in his account a space outside of and different from the state and the 
economy where the public sphere is located. For Torgerson, civil society is the main actor 
in the green public sphere (rather than state institutions or international organisations). This 
                                                 
31 This is also Habermas’ view. For him, the public sphere first arose with bourgeois society. After its 
transformation and decline, the emergence of the new social movements in the 1960s marks for Habermas 
the beginning of the revitalisation of the public sphere (1996). 
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use of the term civil society is not significantly different from that of most theorists of the 
public sphere.  
In his later piece on the green public sphere, Torgerson (2006) pays more explicit 
attention to civil society. He refers to this concept as the domain where the green 
movement – together with other social movements - and green politics emerged, while the 
green public sphere is defined as the discursive space where debate takes place. With this 
distinction in mind, and knowing that Torgerson finds the value of political action in 
politics conceived as debate for its own sake, it is not hard to see why he favours the public 
sphere over civil society: the public sphere is the site where debate is valued for its own 
sake, where the intrinsic value of politics can be realised, while civil society is associated 
with the green movement and with the type of ends-oriented action that Torgerson 
downgrades.  
The concept of civil society is crucial to theorists of the public sphere32. As 
Habermas puts it, the central question concerning the “basis and sources of an informal 
formation of opinion in autonomous public spheres” has to be answered in contemporary 
societies with reference to the concept of civil society (1992: 452-453). He defines civil 
society as  
 
composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, 
organisations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems 
resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in 
amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a 
network of associations that institutionalises problem-solving discourses on 
                                                 
32 Civil society is a highly controversial concept, whose meaning is constantly contested. For definitions of 
civil society in this chapter I focus on those authors who have studied the notion of the public sphere because 
I am interested in the relation between and, even more so, in the difference of conceptualisations between the 




questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public 
spheres (Habermas, 1996: 367).   
 
For Habermas, civil society is the soil that nurtures the contemporary public sphere. 
In the early modern bourgeois society that he investigates, the private realm of civil society 
was formed by “the sphere of commodity exchange and social labor as well as the 
household and the family relieved from productive functions” (Habermas, 1992: 433). At 
this time, the rise of “associational life” in civil society provided the ground for the 
bourgeois public sphere. According to Calhoun (1992: 7-8), Habermas’ understanding of 
civil society goes beyond narrow views of the concept that identify civil society with 
market institutions33. For Habermas, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, civil 
society was the sphere of private autonomy in opposition to the state. Although civil 
society was grounded in the capitalist market economy, it also included social and 
discursive networks (1989). Habermas observes though that the current definition of the 
term differs from the bourgeois meaning in that it no longer encompasses the economic 
sphere of labor, capital and markets. In contemporary terms, the institutional aspects of 
civil society are “voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and the economy”, 
including churches, political parties, labour unions, cultural associations, independent 
media, citizen groups, and sport and leisure clubs, amongst others; these voluntary 
associations are outside the control of the state and the market (Habermas, 1992: 453-454). 
These entities are “opinion-shaping associations, around which autonomous public spheres 
can be built” (1992: 454). According to the Habermasian view, the public sphere connects 
civil society to the state. Public opinion originates outside the state realm; it is rooted in the 
                                                 
33 In some accounts the market is included in civil society, while it is excluded in others. I will refer to the 
implications of this inclusion/exclusion for theories of civil society in my next chapter. 
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deliberations of civil society. Through the public sphere, civil society reaches state 
authority and exerts political influence (Habermas, 1996).  
The above points give an idea of Habermas’ account of the relationship and 
distinction between civil society and the public sphere. He regards civil society as the main 
agent for the creation of a public sphere, and the public sphere as a vehicle through which 
civil society associations can influence the market and the state. This is an instrumental 
account of civil society and the public sphere, where they are both devoted to problem-
solving and transformative action. But the above points also stress that for Habermas civil 
society is defined according to the type of action  that it is engaged in: communicative 
action - although goal-directed. Despite the fact that Habermas’ notion of civil society 
seems appropriate for transcending Togerson’s performative framework in the terms 
described in this chapter, we still need to go beyond views of civil society grounded in 
communication. 
Civil society is conceived as a discursive site by most commentators on the public 
sphere. This may be due to the fact that theorists of the public sphere do not elucidate the 
distinction between civil society and the public sphere. In fact, civil society and public 
sphere are often used in the literature as synonyms to refer to a space outside the state. The 
main actors in the public sphere are civil society members that, through debate, create the 
discourses that inhabit public spheres, to the extent that it is widely argued that a vibrant 
public sphere depends on civil society. But this cannot lead to the conclusion that civil 
society is all about discourse. Sustaining a vital public sphere is one function of civil 
society organisations. As Fraser notes, just as the emergence of a bourgeois civil society – 
understood as a network of diverse societies, associations and clubs - rendered possible the 
rise of a bourgeois public sphere (Fraser, 1992: 114), a diverse and oppositional civil 
society is required to encourage critical debate in the public sphere to challenge power 
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structures in state and society. Some aspects of civil society have a discursive or 
communicative element – and that is what constitutes a public sphere, but as Dryzek 
argues, not everything in civil society is discursive, just as not everything is democratic 
(2000: 100)34.  
 In fact, as Calhoun states, public sphere and civil society “are not precisely 
equivalent concepts” (1993: 269), although they are “closely related” (2001: 1897). They 
both allude to “capacities for social self-organization and influence over the state” (2001: 
1987). More specifically, civil society refers to “patterns of social organization”, to the 
“capacity of a political community to organize itself, independent of the specific direction 
of state power” (Calhoun, 1993: 269-270)35.  
On the other hand, the public sphere embodies a particular form of political 
participation and discourse, one in which “rational-critical arguments rather than the 
statuses of actors are decisive” (Calhoun, 1993: 269) and which is characterised by 
“openness of communication and a focus on the public good...” (Calhoun, 2001: 1897). 
The idea of public sphere evokes the possibility of a form of society’s self-organisation 
that is “self-conscious”, “intentional” and based on discourse (Calhoun, 1993: 272), that is, 
the possibility that what “knits society together or provides for social integration” is 
“rational-critical” will formation (Calhoun, 1993: 269 and 278). It assumes the belief that 
                                                 
34 However, Dryzek sometimes tends to identify civil society with communication networks and public 
spheres. For instance, he defines the public sphere as “politicized civil society” (Dryzek, 2000: 100) and 
argues that “little is lost by treating transnational civil society and transnational public spheres as covering 
similar territory”. He states that this distinction, or rather the lack of it, applies to national civil societies  and 
public spheres too (2000: 130). Although for Dryzek civil society has to involve issues of strategy, his 
account is still based on communication and debate, since he defines civil society as discursive networks and 
conceives it as a locus for deliberative democracy (2000: 99-100).  
35 Calhoun explains that in early modern political philosophy, when the concept of civil society began to be 
developed as the “capacity of self-organisation outside the control of the state”, this capacity came primarily 
from the emergence of self-controlled markets. For thinkers like Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, markets 
were the main “possibility of self-organisation” of “ordinary people” without state intervention. Although the 
dominant tradition stressed “the economic-systemic character of civil society”, a different strand following 
Montesquieu, Rousseau and Tocqueville focused on social relations amongst autonomous actors. This second 
tradition has led to the view that social organisation is not circumscribed to markets and the state, and that 
class systems and particular forms of social relations provide examples of ways in which societies can 
structure themselves without state intervention and outside the market (1993: 271).  
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“communication amongst members might be the basis for self-conscious decisions about 
how to pursue the common good” (2001: 1898). In Calhoun’s view, an expression of 
society’s capacity for self-organisation stressing “plurality and reason” arose with 
Habermas’ “public sphere of civil society, an arena of deliberative exchange in which 
rational-critical arguments rather than mere inherited ideas or personal statuses could 
determine agreements and actions” (Calhoun, 1993: 273).  
Perhaps the difference between civil society and the public sphere is best captured 
by Calhoun when he explains that “[c]ivil society refers to the domains in which social life 
is self-organizing, that is, in which it is not subject to direction by the state. But this self-
organization can be a matter of system function or of conscious collective choice through 
the public sphere” (2001: 1901). As he notes, “[t]heories of civil society focus on the 
capacity for self-organization of social relations, outside the control of the state and usually 
beyond the realm of the family. The basic question posed by theories of the public sphere 
is to what extent collective discourse can determine the conditions of this social life” 
(2001: 1902). According to Calhoun, the work of Habermas does not provide a clear 
theoretical distinction between civil society and the public sphere (2001: 1901).  And he 
warns that the equivalent use of both concepts without trying to answer the above 
questions leads to a “leap from the presence of business institutions, free housing markets, 
newspapers, and telephones to the presumption that civil society prospers and democracy 
will inevitably follow” (1993: 276)
36. That is why he contends that it is important to keep 
both concepts independent37. For him, discourse and politics should not be subsumed into 
                                                 
36 The literature on civil society in China is, in Calhoun’s opinion, the clearest example (1993: 277). 
37 Some may contend that the difference between the two terms is that while civil society includes issues that 
are not political, the public sphere is always about the political. But the critique of theories of the public 
sphere like those of Arendt and Torgerson undertaken in this chapter has focused precisely on the way social, 
economic and private issues are therein neglected. Actually, I share critical views like that of Benhabib and 
Fraser who argue that the whole point of the reconstruction of the concept of the public sphere should be the 
incorporation of those previously excluded issues and groups. So I do not think it is useful to differentiate 
between the two terms on these grounds. 
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social organisation since, when this happens, “the question of the capacity of a ‘public 
sphere’ to organize rational-critical discourse at the level of societal integration or the state 
is bypassed or marginalized” (1993: 278, emphasis in the original).  
In sum, while civil society refers to a form of social organisation (different from 
both the state and, in some visions of the concept, the market), the public sphere alludes to 
a discursive way of organising social institutions. This distinction may help explain why 
Torgerson praises the public sphere over civil society: he would regard civil society as just 
another form of social organisation (in this sense comparable to state and market), but he 
may contend that when civil society organises itself discursively and reflexively so as to 
form a public sphere, then it becomes more valuable and superior to other forms of 
organisation - insofar as it is grounded in critical reason and public-spiritedness, in the idea 
that members of a society can collectively decide about issues of common concern, and it 
suggests that citizens can create their own identities and collective will through 
communication, and not through some form of coercion or narrow group interest.  
 Martin Jänicke advances a functional account of civil society that transcends the 
discourse-centred focus of the public sphere, also present in other notions of civil society. 
For him the term civil society designates public action to address market or state failure. 
This action often consists of social movement activity directed at pressing states, like 
protests, or “paragovernmental” action that targets economic institutions, bypassing the 
state (Jänicke, 1996). Following Jänicke, Dryzek notes that civil society concerns “the 
exercise of power over the state” (by influencing political discourse and thus affecting 
public policy, or by influencing cultural change and power relations, like the women’s 
movement accomplished) and seeks to “reclaim power from the state - and from the 
economy” without seeking inclusion into the state (Dryzek, 2000: 102, emphases in the 
original). As Dryzek concludes, Jänicke’s definition implies that civil society becomes a 
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site for democratisation different from and alternative to the state, insofar as it is “a place 
where people choose to live their public lives and solve their joint problems”. It also 
suggests that “civil society can itself feature problem-solving, not merely cheap talk” and 
that “enforceable collective decisions can sometimes be made without reference to the 
state” (2000: 102-103). Examples of paragovernmental activity challenging the economy 
beyond attempts to influence state policy will be discussed in my next chapter. 
Some of the discussions in this chapter indicate that both civil society and the 
public sphere have multiple and conflicting meanings - not to mention that they are in 
vogue in contemporary political theory. But in spite of the diversity of readings, one 
conclusion can be drawn: while the public sphere is always about discourse and 
communication, civil society - although it can be and is often related to discourse - is not 
necessarily and exclusively a sphere of discourse. Accepting that discourse is a feature or 
element of civil society, I want to stress the distinction between civil society and the public 
sphere by focusing on that part of civil society activity that is not purely discursive in 
nature. This aspect of civil society is engaged in projects that are not essentially 
communicative (although they can indirectly influence and alter the terms of discourse) or 
that seek to bring “to fruition” or “into struggle”, in Calhoun’s words (1993: 279), the 
agreements and deliberations of the public sphere. In this sense, Habermas explains that 
civil society organisations are “opinion-forming associations” that have a political impact 
“because they either participate directly in public communications or, as in the case of 
projects advocating alternatives to conventional wisdom, because the programmatic 
character of their activities sets examples through which they implicitly contribute to 
public discussion” (1992: 454). The second approach indicated by Habermas to express the 
way in which civil society can have political impact helps our purposes in two ways. First, 
it is insightful to understand the distinction between the public sphere and civil society that 
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I want to make in this chapter - a distinction based on the idea that civil society goes 
beyond deliberation and includes ends-oriented or “programmatic” action that is only 
“implicitly” discursive. And, second, it can be used to start thinking about what non-purely 
deliberative, or only indirectly deliberative, activities seeking to promote ecological 
citizenship in civil society may consist of.  
Self-organisation can be built on practices that go beyond discourse in the terms I 
have explained. While a focus on public spheres emphasises social integration and 
organisation through debate conducted in rational and critical terms, civil society allows 
for social integration and self-organisation to be found in doing, practising, in getting 
together to engage in projects, and not just to practise a discourse. I will turn to civil 
society in my next chapter to illustrate examples of political participation and forms of 





  In previous chapters I explored the potential of states and green states for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship. Different initiatives, procedures, regulations and 
institutions emanating from these two forms of social organisation were respectively 
studied. In this chapter, the claim that ecological citizenship demands a space outside the 
state has been investigated by focusing on the green public sphere. Without rejecting this 
view, I have argued that it is nonetheless problematic due to the dominant conception of 
the green public sphere in the literature. This chapter has sought, first, to explain why this 
mainstream view of the green public sphere is limited as far as a transformative notion of 
eco-politics and the promotion of ecological citizenship are concerned; second, to delineate 
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an alternative account of the green public sphere better suited for these purposes; and, 
third, to suggest that a distinct focus on civil society has to be introduced with a view to 
thinking of practices and relations independent from states and capitalist forms of 






                                                 
38 Although some of these practices may fall within the scope of or seek to affect the economic sphere of life 
as broadly defined, they do not relate to markets but to production and consumption institutions different 





ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
In the previous chapter I started exploring the possibilities for the promotion of 
ecological citizenship outside the state. In this respect, the opportunities that the green 
public sphere may offer were assessed. I argued that ecological citizenship needs a green 
public sphere, and that this requires a reassessment of the dominant understanding so as to 
encompass purposive action and progressive aims. Yet I contended that beyond debate, 
practical political activity is important.  With this in mind, and drawing on the distinction 
between civil society and the public sphere sketched in Chapter 4, the present chapter 
focuses on the promotion of ecological in civil society as a site that includes, but 
transcends, political communication.  
Some theorists (Barry, 1999, 2006; Christoff, 1996a; Eckersley, 2004) stress that 
the articulation of ecological citizenship in civil society should aim at the consolidation of 
a green state. The practice of ecological citizenship in civil society is therefore seen as a 
means for institutional transformation. My approach is different – here I focus on the 
democratising capacity of civil society. Although this is sometimes directed at state bodies, 
it can also consist of “paragovernmental” action (Jänicke, 1996) and “intra-society change” 
outside the state organisation (Young, 2000).  
It seems appropriate to start our analysis with an overview of those debates in civil 
society theory that highlight its connection with democracy and self-organisation, since 
these two elements define the practice of ecological citizenship in civil society – as it is 
approached in this thesis.     
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1. Civil society’s democratising capacity 
 
Civil society is a widely used concept in political theory and policy debates. In 
Chapters 1 and 4 I explained that the notion is often deployed without making clear 
whether it refers to social movements and associational life, to the public sphere, or to 
social organisation. As Dickens notes, despite the different meanings and diverse ends to 
which the concept is put, whatever civil society exactly is, it relates to “a sphere of 
freedom for human beings and the possibility for active creation of personal identity”; it is 
associated with both individual and collective self-development (Dickens, 1996: 133). 
Since its origins, the concept has been used in reference to society’s self-organising 
capacity, democratisation and resistance to external authority. This makes civil society 
relevant for the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
Theorists of civil society often distinguish between a traditional and an early 
modern concept. The traditional model goes back to Aristotle and refers to the unity of 
society and the state, of civil and political society. This civil society was “a domination-
free association of peers who communicatively and publicly establish their goals and 
norms of action and who regulate their interaction through principles of justice” (Cohen 
and Arato, 1992b: 122).  
The consolidation of states as “quasi-autonomous organizations” generated the 
separation between politics and other elements of social life, and led to a view of the 
constitution of political communities defined in relation to states. Debates about the 
sources of social order precipitated the emergence of civil society as a distinct domain1. 
The early modern idea of civil society was a reaction against the authority of absolute 
                                                 
1 Seligman contends that the rise of the concept of civil society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was triggered by “a crisis in social order”. Phenomena like the growth of market economies, the 
commercialisation of land, labor and capital, the age of discoveries, and the North American and European 
revolutions, all contributed to the questioning of prevalent forms of external authority. People began to look 
at society itself to identify the sources of social order (Seligman, 1993: 140, 155).  
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monarchs, and referred to “the capacity of a political community to organize itself, 
independent of the specific direction of state power” (Calhoun, 1993: 270). The modern 
concept, then, assumes the distinction between society and the state.  
For early modern bourgeois society, civil society was mainly constituted by the 
market, but it also included “institutions of sociability and discourse only loosely related to 
the economy” (Calhoun, 1992: 8). Market societies were perceived as “a natural basis on 
which parties encounter one another as inherently free and equal” (Habermas, 1996: 44). 
But this civil society was not open to everyone. The process of creating a “distinctive 
culture of civil society” cannot be separated from the “the process of bourgeois class 
formation” (Fraser, 1992: 114-115). 
Political economy triggered transformations in the liberal conception of civil 
society. The writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo developed a view “that conceived 
bourgeois civil society as a sphere of commodity exchange and social labour governed by 
anonymous economic laws” (Habermas, 1996: 45). The concept of civil society evolved, 
therefore, from being a set of “conditions under which individuals could voluntarily and 
consciously join in association and bring the social process under their common control”, 
towards being an “anonymous system independent of the intentions of unconsciously 
associated individuals, a system that followed its own logic and subjected society as a 
whole to the economically decoded imperatives of its self-stabilization” (Habermas, 1996: 
45, emphasis in the original). This account of civil society contributed to the consolidation 
of the concept of civil society as a field of study on its own, different from the state and the 
individual (Calhoun, 2001: 1898). 
After a period of decline during most of the twentieth century, the concept of civil 
society made a comeback. Often invoked as a panacea, civil society has reappeared in the 
writings of thinkers at both ends of the political spectrum, in different locations and with 
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diverse meanings (Terrier and Wagner, 2006a; Seligman, 1993; Cohen and Arato, 1992b)2. 
The contemporary revival of civil society is often related to struggles for civic liberties and 
democracy in state-socialist societies in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Wagner, 2006: 1-2; Habermas, 1992: 454; Calhoun, 2001: 1901 and 1993: 267; Seligman, 
1993: 139; Walzer, 1992: 89-90). In this context, the notion of civil society is used to refer 
to a domain outside the state and free from its control - more or less absent in systems of 
state communism. Also in Latin America, transitions from right-wing dictatorial regimes 
were defined in terms of bringing civil society back in (Calhoun, 2001: 1901; Walzer, 
1992: 90). Social movements have been crucial in the reconfiguration of civil society. 
Hence the trajectory and evolution of the concept illustrates the connection between 
civil society and demands for democracy. The notion of civil society emerged as a 
response to the need for collective self-determination and resistance to illegitimate 
authority. It lost prominence with the consolidation of liberal democracy and re-emerged at 
a time when democracy was threatened due to the domination of political agency by 
bureaucratic and market imperatives underpinned by strong political doctrines (Terrier and 
Wagner, 2006a).  
Unlike the liberal reading of civil society, the post-liberal account stresses the 
independence of civil society from both states and markets. Although some commentators 
still include the market within civil society, most political theorists make a distinction 
between voluntary associations of civil society and both the market and the state (Calhoun, 
2001; Keane, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Young, 2000; Cohen and Arato, 1992a; 1992b; 
Alexander, 1998). The work of Habermas contributed to stress this separation.  
                                                 
2 The concept of civil society has been the subject of various critiques. Perhaps we find the earliest one in the 
writings of Marx. He saw civil society as a collection of structures that privileged capital accumulation, 
generated inequalities, and thus he rejected civil society because of its identification with bourgeois society 
(Habermas, 1996: 45; Cohen and Arato, 1992b: 133). More recently Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001) have 
argued that the positive meaning and value of the notion of civil society cannot be taken for granted and 
stress that its development was underpinned by Eurocentrist and colonialist discourses, theories and practices 
of masculine domination, and neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologies.   
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In fact, in order to draw a distinction between the state, civil society and the 
economy, scholars of civil society often draw on Habermas (Cohen and Arato, 1992a; 
1992b; Young, 2000). His system-lifeworld theory, introduced in his work The Theory of 
Communicative Action II (1984), and discussed in Chapter 4, results in a three-fold 
framework in which state, economy and civil society are different forms of action co-
ordination. State, economy and civil society employ different mechanisms for action co-
ordination: the state uses authorised power, the economy favours money and civil society 
makes us of communicative interaction. The state and economy generate systemic power. 
Through systemic imperatives of bureaucratic functioning and profit-maximising they 
coordinate the actions of millions of disparate individuals, in different places and with 
different goals, in networks ruled by power or money, where actors exhibit instrumental 
and strategic rationalities. Each system seeks to expand its influence beyond itself, 
bureaucratising or commodifying relationships and human needs.  In contrast, the lifeworld 
encompasses voluntary associations and activities coordinated through communicative 
processes and not by systemic imperatives. In the lifeworld, people discuss instead of 
checking processes or following rules. The associations of the lifeworld correspond to civil 
society (Young, 2000: 157-159).  
Despite being three autonomous forms of action coordination, the activities, 
functions and virtues associated with state, economy and civil society influence and shape 
each other. The state has aligned with the capitalist economy and together they have 
colonised the lifeworld3. As a consequence, Cohen and Arato argue that “the actual 
potential for democratisation in a postbourgeois civil society cannot be independent of the 
more limited forms of democratisation that can and should be undertaken in state and 
                                                 
3 Young observes that when state agencies promote issues of self-organisation and governance that seek 
transformation in their agencies and institutions, they are being receptive to some of the features and 




economy (1992b: 135). Today’s politics of civil society requires, for them, strengthening 
and preserving the lifeworld and exerting political pressure to influence legislation and 
policy-making, and to democratise both the corporation and the state. This double process 
requires, on the one hand, a structure of fundamental rights that preserves, stabilises and 
institutionalises civil society. On the other hand, civil society should extend its political 
influence beyond its internal boundaries, seeking to affect economic and political 
institutions, as civil society cannot be democratised without influence over the economy 
and the state (Cohen and Arato, 1992b: 138-139).  
This process of double democratisation informs theories of the green state, 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Likewise, some of the initiatives to promote ecological 
citizenship illustrated in this chapter, particularly those based on claiming justice, rights 
and recognition, demand cooperation from the state – which has to grant rights, basic 
services and implement mechanisms for inclusion. Yet if we focus on ecological 
citizenship defined in relation to obligations of justice and sustainable living, what is more 
distinctive of civil society-based practices is the way they bypass the state, targeting 
economic actors and changing society itself. In order to explain the distinct functions civil 
society plays in relation to the state, the economy and society, and how this shapes the 
cultivation of ecological citizenship in this terrain, Iris Young’s distinction between 
different types of civil society activity is useful4.    
For Young, civil society is a solution to the problems of social and economic 
inequality generated by formal democracy. Civil society activity can trigger 
transformations in the state, the economy and civil society itself in order to bring about 
justice and democratisation in ways not allowed by the state and the economy (Young, 
                                                 
4 Young’s scheme of civil society supports my arguments in the previous chapter that not all aspects of civil 
society are discursive. 
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2000: 155-159)5. Young draws on Cohen and Arato’s “dualistic theory of civil society” 
with “defensive” and “offensive” functions. According to this view, civil societies are 
defensive when they encourage the consolidation of identities, new forms of participation, 
and solidarity networks. Young refers to this element as “self-organization”. On the other 
hand, civil society’s offensive aspect seeks to influence the state and economic practices. 
Young describes this function as the “activity of the public sphere” (2000: 164). 
According to Young’s scheme, the self-organising aspects of civil society promote 
democratisation and self-government in three different ways. First, they give voice to those 
formally excluded in democracies with structural social and economic injustice, thus being 
a form of social solidarity and resistance to domination. When excluded groups self-
organise and get together to form all sorts of associations, they are given voice to express 
their concerns and interests in a way formal political processes do not generally allow. 
Second, they encourage social innovation; those dissatisfied with dominant conventions 
and values form associations to give expression to new ideas and practices, some of which 
are then adopted at a wider level making social change possible. As Young puts it, “self-
organizing activities in civil society enable people who believe that their sorts of 
experiences, interests, and needs are socially and politically marginalized to find one 
another and develop their social voices” (2000: 164). Third, they enact new systems of 
provision of goods and services outside the state and the for-profit economy, often more 
democratically organised, empowering and connected to communities than state and 
market-provided services. Young notes that “[d]emocracy and social justice would be 
enhanced in most societies if civic associations provided even more goods and services” 
(2000: 166). It is my contention that this self-organising or defensive aspect of civil society 
and the way it performs functions of self-determination, and the creation of new systems of 
                                                 
5 As Young explains, private corporations, many of which are bigger and more powerful than certain states, 
dominate and shape the lives of millions of people. Their structure is, though, less democratic than that of 
many states (Young, 2000: 159). 
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provision and social innovation, are crucial for the promotion of ecological citizenship, as 
will become clear further on. 
Through the public sphere, civil society performs its functions of critical opposition 
to power and accountability - by exposing what the powerful do - and political and policy 
influence – facilitating debate about what should be done. The associations of civil society 
serve to identify problems, interests and needs, which then, through the public sphere, are 
communicated to the wider society, state institutions and economic actors. These ideas 
were elaborated in the previous chapter in relation to how they may inform a more 
transformative concept of the green public sphere.  
 Sometimes civil societies and their public spheres can facilitate social change 
bypassing the state and the economy, targeting civil society itself (Young, 2000: 173-178). 
The environmental movement illustrates this “intra-society change outside state 
institutions” (Young, 2000: 179). Ecologism triggered social and cultural changes in 
everyday practices in the lifeworld of civil society in the first place, before governments 
adopted environmental legislation and standards, and before corporations took up the idea 
of green business. Only after social change had been consolidated, were transformations 
expanded via government and corporate action (Young, 2000: 179). In this chapter I focus 
on civil society’s potential to produce intra-society change.  
As Young concludes, “people collectively exercise positive power through civil 
society in a variety of ways. People acting in civil society to develop new ideas, 
disseminate alternative practices, or organize public criticism of state and economic power, 
form solidarities for both the privileged and the relatively disadvantaged”, and this 
promotes self-determination, a key aspect of social justice, and self-development – through 
the expression of specific ways of life and the provision of goods and services (Young, 
2000: 179-180). A free, active and plural civil society is essential for democracy: it fosters 
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communicative interaction, inclusion, opposition to state and corporate power and the 
development of the knowledge required to engage in political action. Hence, civil society 
“limits the ability of both state and economy to colonize the lifeworld” (Young, 2000: 
189).  
Civil society is important because of its combination of self-determining, self-
organisational, oppositional, communicative and creative aspects, all of them equally 
valuable. Taken together, these elements give a first idea of the relevance of civil society 
as an agent for the promotion of ecological citizenship. The distinction between different 
functions of civil society and the theory of a dual politics underscore the idea advanced in 
last chapter that, although there is certainly communication in civil society and this is an 
important dimension of it, not everything in civil society is about discourse and public 
opinion; there is a more practical, ends-oriented dimension. And this is what this chapter is 
mostly concerned with. 
 
 
2. Green politics and civil society    
 
The concept of civil society has been well received within green politics. Both the 
liberal and post-liberal readings of civil society, explained above, have been considered by 
ecological thinkers. Free-market environmentalists would claim that the market is not only 
the most efficient form of social organisation, but the most appropriate institution for 
environmental protection. Yet, as Barry notes, the post-liberal view – which defines civil 
society in terms of those associations that are independent from both the state and the 
market - is perhaps more important for the politics of nature. This is manifested in the rich 
discussions on green forms of deliberative democracy and the public sphere, the 
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characterisation of green politics as a new politics of civil society, and the green critique of 
the market and the administrative state (Barry, 1999), all this illustrated throughout this 
thesis. 
Under the influence of Habermas, greens tend to assume that civil society is a 
positive thing, although one which is under threat. The lifeworld has been penetrated by 
market economy and state bureaucracies and these tensions undermine the autonomy of 
civil society. Yet they also give rise to “new forms of politics”, no longer based on class or 
production. Ecologism is an example of these new forms of organisation and resistance to 
the colonisation of the lifeworld, one that seeks to connect the totality of the social system 
to everyday life (Dickens, 1996: 133). 
 The green defence of civil society may be analysed in relation to the ecological 
critique of the state, explained in Chapter 2. Theorists like Illich and Gorz have played a 
key role in introducing to green political theory the idea of the autonomy of civil society 
from both the state and the market. They developed a new approach to the relationship 
between state and civil society, based on the idea that the welfare state undermines 
individual and collective autonomy, and self-reliance, and that decisions about social 
welfare should not be dictated by the state and the market but by individuals and 
communities. Barry notes that such a “fundamental restructuring of the definition (ends) as 
well as the institutions (means) of welfare is at the heart of the green aim to place the 
market and the state at the service of civil society rather than vice versa” (1999: 238). 
From this point of view, debates on civil society are related to ecological politics through 
the notion of welfare. This view of civil society organisations as the main providers of 
welfare permeates some of the initiatives to promote ecological citizenship in civil society 
illustrated further on.  
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The notion of civil society stresses the political importance of the collective 
regulation of economic relations. A civil society-based redefinition of welfare is part of the 
attempt to rethink the relationship between the state, the market and civil society from an 
ecological perspective. Following Barry, it can be argued that this constitutes a shift from a 
“politics of social welfare”, where the market and the state determine the needs of civil 
society, to a “politics of well-being” where civil society organisations and individuals 
define their own needs. A green politics of self-reliance, local relations and well-being is 
one in which citizens are not treated as consumers or clients but as social beings, and 
where “the good” is conceived as “doing rather than consuming or having”. While social 
practices have, as Barry notes, environmental impacts, “it is clear that a view of human 
well-being in which the emphasis is on social (which can include political) interaction as a 
major, though not the sole, component of the good life will make fewer demands on the 
environment” (Barry, 1999: 239).   
Besides issues of economic self-organisation and the autonomous provision of 
welfare, other reasons help explain the relevance of the concept of civil society for 
environmental politics. Since civil society is independent from both the state and the 
market, it is the site where value pluralism can be best guaranteed. Given the interest of 
green democratic politics in preserving the wide range of approaches to the environment, 
civil society is crucial for the expression of value pluralism, particularly for the expression 
of oppositional values, marginalised elsewhere (Smith, 2003: 124, 127). The examples 
discussed in this chapter illustrate different practices of ecological citizenship through 
which participants enact confrontational and alternative values and forms of social 
provision. 
In addition, there is a connection to be made between green political thought and 
civil society through deliberative democracy. As noted throughout this thesis, green 
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political theory is dominated by deliberative accounts of democracy. Deliberative 
democracy concedes great importance to the organisations of civil society for the role they 
play in the creation of a vital public sphere (Smith, 2003; Torgerson, 1999), and this is so 
even for advocates of the green state, like Eckersley (2004), as explained in Chapter 3. 
  
 
3. Civil society and ecological citizenship 
 
The relationship between ecological citizenship and civil society may be 
approached from two angles. The first one deals with the promotion of ecological 
citizenship through struggles for justice, recognition and inclusion, which constitute an 
ongoing process of construction of the meaning of ecological citizenship itself. This 
dimension stresses the idea of a politics of civil society and ecological citizenship critical 
of the status quo and confronting power. It focuses on ecological citizenship cultivated 
through engagement in citizen and community campaigns seeking to affect the content of 
rights and policy. This approach to the promotion of ecological citizenship is part of the 
public sphere activity of civil society. 
The second one stresses ecological citizens’ duties to live sustainably and to 
promote justice, and focuses on the ways ecological citizens can get involved in creating 
the right contexts and infrastructures to enable sustainable and just forms of living, 
working and consuming. This second approach emphasizes the self-organising and 
autonomous capacity of civil society, and therefore stresses the idea of collective 
determination and construction of an alternative socio-economic order in which the 
practice of ecological citizenship can be generalised and given meaning. It focuses on 
those activities and relationships through which people seek to live sustainably as 
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ecological citizens and to create the infrastructure that enables them to do so. As in the first 
approach, these are also practices through which the meaning of ecological citizenship is 
constantly renegotiated, so as to include activities excluded in accounts of politics and 
citizenship that are centred on communication and holding a conventional understanding of 
the political. 
In what follows I consider these two views of the ecological citizenship-civil 
society relation. This does not mean that I regard these dimensions as being independent 
and exclusive. Indeed, as will be clear from the analysis, both types of activities and 
objectives can overlap in practice, and be mutually reinforcing. Although I understand that 
struggles for emancipation, justice and rights may be part of ecological citizenship activity, 
I regard ecological citizenship to be more distinctly conceived as the fulfilment of duties of 
justice, as I explained in Chapter 1. Therefore, I am more interested in the second 
approach, which I discuss in greater detail. 
 
 
3.1. Struggles for justice, recognition and rights 
 
It is well documented that social movements have played a key role in the historical 
development of citizenship (Crouch et. al., 2001; Forewaker and Landman, 1997; Barbalet, 
1988; Turner, 1986). The green movement is expanding this process. Since ecologists 
operate in the political arena, they link green concerns with citizenship issues (Keohane et. 
al., 1993; Dryzek et. al., 2003; van Steenbergen, 1994)6.   
                                                 
6 This activist-centred perspective on ecological citizenship is resisted by Hayward (2006a, 2006b). He 
argues that the activities of groups and networks in civil society should not be defined as citizenship and that 
civil society cannot constitute a political community. He argues that civil society lacks power, authority and 
institutions and so is not political in the sense it would need to be to generate political obligations” (2006a: 
437). Yet ecological citizenship is about obligations and relations between cit izens themselves that are 
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These ideas are further elaborated by Jelin (2000). She relates ecological 
citizenship to the green movement’s struggles and activities, which, according to her, 
constitute an ongoing process for the establishment of new environmental rights. In 
defining environmental issues in terms of access to environmental and social rights, green 
activists have brought environmental issues into the public arena and related them to 
citizenship. This process highlights “the social construction of citizenship” (Jelin, 2000: 
52). In this view, ecological citizenship is shaped by the way green movements formulate 
their demands, introducing more and more environmental issues and dimensions of the 
environmental question into the public realm and onto public agendas, and with this 
contributing to democratisation.  
Similarly, Gilbert and Phillips argue that a critical understanding of citizenship 
should consider not only those rights granted by states but also those “practices through 
which the limits of established rights are re(defined) and re(affirmed)” (2003: 314). This is 
a form of “performative or substantive citizenship” that works to reshape citizens’ rights 
by stressing the gap between theories of citizenship and the reality of “everyday practices 
of citizenship” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 313). It is “a set of actions, practices and claims 
that reveal the gap between an assumed equality of individual citizens within a self-
governing nation-state and aspirations for appropriate or even alternative forms of 
governance” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 314). Seen in this light, citizenship is “a continual 
process of construction and constitution” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 314). This citizenship 
is enacted as “the political mobilization of citizens around a cause and/or against the 
governance of the state” (Gilbert and Philips, 2003: 315). From this performative 
perspective, ecological citizenship is promoted through the “political, social and 
                                                                                                                                                    
nonetheless political (as opposed to moral, family or friendship relationships) and, in this sense, civil society 
qualifies as the agent and the locus for its promotion. See Dobson (2006c) for a response to Hayward. 
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environmental disputes that challenge the imposed marginalization of some people” 
(Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 315).  
This account of ecological citizenship emerges from a “cultural politics of 
recognition” that seeks the inclusion of groups such as women, Aboriginal people and 
ethnic and linguistic minorities, who have been marginalised in the process of construction 
of the constitutional state. In this context, ecological citizenship aims at achieving different 
forms of recognition within the polity. This cultural politics of recognition and the 
practices of performative citizenship associated with it confront the hegemony of the state. 
Performative citizenship is an expression of “the constant political, social, and 
environmental disputes challenging the imposed marginalization of some people, while 
also claiming rights rooted in changing social conditions” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 313-
314). These cases of re-appropriation and re-definition of rights are examples of activity in 
civil society that target the state and place demands upon the state, while at the same time 
being critical of it. 
Campaigns to prevent water services privatisation and struggles against forced 
eviction are examples illustrative of particular forms of mobilisation and conflict that 
promote a performative ecological citizenship, defined in the process of resisting the 
mercantilisation of basic rights and services7. Privatisation makes fundamental rights, like 
water and housing, tradable and removes them from the realm of public goods; it turns 
citizens into consumers who have to pay for what should be basic services and rights 
(Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 322). These struggles against state-corporate alliances are an 
expression of “rights to difference” or “rights to public re-appropriation against private 
appropriation” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 323). In line with Jelin’s arguments, Gilbert and 
                                                 
7 Gilbert and Phillips’ arguments are based on case studies on Water Watch campaign against water services 
privatisation and the Tent City campaign against forced eviction, both in the city of Toronto. 
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Phillips note that these struggles point to the failure of the nation-state to guarantee 
citizens’ rights.  
The above examples constitute practices of environmental citizenships that 
question relations of injustice generated by markets (i.e. development projects) and the 
state (i.e. withdrawal of basic services and social rights). These forms of ecological 
citizenship expose “the tensions between the promise and the reality of neoliberal 
democratic governance” (Gilbert and Phillips, 2003: 203). 
The environmental justice movement is another example that serves to illustrate the 
promotion of ecological citizenship through campaigns of activists and community groups 
in civil society (Latta, 2007; Reid and Taylor, 2000)8. Environmental justice activism has 
been defined as “a sphere in which new visions of citizenship rights and practice are being 
born” (Latta, 2007: 388). The movement constantly redefines the meaning of citizenship, 
stressing the difference between citizens’ formal equality and the inequalities masked by 
the formal language of citizenship. Environmental justice praxis constitutes oppositional 
forms of knowledge and identities which in turn give shape to new conceptions of 
citizenship. Following Jelin, Latta contends that citizenship is a dynamic concept that 
constantly constructs and transforms itself. In this context, ecological citizenship “does not 
precede a politics of nature” but is “an emergent property of existing struggles for 
sustainability and political-ecological rights” that goes beyond existing theoretical or 
formal understandings to embrace “the struggles that seek to reshape it” (Latta, 2007: 388-
389, emphasis in the original).  
                                                 
8 In contrast to this approach, Agyeman and Evans (2006) do not believe that the concepts of environmental 
justice and ecological citizenship should be brought together. In their view, ecological citizenship is related 
to lifestyle and attitude change and therefore lacks the political and democratic dimension associated with 
struggles for environmental justice. Their position derives from an analysis of ecological citizenship 
grounded on conceptions such as that developed by Environment Canada (Agyeman and Evans, 2006: 200), 
discussed in Chapter 3 and problematised for being a narrow and limited account of ecological citizenship. 
There is evidence enough throughout this thesis to affirm that ecological citizenship is related to social 
equality, justice, democratisation and the political, and this weakens Agyeman and Evans’ critique of the 
concept. This chapter provides further arguments and examples that strengthen the connection between 
ecological citizenship and democratisation. 
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The environmental justice movement includes a variety of struggles such as 
community mobilisations for healthy towns, indigenous people’s struggles for access to 
land and opposition to global corporate interests. The common element in all these disputes 
is the way they link environmental and social justice questions. These projects incorporate 
nature into the concept of citizenship by bringing together political struggles for dignity, 
identity and recognition and the “physical, emotional and spiritual investments that people 
make in the ecological spaces where they dwell and work” (Latta, 2007: 391). As a form of 
citizenship emerging from and being promoted through the politics of environmental 
justice, ecological citizenship should be related to “political struggles for more democratic 
citizenship” (2007: 385), to demands for political and social inclusion, democratisation and 
transformative change. 
The above discussion indicates a path for ecological citizenship transformation 
based on struggles for sustainability, justice and recognition. From a 
performative/recognition approach, ecological citizenship is about bringing nature in all 
practices of citizenship and within civil, social and political rights, and about bringing all 
these rights together. This constitutes an ongoing process of redefinition of rights, nature, 
society and citizenship. This rights-based approach to the promotion of ecological 
citizenship is different from the constitutional and procedural initiatives analysed in 
Chapter 3. The point here is not to make use of previously granted and constitutionally 
protected rights, but to expose the way in which some citizens cannot enjoy these rights. In 
this sense, these initiatives to promote ecological citizenship may be useful for 
transcending some of the problems of approaches centred on formal rights, especially those 
related to barriers of participation grounded on material inequalities that prevent full 
ecological citizenship. Furthermore, such a conceptualisation of ecological citizenship 
transcends, on the one hand, the narrow, strictly environmental focus on the environment 
213 
 
of some of the state-centred proposals discussed in Chapter 3 – as it includes issues of 
justice and equality - and, on the other hand, the individualism and lack of political 
character of those notions of ecological citizenship based on personal lifestyle change.  
Yet, as I noted earlier, this view of ecological citizenship is related to the public 
sphere aspects of civil society. It is based on a form of citizen activity that seeks to expose 
what the powerful do and to exert influence over state policy and economic practices 
through the public sphere. In this sense, it is illustrative of the type of critical, influential 
and ends-oriented activity that a green public sphere should include, in line with the 
arguments developed in the previous chapter. However, as I noted, there is a more practical 
dimension in civil society, which relates to self-organisation. This allows us to think of 
civil society as the actor that will create the infrastructure needed for the promotion of 
ecological citizenship9. For this reason, I discuss this second dimension in greater detail. 
 
 
3.2. Self-organisation and the politics of sustainable living 
  
Ecological citizenship goes beyond accounts of citizenship grounded on struggles 
and campaigning in the conventionally understood political realm. Being an ecological 
citizen mainly means living in a just and sustainable way so as to minimise the size and 
impact of one’s ecological footprint in both our individual and collective lives. Certainly 
many people live sustainable lives and, in this sense, they are ecological citizens. Amongst 
these, the lives of some environmental activists can be taken as a model.  
Horton (2006) notes that ecologism is a form of embodied politics that seeks the 
incorporation of eco-political concerns of activists into their personal lives so as to make 
                                                 
9 Struggles for justice and rights sometimes result in the creation of new infrastructure. This happens, for 
instance, when campaigns against privatisation of services lead to the appropriation and provision of these 
services by the community itself.  
214 
 
everyday practices and relations consistent with the societies they seek to create. Because 
of this, green activists practise a form of ecological citizenship that goes beyond political 
campaigning and participation in struggles such as those illustrated in the previous section. 
Activists’ shopping habits, social relations, leisure and travel practices show that it is 
possible to live in ways that respect ecological risks and the rights of others. Their 
quotidian routines are an expression of the awareness and assumption of their 
asymmetrical duties of ecological citizenship. This indicates that “[c]itizenship is less a 
quality of individuals than of the architecture that produces and reproduces citizenship” 
(Horton, 2006: 147).  
The conditions surrounding the lives of green activists are a means to understand 
how ecological citizenship may be best promoted, given that these activists constitute an 
“elite” that is already acting and living as ecological citizens. If these conditions can be 
reproduced, then there may be more chances for other people to enact similar forms of 
ecological citizenship. So it is worth examining the characteristics of these particular forms 
of living. Horton notes that activists’ practices are produced through their participation in a 
green culture. This culture comprises a combination of green networks, spaces (like 
vegetarian cafes and community centres), materialities (like the bicycle and organic goods) 
and times10. Particularly important in the production and reproduction of this local green 
world are “weak ties”: shared leisure, shopping, dress style, diet and travel habits, and 
participation in similar events, such as festivals and workshops. These ties “enable people 
to recognize and be recognized by one another as belonging to the same political 
community, and are the basis of political solidarity” (Horton, 2006: 131). This alludes to a 
conception of citizenship in which what defines the political community and binds citizens 
                                                 
10 Horton’s arguments are based on an ethnographic study amongst green activists in Lancaster conducted 
between 1998 and 2002 (2006). 
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together are the “cultural and political spaces of contemporary environmentalism” (2006: 
128). These spaces are characterised by an emphasis on living and socialising locally. 
Green activists are environmental citizens whose behaviours and lifestyles are not 
possible for others because of the lack of “green structures” that make “green agency” 
possible. This suggests, Horton notes, that the cultivation of ecological citizenship 
demands “the promotion of the green culture from which activists’ ordinary everyday 
practices emerge” (Horton, 2006: 133). So Horton’s findings resonate with some of the 
conclusions of our assessment of state-sponsored forms of ecological citizenship. In 
Chapter 3 I argued that more than encouraging particular behaviours and habits, the 
promotion of ecological citizenship requires the creation of structures that make it easier 
for individuals to live as ecological citizens. In Horton’s analysis, this amounts to 
“increasing the range of places, times, and groups where environmental citizenship 
practices can be enacted” (Horton, 2006: 147)
11.    
 In the rest of the chapter I discuss some specific practices that constitute attempts to 
promote ecological citizenship in civil society. All these are based on the view that 
ecological citizenship requires citizens to live environmentally just and sustainable lives, 
fulfilling their duties of sustainability and justice and reducing their ecological footprints, 
as explained in Chapter 1. This selection of projects does not claim to cover all the 
possibilities for the promotion of ecological citizenship in civil society. There are countless 
initiatives similar to those discussed here. I focus on those activities that stress the practical 
and non-discursive elements of civil society, and which offer an account of political 
activity and the political that transcends the focus of the green public sphere as described 
in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the projects discussed certainly include a communicative 
                                                 
11 However, for Horton, the task of building adequate green infrastructures and spaces is to be achieved by 
means of greening discourses in the public sphere. Although ecological citizenship clearly demands and 
contributes to a green political culture and public sphere, different economic and social infrastructures that 
allow alternative systems of provision are needed too - as will become evident further on - and this goes 
beyond the greening of the public sphere.  
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dimension – especially in relation to adopting collective decisions about environmental 
issues, which, as I argued, is a key aspect of the promotion of ecological citizenship.  
I have restricted the choice to those activities which are clearly civil society-
sponsored, leaving aside partnerships between state agencies and civil society 
organisations, and projects that could be defined as articulations of environmental 
governance. I have chosen two concrete activities - seed saving and community and urban 
gardening - and different economic models, particularly the social economy and 
“alternative sustainable consumption”. Although these are broad topics that can be 
discussed from many angles and include multiple debates, I focus on studies that analyse 
these activities through an ecological citizenship lens. I do so because I am interested in 
how they may be used to facilitate ecological citizenship. 
 
 
3.2.1. Seed saving 
 
According to Phillips (2005), seed saving encompasses the growing, storage, reuse, 
and/ exchange of seeds as well as the production of the knowledge required for the practice 
of saving seed. Not only do seed savers manage seeds and plants, but they also learn from 
the experience of seed saving; they are “taught by nature” (Phillips, 2005: 43). This 
constitutes a collective process of learning based on “direct experience”; it is not only the 
individual, private act of seed saving that counts, but also the collective and public acts of 
the organisation of seed swaps and other gatherings to share information and seeds with 
others. 
Phillips’s study on seed saving as a form of ecological citizenship suggests that 
seed saving conforms with ecological citizenship understood both as “stewardship” and as 
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“eco-deliberation” 12. In line with ecological stewardship, saving seed is an expression of 
citizens’ acceptance of responsibility for the creation of sustainability. In this sense, many 
engaged individuals conceive seed saving as a moral obligation to sustainability aims such 
as biodiversity conservation, the preservation of a particular farming and food culture, and 
to more enduring and balanced food systems. All these aims fit well with the general 
ecological citizenship duties to promote sustainability and justice.  
Yet Phillips argues that seed saving practices also resonate with deliberative 
accounts of ecological citizenship emphasising the intrinsic value of citizenship and debate 
and the importance of a green public sphere. For seed savers, the need to respect different 
points of view about the justifications for seed saving, and to foster public debates about 
the regulation of seed production and distribution, is crucial13. Actually, seed savers often 
lament the absence of public debates about these issues, and accuse governments and 
corporations of adopting technologies and legislation beneficial for their own interests and 
not for the public good. 
Three aspects of Phillips’ research are relevant to our inquiry. First, that seed 
saving is an example of a citizen and political activity that redefines what we understand to 
be political. According to this study, seed saving is a form of political engagement, a 
practice of resistance through which seed savers embrace alternative forms of living that 
challenge mainstream socio-natural relations, oppose state legislation, corporate practices, 
technological developments - such as industrial agriculture and farming, genetically 
engineered seeds - and patent laws that jeopardise traditional practices of seed saving and 
                                                 
12 However Phillips argues that some seed savers do not experience the feeling of a moral or political 
obligation, and that, in other cases, when this is felt, it appears to be combined with different types of 
motivation like spiritual values, “the spirit of joy” and “a sense of fun and sensuality” (2006: 43-44). That is 
why she contends that the language of ecological citizenship cannot capture the whole spectrum of 
dimensions involved in saving seed.  
13 As Philips notes, seed savers also engage in conventional citizenship activities in the public sphere such as 





exchanging by farmers and gardeners, challenge “farmers’ rights” and make seed saving 
difficult and, in some cases, illegal. Beyond technical sustainability issues, the activities of 
seed savers address dominant socio-natural relations and questions of power. Second, seed 
saving as eco-deliberation acknowledges the ends-oriented value of debate, in this case, the 
preservation of a food system and culture increasingly being marginalised. In this sense, 
seed savers may be sustaining a green public sphere as defined in Chapter 3. And, third, 
that ecological citizenship learning and transformation are produced through practical 
activity. Phillips stresses that beyond mere talk about seed saving, what is important is the 
act of seed saving itself. Seed savers express an awareness of the difference between the 
value of discourse (or intellectual knowledge) and the value of action (as practice). Many 
seed savers are convinced that “it is through their actions with/in nature and with/in 
networks that they gain knowledge and efficacy for themselves, simultaneously 
influencing others and the world around them” (Phillips, 2005: 46).  
  
 
3.2.2. Community gardens and urban agriculture 
 
The contemporary movement for community gardening conceives this practice as a 
route to changing people and places. Community gardens are different from private 
gardens in that they are owned, accessed and democratically managed by a collective. This 
collective can be either a civic association or a citizen group, acting alone or in partnership 
with local authorities. Land scarcity, urban expansion and development are contributing to 
the increasing demand of communal gardens. They perform different functions, ranging 
from the provision of affordable locally grown vegetables for the community, to the 
facilitation of green open spaces. Just as there are many definitions and types of 
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communities, the concept of the community garden is broad and encompasses the diversity 
and plurality of communities and communal spaces14.  
Some of these projects are forms of urban resistance to development through the 
appropriation of urban sites that had been left empty or through the creation of car-free 
spaces. Others are “demonstration gardens” where people are taught about water 
conservation techniques, organic gardening and composting, or ecological restoration 
gardens bringing together citizens and experts15. In some cases, gardens are thought of as 
means to fight poverty and social exclusion in disadvantaged areas, by providing education 
and training, affordable organic vegetables and job opportunities for the community (Ferris 
et. al., 2001). 
More than simply gardening is at stake. Like seed saving, gardening is not only 
about the results of the act of gardening itself (i.e. getting plants and vegetables out of 
seeds and soil). Research on community gardens and urban agriculture identifies a strong 
connection between the use of urban and community gardens and the promotion of 
environmental justice and social equality, by “reconciling people, land and sustainability” 
(Ferris et. al., 2001: 560-561). Gardening and agriculture lead to community building, 
encouraging mutual aid and reciprocity. Heirs of the civil rights movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s, community gardens are described as hubs for local and neighbourhood politics 
(Ferris et. al., 2001: 567). 
Likewise, the personal benefits of gardening have been noted too. Gardening “heals 
the spirit, expands the mind, mends the broken body, and realizes a deeply felt human need 
for connection with the earth and other people” (Pudup, 2008: 1228). Gardens are, beyond 
                                                 
14Ferris et. al., (2001) refer to “leisure gardens”, “child and school gardens”, “entrepreneurial gardens”, 
“crime diversion gardens”, “work and training gardens”, “healing and therapy gardens”, “quiet gardens”, 
“ecological restoration gardens” and “demonstration gardens”.  




spaces for “physical labor” or “mere work”, a route to “individual, social and spatial 
transformation” (Pudup, 2008: 1228).  
 Urban spaces, urban agriculture, farming and city gardens have been studied in 
relation to ecological citizenship (Travaline and Hunold, 2010; Pudup, 2008). Although 
Pudup (2008) is sceptical about the potential for ecological citizenship in the specific 
projects she studies because, in her view, these are top-down initiatives, Travaline and 
Hunold’s research on urban agricultural organisations in Philadelphia arrives at more 
promising conclusions16. They show the way in which urban agriculture leads to the 
promotion of participation and learning associated with ecological citizenship. Particularly, 
they illustrate a form of social learning and public participation in decision-making about 
issues related to food production and consumption, in clear contrast with the less 
democratic approach of agribusinesses. These projects of urban agriculture and farming 
promote community involvement; citizens decide what it is to be grown, how it should be 
grown, and how it is to be distributed, and they contribute with their time to the 
maintenance of the gardens. This is a type of “hands-on participation” (2010: 582) where 
groups involved in urban agriculture explore alternative food systems and develop 
participatory ways to organise food production and distribution. City farming helps people 
to act as “food citizens” and not as mere consumers (Travaline and Hunold, 2010: 588). 
Participation in urban agriculture organisations generates knowledge amongst participants 
about agricultural, environmental and food-related issues, so that citizens may be able to 
make more informed individual and collective decisions. It is also a form of civic and 
social learning: through their direct engagement, citizens develop “the political and social 
skills necessary for effective citizenship, building community and transforming some 
                                                 
16 Pudup’s assessment is based on two case studies on organized garden projects in the San Francisco Bay 
area. According to her, these are disciplining projects, designed by their managers - usually a 
“countercultural elite” that seeks to expand its power - to transform individuals involved and to create 
particular types of “citizen-subjects” (2008: 1238).  A more positive account of these two projects analyzed 
by Pudup is offered by Ferris et al (2001).  
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residents into urban ecological citizens” (Travaline and Hunold, 2010: 589). For the 
authors of the study, these practices show that unused city land can be used for socially 
beneficial purposes, like alternative food systems promoting sustainability and justice.  
 
 
3.2.3. The social economy and alternative consumption 
 
As stressed throughout this thesis, green political theorists have focused on political 
institutions and, particularly, deliberative democratic processes as sites for the promotion 
of ecological citizenship. As a result, perhaps, the economic sphere has received less 
attention. Yet living sustainably often involves activity and choices in the economic terrain 
for individuals, especially in the sphere of consumption. In addition, in Chapter 3 I alluded 
to current economic organisations and consumption patterns that shape citizens’ lives as 
obstacles to ecological citizenship. Thus it seems appropriate to examine economic 
innovations that may hold more promise for the promotion of ecological citizenship. One 
of this is the social economy17.  
As Smith notes (2005a), the ‘social economy’ refers to those organisations - 
including co-operatives, voluntary associations and foundations - that aim to provide 
services either to their own members or to the wider community. They prioritise people 
over capital, are governed by a democratic structure and are managed independently of 
public authorities. The ethos of the social economy is grounded in the idea that social aims 
are more important than capital accumulation and profit. Many social economy activities 
address poverty alleviation and socio-economic injustice, two objectives that are part of the 
broader aims of sustainable development and ecological citizenship. More strictly 
                                                 
17 Smith notes that the distinction between the social and the informal economy is difficult to draw. While for 
some authors the informal economy is a type of social economy organisation, for others these are two 
completely different spheres of activity (2005a: 278).  
222 
 
environmental concerns are amongst the objectives of some of the social economy 
organisations, particularly food cooperatives and ethical trading schemes. Smith argues 
that whatever their aims are, a respect for the environment is always part of their ethos. In 
addition, the governance structure of social economy organisations leads to a division of 
labour and relations of power that are more democratic than those of capitalist corporations 
and public bureaucracies. The social economy offers a variety of possibilities for 
participation in economic decisions (Smith, 2005a: 276-280). 
 How do the ethos and structure of the social economy specifically promote 
ecological citizenship? Smith suggests that, first, participation in the social economy raises 
awareness and understanding of socio-environmental relations amongst those involved. 
Second, the fact that social and environmental injustice are some of the targets of social 
economy activity makes it appropriate for the cultivation of the virtues of justice, care and 
compassion associated with ecological citizenship. And, third, the governance form of 
social economy institutions makes them an appropriate locus to learn the practical, political 
and critical skills required of ecological citizens, such as speaking, self-representation, 
reciprocity, trust, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills (Smith, 2005a: 280-281).  
Alternative sustainable consumption projects are examples of social economy 
innovations of particular relevance for the promotion of ecological citizenship. Chapter 3 
addressed some of the implications that dominant strategies for sustainable consumption 
have for citizenship. It was noted that state-sponsored policies are ineffective for changing 
current unsustainable forms of consumption and promoting ecological citizenship. 
Mainstream sustainable consumption simply encourages individuals to “do their bit” 
through the acquisition of ecologically and ethically produced goods. The value of 
decreasing consumption – related to ecological citizenship obligations to reduce the size of 
one’s ecological footprint - is neglected, since under mainstream sustainable consumption 
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practices the end is still to consume. The ecological citizenship-sustainable consumption 
link can reinforce the possibility that ecological citizens consolidate a new type of 
ecological or green consumerism. Moreover, the conventional concept of the consumer, 
informed by individualism and economism, advanced by neoclassical economics, seems to 
be incompatible with the notion of citizenship. These problems suggest, as indicated in 
Chapter 3, a negative reading of the citizen-consumer nexus, on the grounds that it is 
detrimental to both the promotion of ecological citizenship and sustainable consumption.  
If trying to promote ecological citizenship through sustainable consumption can 
actually undermine it, should sustainable consumption be rejected altogether as a form of 
citizenship, or is there a way out of this deadlock?18 I believe that there is. Rather than 
choosing between either being a citizen or a consumer, or attempting to replace the 
consumer with the citizen, what is needed is a redefinition of both notions of citizenship 
and consumption. The key to move this idea forward is to conceive consumption as 
something more than the expression of interests and choices of individual and isolated 
consumers. Economism, consumerism and individualism should be replaced by socio-
natural relations that take into account issues of justice, equality, the social dimension of 
consumption and production, as well as other values - such as a non-instrumental view of 
nature and the interests of future generations. Moreover, the reduction of citizenship to acts 
of consumption - so frequent in environmental state policy - should be resisted. When the 
citizen is reduced to the category of consumer, not only is consumption depoliticised, but 
so is citizenship, which is detached from the political and collective dimension that comes 
into being with participation with fellow citizens in public life. 
Through consumption, humans interact with nature. And this is a political relation. 
It includes issues such as what it is to be produced, how, in what quantities and to which 
                                                 
18 The following arguments are included in Melo-Escrihuela (2010). 
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ends. Currently these crucial decisions that affect and determine our future are taken by big 
businesses, with the support of governments that in some cases represent economic 
interests. To acknowledge the political dimension of consumption and of human-nature 
relationships implies accepting that consumption choices and decisions are not private and 
therefore they have to be adopted by society as a whole. Beyond sustainable practices such 
as recycling and green buying, being a citizen in the sphere of consumption requires 
opposing the privatisation of consumption that takes place in consumerist societies and 
assuming collective control of decisions affecting the socio-natural metabolism, that is, 
human-nature relations (Sempere, 2009). This is the positive reading of the citizen-
consumer dilemma, one that makes it promising for the cultivation of ecological 
citizenship. 
Likewise, the collective aspect of both consumption and citizenship has to be 
emphasised in order to counteract the tendency towards green consumerism underlying 
some practices of sustainable consumption, like those discussed in Chapter 3. If ecological 
citizenship is to be promoted through consumption, citizens’ acts have to be placed within 
a collective context. This is true for several reasons. First, because by inserting them in a 
collective context they transcend the private domain and acquire political significance. If 
considered on their own and in isolation these practices tend to be perceived as self-
restraints and sacrifices, as individual ethical commitments. Second, because introducing a 
collective dimension will make them accessible for most citizens. Some sustainable 
consumption practices like vegetarianism or organic food are perceived by some citizens as 
eccentricities, fashions or trends, or even as counter-cultural and anti-system practices, and 
are rejected by those individuals who do not identify themselves with those cultural groups 
with which they are associated. Or in some contexts they are reduced to forms of 
consumption for the privileged classes to the extent that disadvantaged groups with fewer 
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resources cannot participate. Third, because only through collective action is it possible to 
produce the necessary conditions for citizens to act and choose in sustainable ways and to 
render individual acts of consumption meaningful.  
We can start thinking about such redefinitions of consumption and the citizen-
consumer by looking at Seyfang’s work on alternative sustainable consumption as a tool 
for ecological citizenship (2009, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003). This alternative model of 
sustainable consumption contrasts with the mainstream state-led policy perspective 
discussed in Chapter 3. It offers “more radical critiques of current consumption patterns 
that incorporate social sustainability and equity, and favour a downscaling of material 
consumption (rather than continued growth)” (Seyfang, 2003: 2). This approach draws on 
some of the ideas put forward at the Rio Summit, arguing for a redefinition of development 
objectives in line with socio-environmental priorities and beyond economic interests. 
These claims, marginalised in the mainstream policy agendas of governments and 
businesses, are common amongst the “new economics” followers (Seyfang, 2009: Chapter 
3; 2005: 298-299; 2004: 9).  
New economics offers an alternative view of sustainable consumption and 
environmental governance19. This is based on small-scale innovations to be achieved 
through collective action. The aim is to trigger changes in socio-technical systems of 
provision, generating new infrastructure and non-market mechanisms (Seyfang, 2009: 21-
25). The new economics movement rejects “mainstream ‘light green’ approaches to the 
environment which presume an incrementally-improved ‘business as usual’ approach to 
sustainable development” (Seyfang, 2009: 47). It draws on a wider account of the 
economy, “wealth”, and “prosperity” so as to include social and environmental concerns. It 
                                                 
19 The new economics “is an environmental philosophical  and political movement founded on  a belief that 
economics cannot be divorced from its foundations in environmental and social contexts, and that 
sustainability requires a realigning of development priorities away from the primary goal of economic growth 
towards wellbeing instead” (Seyfang, 2009: 23). The movement seeks to achieve a “paradigm shift for the 
economy”, a “wholesale transition” rather than “incremental changes” (Seyfang, 2009: 23). 
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favours an extended notion of work that includes “non-commodified labour”, unpaid 
socially necessary labour and informal employment, and advocates a different conception 
of money to include community currencies and other alternative money systems (Seyfang, 
2009).       
The new economics approach constitutes an “equity-based understanding of 
environmental governance, drawing on ‘ecological footprinting’ metaphors to guide 
action” (Seyfang, 2009: 24). It is based on the idea that the implementation of five 
interrelated processes is needed for sustainable consumption to be advanced. These are, 
 
localisation (to increase resilience and protect local economies against 
external shocks), community-building (to create cohesive, inclusive 
communities), reducing material consumption (to reduce the environmental 
and social impacts of inequitably high resource use in the developed world), 
collective action (to overcome the limitations of individualism in solving 
collective problems) and the creation of new social infrastructure (to embody 
these values and enable people to express them in everyday life) (Seyfang, 
2006c: 3).  
 
Local organic food chains and community currencies are grassroots innovations 
favoured by the new economics approach to achieve its objectives and the desired changed. 
Following Seyfang, I look at their effectiveness as tools for the promotion of ecological 
citizenship.  
Local organic food networks seek to protect local economies from external threads, 
promoting localisation and decentralisation. Seyfang’s case studies on Eostre Organics 
(2009, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2005), an organic food producer cooperative in East Anglia, 
show that participants - who belong to all social and income levels - assume ecological 
citizenship duties of sustainability and justice by reducing the sizes of their ecological 
footprints. They voluntarily choose to act in ways that are in contradiction with the signals 
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that they get from businesses and governments, expressing a strong commitment to social 
equality and justice (by accepting to pay more for what is produced in a more socially and 
environmentally just way, and by reducing food miles and packaging) 20, and to 
community-building (strengthening relations between producers and consumers, and 
contributing to the development of local economies in the face of economic globalisation). 
According to Seyfang, this reveals a conscious determination to get involved in alternative 
food networks – and to deliberately avoid supermarkets - and shows that their actions are 
motivated by their values and commitment to the common good. 
Engagement in local food supply chains is a learning process in which knowledge 
is acquired through direct involvement. As Seyfang contends, participants learn about the 
social and environmental aspects of sustainability, including the value of seasonal 
vegetables and of locally and organically grown food; they also acquire knowledge about 
food miles. They learn what the real cost of food is and how local economies function. 
They can visit the various farms involved, so they can see where their food comes from. 
But they also learn social skills and the benefits of being part of a community, face-to-face 
interaction and participation in decision making. Through this social and environmental 
learning process, citizens internalise ethical and political motivations to act. 
In addition, Seyfang notes that cooperative food systems empower individuals – 
both consumers and producers - through “daily private decision making with political 
implications”, in line with the objectives of ecological citizenship (Seyfang, 2006a: 392). 
In this way, local organic food systems are “able to enfranchise [their] customers with a 
                                                 
20 The higher prices when compared to non-organic products are one of the bigger obstacles to increased 
consumption of organics. According to Seyfang, a way to overcome this obstacle would be providing 
information through education and media campaigns about food miles and the social and environmental 
hidden costs of products. Another solution is state intervention to correct prices, by removing subsidies to 
intensive industrial farming and with decisions aimed at internalising externalities and having prices that 
reflect the real social and environmental cost of products. A third solution would be to provide activist and 
grassroots groups engaged in this alternative consumption initiatives with funding to maintain their projects 
(Seyfang, 2009: 111; 2005: 301; 2006b: 10). But for governments to provide this favourable policy 
framework, they have to resist pressure from the food industry. 
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feeling of political agency which fulfils their need for expression and activism” (Seyfang, 
2006a: 392).  
Alternative sustainable food projects consolidate new infrastructures of provision 
and novel markets, like collective box schemes, farm shops and market stalls; these are 
direct marketing strategies, with no intermediaries, where principles like fair trade, mutual 
aid, cooperation and loyalty are favoured over the competitiveness of the conventional 
market system. They re-embed economic relations within the community, strengthen social 
networks and guarantee sustainable rural livelihoods. They allow for the expression and 
consolidation of alternative social, economic and environmental values.  
Hence Seyfang argues that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between 
ecological citizenship, local organic food networks and sustainable consumption. On the 
one hand, ecological citizenship values and motivations encourage people to take part in 
organic food supply chains to meet sustainable consumption goals. On the other hand, 
local organic food networks contribute to the promotion of ecological citizenship by 
creating “informed, educated communities around food – through education, outreach, 
literature, farm visits and web sites, etc...” (Seyfang, 2009: 109-110), thereby both 
supporting the ethics, values, motivation and commitment to justice that define it, and 
building the social infrastructure that enables its expression in everyday life (Seyfang, 
2006a: 393; 2006c: 12).  
Another grassroots economic innovation with potential to encourage ecological 
citizenship is “complementary” and “community currencies”. These are “monetary tools 
which aim to overcome structural weaknesses in mainstream money, by incentivizing more 
sustainable behavior” (Seyfang, 2009: 26). These “alternative exchange systems”, which 
coexist with mainstream money, have appeared in both developed and developing 
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countries since the 1990s to meet social, economic and environmental needs21. Like 
organic food supply chains, they are community responses to the different threats posed by 
globalisation (Seyfang, 2009: 54). Mainstream systems of money promote formal paid 
employment and penalise unpaid but socially necessary community work. In contrast, 
green mechanisms of exchange, like complementary currencies, value all forms of work 
(Seyfang, 2009: 144).  
Time banks are an example22. These are non-market based exchange systems aimed 
at creating community networks of support and reciprocal help. They are grounded on the 
following principles: everybody has skills to be shared; the informal economy and unpaid 
work are important and key to community development; reciprocity and exchange are 
prioritised over dependency; learning and skills-sharing have to be encouraged; and finally, 
people should participate in decision-making. Time is deployed as a currency to 
consolidate community cohesion and social capital, while promoting mutual aid. Citizens 
and local associations are brought together in a scheme designed for exchanging services - 
such as gardening, DIY jobs, dog-walking or giving lifts - for time credit. Hours are 
“banked” and later on “withdrawn” when needed (Seyfang, 2009: 149-150). According to 
Seyfang, since every participant’s time is worth the same, time banks are appealing to 
socially vulnerable groups, excluded in other modes of sustainable consumption. They also 
operate in marginalised neighbourhoods where they contribute to community building and 
generate trust amongst participants. While the skills and knowledge of socially excluded 
individuals have no value in the mainstream economy, they are recognised in time banks 
and this, in Seyfang’s view, empowers individuals and communities (Seyfang, 2005: 301; 
                                                 
21 As Seyfang notes, some non-monetary, virtual currencies exist in compatibility with mainstream money 
systems and perform functions different from those performed by community currencies. This is the case of 
air miles, which incentivise flying, and supermarket reward cards that encourage consumption (Seyfang, 
2009: 145). These corporate schemes do not embody the values of ethical and sustainable consumption. 
22 Time banks draw on the US time dollar scheme developed in the 1980s by the civil rights lawyer Edgar 
Cahn to resist social fragmentation and the erosion of neighbor and social networks for support. The first 
time bank was created in the UK in 1998 in Gloucester (Seyfang, 2009: 149-150). 
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2009: 152). Just as conventional money rewards people who compete with each other, 
local currencies, like time banks, reward people who cooperate with each other (Seyfang, 
2009: 140). Individuals get involved in these initiatives not only for their affordability but 
because they allow the expression of anti-materialist values and alternative forms of 
economic exchange and needs-satisfaction (Seyfang, 2005: 301). 
Time banks are economic spaces outside the mainstream economy, which “enable 
the non-profit oriented exchange of non-monetised services to meet social and economic 
needs, and which operate according to cooperative, egalitarian principles” (Seyfang, 2009: 
150). Seyfang’s studies conclude that they facilitate civic engagement, participation in 
local decision-making, community-building and social networking, resisting social 
exclusion and promoting active citizenship. They encourage sustainable consumption and 
ecological citizenship, while “creating new institutions of wealth, value and work” 
(Seyfang, 2009: 153, emphasis in the original). Seyfang notes that “[t]ime banks represent 
a new infrastructure of income distribution for society, where income is not dependent 
upon one’s value to, and activity in the formal economy, but rather upon work – broadly 
defined...” (Seyfang, 2009: 153).  
LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems) are another example of green money23. 
They enable their members to exchange goods and services for a local currency instead of 
cash. Trades are recorded through a system that keeps track of credits and debits. 
Participants in LETS experience the benefits of helping each other by exchanging work, 
goods and services. Local identity and belonging are strengthened, and this is emphasised 
by the locally-relevant names given to currencies (Seyfang, 2005: 301; 2009: 146).  
Seyfang’s studies conclude that LETS promote localisation, as they allow a 
community to trade within itself, with money circulating locally and reductions in the 
                                                 
23 LETS originated in Canada to counteract the negative effects of globalisation, like unemployment and 
social fragmentation. Although most LETS are small initiatives run by community activists, some have 
emerged with the support of local authorities particularly in the context of Local Agenda 21 (Seyfang, 2009). 
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number of imported goods and services. They facilitate informal employment and 
acquisition of a variety of skills. They also help citizens to reduce their ecological 
footprints by promoting local consumption, recycling through a market for unwanted 
items, and shared used of resources, like cars and electrical equipment amongst community 
members, thus facilitating consumption reduction. LETS promote community-building by 
creating social networks, generating friendships, self-confidence and self-esteem (Seyfang, 
2005; 2009). They are socially inclusive and provide interest-free credit to financially 
vulnerable groups. Hence LETS constitute a “tool for building more self-reliant, socially-
embedded local economies” and have a crucial role to play in the transition towards a 
green economy and citizenship (Seyfang, 2009: 148)24.    
Local food supply chains bypassing supermarkets, community currencies and time 
banks uphold a concept of consumption grounded in different values, particularly a 
definition of development that pays attention to socio-environmental criteria and human 
well-being. According to Seyfang’s analyses, these projects generate new forms of 
economic governance and more just social relations that bring participants closer to each 
other. These initiatives promote sustainable consumption, defined - following  new 
economics - by the criteria of decentralisation, localization, ecological footprint reduction, 
community-building, collective action, and the creation of new institutions.  They provide 
a social context and infrastructure – that emerges in opposition to the wider institutions - in 
which it is possible to lead individual and collective lives based on a culture of sufficiency 
rather than increased consumption. These initiatives constitute grassroots efforts to resist 
economic globalisation, as well as social and environmental injustice. Since they facilitate 
non-monetary exchange of goods, time and knowledge outside the market, they remain 
open to those with lower incomes, thereby being more inclusive and accessible than other 
                                                 
24 On LETS as vehicles for ecological citizenship, see also Barry (1999) and Bary and Proops (2000). 
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forms of sustainable consumption, like organic food markets. These initiatives strengthen 
the sphere of the informal economy, since they create relationships that are less dependent 
on paid work. For all these reasons, they are crucial spaces for the expression of ecological 
citizenship. 
However, it could be argued that – even though the economic innovations studied 
reveal participant’s commitment to ecological citizenship values and motivation- an 
examination of other similar projects may lead to different perceptions. Other initiatives 
could achieve the same objectives of reducing ecological footprints, but they may not 
necessarily generate the social and community benefits identified by Seyfang, or be based 
on participants’ justice-related motivations. And this, of course, also applies to research on 
community gardens and seed saving, too. As with most initiatives embodying an 
alternative vision of society, economic innovations like those discussed above tend to 
attract people who are already committed to the values that these projects seek to 
materialise, and in this sense they tell us little regarding how to engage the broader society. 
It may also be objected that these projects represent a marginal form of consumption, 
difficult to generalise and implement at a wider societal scale, and that in any case they 
represent a small amount of the total of economic exchange, and are thus not likely to 
produce significant impacts in the wider national and global economies. 
Despite these weaknesses, what makes alternative sustainable consumption relevant 
is that it provides a clue to the type of institutions that could be reproduced at a larger 
scale. It can help us to think about different forms of organising our societies and 
economies where today’s alternative practices become tomorrow’s logical, coherent and 
widespread forms of consumption within a given system of values and institutions. At the 
same time, these initiatives are effective means to encourage ecological citizenship 
learning and practice, and constitute an example of the type of social and economic 
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institutions that would provide the appropriate context for the cultivation of ecological 
citizenship as part of a larger project for sustainability.    
 
 
4. Assessing civil society as an agent for ecological citizenship transformation 
 
After having discussed different initiatives to think through the promotion of 
ecological citizenship in civil society, I now assess more specifically how they encourage 
ecological citizenship. I do so with particular reference to the other agents for 
transformation studied in the previous chapters. This analysis helps identify forms of 




4.1. Citizens’ motivations, sustainability and justice 
 
The practices discussed in this chapter promote ecological citizenship by enabling 
citizens to consciously and voluntarily assume duties of sustainability and justice. Those 
engaged in activities like alternative sustainable consumption, community gardening and 
seed saving express an ethical and political obligation to reduce consumption levels and 
carbon emissions, to protect biodiversity, future generations and other species, and to 
preserve rural environments, cultures and knowledge. Through these practices, citizens 
show their commitment to social equality, environmental justice and poverty alleviation. 
On these grounds, it could be argued that civil society initiatives to promote ecological 
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citizenship both draw on and consolidate an account of sustainability broader than state-
centred proposals examined in Chapter 3. 
Participants in these initiatives are motivated ecological citizens who assume 
responsibility for creating the conditions for sustainability. In clear contrast with most 
state-based approaches to ecological citizenship, which encourage behavioural change 
based on external motivations – like monetary incentives and regulation - these civil 
society strategies foster changes in actions and attitudes motivated by the aspiration to live 
sustainably and to do justice. Individuals are not addressed as green consumers but as 
citizens. They are not steered in particular directions, but are encouraged to define 
problems, identify solutions and put them into practice. As explained in Chapter 4, some 
state-sponsored campaigns do not treat citizens as autonomous citizens but as obedient 
subjects who are told what to do, in a way that emulates analysis of governmentality25.  
In the civil society approaches studied, individual behaviour is politicised. By 
getting directly involved, citizens acquire a deep understanding of environmental issues 
and about the consequences of their actions for sustainability. They become aware of the 
implications of reducing ecological footprints and decreasing consumption. This provides 
reasons and motivations for action that go beyond individualist and moralist accounts of 
environmental responsibility. These ecological citizens are committed to the common good 
and the well-being of their societies. 
For instance, by accepting to pay more – the real cost – for locally and organically 
produced goods, individuals are following internal motivations and acting as concerned 
citizens, not as selfish, individualist consumers who simply respond to incentives. By 
consciously choosing to reduce their ecological footprints and by decreasing consumption 
                                                 
25 Of course govermentality emerges in civil society too. An example can be found in Pudup’s study on 
community gardens. She describes organised garden projects as“spaces of neoliberal governmentality, that is, 
spaces in which gardening puts individuals in charge of their own adjustment(s) to economic restructuring 
and social dislocation through self-help technologies centered on personal contact with nature” (Pudup, 2008: 
1228).   
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levels, citizens are expressing their motivation and commitment to a fair distribution of 
goods and services and to a redefinition of development that includes wellbeing and 
environmental protection. The possibilities that the economic sphere and civil society offer 
for the promotion of ecological citizenship challenge Sagoff’s (1998) much quoted 
distinction between the citizen and the consumer - and his idea that citizen and consumer 
motivations are always in contradiction26 – and suggest, as I argued, a positive view of the 
citizen-consumer.  
Conflict and opposition (in order to fight injustice) are important motivations for 
ecological citizenship. Although not all projects in civil society are based on resistance and 
confrontation, aspirations of justice as a motivation for action are more likely to be found 
in civil society, which is less constrained by imperatives than the state. The initiatives 
studied in the previous sections encourage contestation and resistance to accept injustice as 
reasons for action. I will return to this point shortly.     
 
 
4.2. Beyond debate and intellectual knowledge: practice and lived experience 
 
The issue of knowledge acquisition is crucial for ecological citizenship, which has 
been defined several times throughout this thesis as a learning process. Following Luque 
(2005), I argued in Chapter 4 that beyond school environmental education and the 
provision of information through environmental campaigns which provide scientific-based 
evidence of the state of the world, ecological citizens need the type of knowledge that 
contextualises environmental issues within a broader socio-economic system, and helps 
them to understand the relationship between this and concerns of justice, between 
                                                 
26 See Keat (1994) for one of the earliest critique’s of Sagoff’s dualism. 
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sustainability and social organisation. A closer understanding of socio-environmental 
issues and how these relate to questions of justice may help citizens to make more 
informed decisions and choices, and to envision possible routes and strategies for social 
and environmental change.  
How is this knowledge generated? One way is activist-type of engagement in the 
political arena as conventionally understood, namely campaigns, protests, lobbying and 
opposition to government plans. This has been illustrated earlier when referring to the 
promotion of ecological citizenship through struggles for environmental justice and 
recognition. This is a form of ecological citizenship related to the public sphere activity of 
civil society. Yet I argued in the previous chapter that civil society also includes action 
beyond that which characterise the public sphere. In this sense, this chapter has stressed a 
particular form of knowledge-seeking and sharing, different from both that which is 
abstract, bureaucratic and scientifically produced - which often informs state-sponsored 
campaigns to encourage ecological citizenship activity - and also different from that which 
is generated through debate, political campaigning and contestation in the green public 
sphere. This knowledge is gathered though practice and lived experience.   
A practice-based form of knowledge like this is excluded in most accounts of 
politics and citizenship, yet it is a vehicle for the promotion of ecological citizenship. It 
constitutes a process of learning from nature first hand, by “being taught” by nature 
through direct experience in practices like seed saving or gardening. Knowledge is 
acquired not only through the individual act of doing a particular activity, but also through 
collective acts of exchanging and sharing. As the studies carried out by Travaline and 
Hunold (2010) and Smith (2005a) suggest, experience and direct involvement not only 
lead to knowledge about the social and environmental conditions for sustainability, but 
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also to the acquisition of the social, political and critical skills needed for effective 
citizenship.  
For instance, in community gardening and urban agriculture projects examined by 
Travaline and Humold, social and environmental knowledge is acquired by participants 
who “get their hands dirty and help with the daily activities involved in growing food” 
(2010: 584). Community members undertake the harvest, wash, package and distribution 
of vegetables in the neighbourhood. In doing so, participants are reconnected with their 
food; they learn about food production and get a deeper understanding of the value and real 
cost of food. This in turn leads to the ability to make better and more informed decisions 
about food policy. 
 Gardening also fosters collective learning. In those communities where people are 
involved in agriculture projects there is a higher awareness of all the issues surrounding 
food production and consumption, and about the agrifood system in general, regardless of 
the fact that they are directly involved themselves. Travaline and Hunold believe that “just 
having access to locally grown food educates the community and raises awareness of 
agrifood issues” (2010: 586). Participation is often triggered by seeing neighbours getting 
involved. In this way, citizens encourage and teach each other in a process of mutual 
learning. This collective learning is then carried out at the individual household level. 
Travaline and Hunold’s studies found that people involved believe that more and more 
community members and neighbours start growing plants and vegetables in their homes, 
because the effect of gardening is “catching on” (2010: 586). 
Another example is walking, an activity that not many would consider citizenly, not 
even green activists - who, when asked, would perhaps name recycling, sustainable buying 
or political lobbying as the activities they are usually engaged in. Reid and Taylor’s case 
study on ecological citizenship and activism in the Appalachia region, in the United States, 
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suggests that through walking, people learn new experiences by being attentive to specific 
places, living beings and rocks.  They learn about the environment by looking at changes 
in wildlife, in the state of the roads and paths, or observing the consequences of the floods. 
Walking often leads them to identify possible dangers and damages, and engage in activity 
to repair the damage, for instance, by stopping erosion or cleaning contaminated waters. 
This type of learning is rooted in “a sense of place” and contributes to local knowledge 
(Reid and Taylor, 2000: 462)27. Reid and Taylor argue that walking and experience-based 
learning, usually in the company of relatives and as part of an activity carried on through 
generations, shapes individuals’ identities as ecological citizens. Walking – they conclude 
– enables these people to express their environmental activism and citizenship (Reid and 
Taylor, 2000: 459-461).  
Through participation in activities and projects like seed saving, food supply 
chains, LETS, time banks, gardening and agriculture, or simply by walking, citizens are 
taught about socio-environmental relations through direct experience. They learn issues 
concerning seed saving, water conservation, composting, organic agriculture, biodiversity, 
seasonal vegetables, locally grown food, food miles, the real cost of food, and local and 
rural economies. Yet besides knowledge needed to live a sustainable life, through direct 
experience and engagement, citizens acquire the skills needed for active citizenship. These 
are skills related to negotiation and conflict resolution, confrontation and resistance to 
power, mutual aid, and a sense of empowerment or feeling that their choices and actions 
can make a difference. This is a form of democratic learning that takes place both at the 
individual and community levels, as the examples illustrated in this chapter show.  
                                                 
27 See also Taylor (2007) for similar arguments about citizenship grounded in local or place-based 
knowledge, particularly for a case study on the activist group Citizens for Sensible Forestry also in the North 
Carolina Appalachians, which was constituted to oppose forestry policy. Taylor argues that Citizens for 
Sensible Forestry managed to expand ecological democracy by building public spaces where local 
knowledges rooted in “local places, ecologies and lifeways” waere brought together with expert knowledge.  
239 
 
Individual learning occurs when citizens “gain strong civic virtues and enhance 
their democratic capacity, learning the rights and responsibilities associated with 
participating in a democracy” (Travaline and Hunold, 2010: 587). For citizens to engage in 
ecological citizenship activity, they have to feel that they can make a difference with their 
actions and that their daily acts will have a positive effect on sustainability. Participation in 
community or neighbour decisions about issues like production and consumption 
empowers citizens and helps them develop a feeling of political agency which satisfies 
their need to express their civic and political engagement, and their ecological citizenships, 
as Seyfang’s work demonstrates. The promotion of efficacy – or the feeling that one can 
have an effect on collective actions – or capacity building and empowerment is crucial 
(Smith, 2005a: 280-281).  
Democratic learning at the collective level constitutes a process of community 
building. A “sense of shared accomplishment” is developed, together with a “greater 
community confidence and skills base” that makes a community interested in decisions 
about the direction of its own future development (Travaline and Hunold, 2010: 588). It 
has been documented that, in getting directly involved, citizens also cultivate a sense of 
belonging, recognition, self-esteem and friendships, key to the satisfaction of psycho-social 
needs (Seyfang, 2009: 144). The social learning process facilitates collective action, as it 
helps citizens internalise the value of interacting with others to build new infrastructures. 
The sense of community is achieved by processes such as bringing closer producers and 
consumers, getting together to garden or exchange seeds, and sharing skills, services and 
goods. These activities have the potential to lead citizens to acknowledge the benefits of 
mutual aid and cooperation, support and reciprocal help. These values are crucial for the 
emergence of a culture of solidarity that opposes the current culture of individualism and 
competitiveness, which arguably leads to an ever growing consumerism.      
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A final question arises in relation to knowledge: is knowledge a precondition to 
engage in ecological citizenship practices, or are knowledge and awareness acquired after 
practice, due to practice? What comes first? State-sponsored accounts of ecological 
citizenship like those examined in Chapter 3 seem to assume that knowledge is a 
precondition for engagement, and that citizens fail to act out of lack of information. 
Initiatives analysed in this chapter may indicate that it is through practice that the 
knowledge and awareness leading to ecological citizenship are generated. In fact, those 
looking for empirical evidence of the existence of ecological citizens argue that people are 
not likely to use the term ecological citizenship, or even citizenship, to refer to their 
activities. This could suggest that people do not engage in those specific actions because 
they are trying to fulfil their ecological citizenship duties. Rather, it seems to be more the 
case that, once they are engaged, they become aware of the socio-environmental 
implications of their actions (although this chapter has also looked at evidence that some 
people who consciously engage in practices like alternative food supply chains to resist 
globalisation, avoid supermarkets and promote organic food, so they are acting on 
previously acquired knowledge). However, these are only assumptions, and the only way 
to respond to the above question is perhaps through more research that seeks to find the 
reasons why people engage in ecological citizenship-related activity. 
 
 
4.3. Overcoming obstacles: civil society’s oppositional dimension 
 
From the analysis done so far, including the conclusions drawn in previous 
chapters, it could be argued that there are two main – and related - obstacles holding back 
the promotion of ecological citizenship. One of them are states, constrained by imperatives 
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– such as capital accumulation and national security – which make them act in ways not 
compatible with ecological citizenship and the requirements of sustainability and justice. 
As stated in Chapter 3, ecological citizenship promoted by states depoliticizises and 
individualises sustainability and environmental responsibility, while it reduces citizens to 
the category of consumers.  
The second main obstacle is global capitalism. Capitalism has resulted in the 
commodification of nature. It has led to the belief that production and capital accumulation 
can increase constantly. This is an irrational logic that externalises costs - which fall onto 
ecosystems and humans - and generates systems of provision that are clearly anti-
ecological: great deal of resources are used, and a considerable amount of waste and 
emissions is generated. These processes also produce great inequalities, injustice and bring 
suffering to millions of people worldwide. Only affluent individuals and societies have 
managed to protect the places they inhabit from ecological risks. Green businesses that 
merely greenwash the status quo attract the privileged classes, while shifting citizens’ 
attention away from the unsustainable production processes and externalities. As a result, 
environmental discourses have become mainstream policy discourses. Environmentalism 
has been co-opted by corporations through a “green-washing” process. Capitalistic 
competition requires ongoing innovation and diversification of goods, advertising and 
creating wants, product changes and inbuilt obsolescence. For current consumption levels 
to be maintained, the deregulation of credits and financial services, as well as the 
promotion of a “work and spend” ethos are needed. Existing institutions support and 
perpetuate these processes – for instance, through the consolidation of full-time 40-hour 
working weeks - making it extremely difficult for individuals to resist this form of life. 
Dominant cultural discourses of industrialism, productivism, individualism and 
consumerism reinforce this dynamic too, by legitimising the status quo and preventing 
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people from acknowledging the dramatic consequences of current socio-economic global 
interactions. In the face of this, little can be achieved by encouraging individual changes in 
lifestyles and consumption patterns; while being immersed in structures that reinforce the 
paradigm of economic growth, it is not possible that citizens live sustainable and just lives 
(Seyfang, 2009; Sempere, 2009).  
The promotion of ecological citizenship requires opposition to this alliance between 
economic and political institutions that benefit from unsustainability and social inequality, 
as they consolidate the infrastructure and systems of provision that condition citizens’ acts. 
Moreover, if we accept that justice is the first virtue and objective of ecological citizenship, 
and that the main requirement is that people live sustainably, the duty to oppose 
unsustainability and injustice arises (Luque, 2005; Barry, 2006). Ecological citizens have 
to resist state and corporate-based projects prescribing behavioural change28. 
 How can this confrontation be translated into ecological citizenship activity, and, at 
the same time, lead to the promotion of ecological citizenship? One way would be the use 
of environmental constitutional rights of participation - like those guaranteed by the 
Aarhus Convention, as discussed in Chapter 3. Another possibility is to challenge 
hegemonic discourses in the public sphere so as to sustain a green public sphere for 
environmental discourse – as explained in Chapter 4 – or to engage in struggles for 
sustainability, justice, identity and recognition, opposing global economic powers and 
neoliberal policies that cause environmental degradation and social marginalisation, in 
                                                 
28 That ecological citizenship should be oppositional and critical has been stressed by several green theorists. 
In line with the arguments I seek to advance, Barry has referred to ecological citizenship as a form of “cr itical 
citizenship” (2006: 22) or “resistance citizenship” (2006: 43) against market and state-based forms of 
inequality and unsustainability. Seyfang too argues that ecological citizens “should challenge the 
commercial, political and legal forces which currently favour commodification” and mainstream approaches 
based on incremental change to achieve eco-efficiency and cleaner growth (2009: 51). MacGregor and 
Szerzinski stress that ecological citizens have to resist disciplining and normalising power, and engage in a 
“contestatory politics” (2003: 19). See also Reid and Taylor (2000). In these approaches, opposition seeks to 
democratise and green the state, or leads to demands for more social policy to facilitate the conditions for the 
practice of ecological citizenship and state-based provision of welfare, in line with the assessment in Chapter 
1 of what would be a positive role for the state in the transition to ecological citizenship. 
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ways similar to what has been mentioned earlier on in this chapter. Although these two 
forms of resistance facilitate ecological citizenship in different ways – as I explained – and 
hence are important manifestations of the confrontational aspects of ecological citizenship 
activity, they focus on opposition through the exercise of rights and/or engagement in 
conventional citizen and activist-type of activity in the public sphere. There is a different 
and perhaps less explored - from a citizen perspective – way to engage in contestation, and 
this is ‘doing’, creating alternatives that seek to transform society itself, beyond changes in 
the status of citizenship rights, state law or the contents of government policy.  
This other form of resistance stressed in this chapter relates to those grassroots 
innovations that create new infrastructures and systems of provision outside capitalist 
relations and the control of the state, where anti-ecological dynamics are opposed and 
people get to live sustainable lives.  
 
 
4.4. Creating infrastructure for ecological citizenship 
 
 For ecological citizenship to be promoted, it is not enough to engage in 
oppositional and critical activity that seeks to expose the anti-ecological features of 
contemporary societies. Positive alternatives have to be built to give expression to 
ecological citizenship in everyday practices, to make it possible for citizens to live 
sustainable lives and to give others hope by showing that it is possible to live, work, 
produce, consume and learn in different ways, in accordance with the requirements of 
long-term environmental and just sustainabilities. Some of the initiatives examined in this 
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chapter are attempts to build this alternative infrastructure. They all stress the collective 
aspect of ecological citizenship29. 
 This collective dimension is needed in order to counteract the tendency to 
individualism and green consumerism of most state-sponsored accounts of ecological 
citizenship, discussed in Chapter 4. It is through these collective projects that the virtues, 
motivations and values leading to ecological citizenship are learnt and exhibited. In 
addition, it has been stressed throughout this thesis that only through collective action may 
existing institutions of governance be challenged and replaced by a socio-economic 
context that renders the practice of ecological citizenship meaningful, so that citizens feel 
that their individual activity is part of a broader collective endeavour.  
The collective framework required for the promotion of ecological citizenship 
could be constituted and maintained by a green state, as I explained. In this chapter, I 
focused though on other possible contexts created by citizens and groups acting 
collectively in civil society outside the state. While the green state can provide a formal-
institutional and constitutional context which emphasizes deliberation, initiatives discussed 
here, like alternative consumption projects, focus on socio-economic institutions and 
practical activity – although they also include and value a deliberative dimension. But 
these conditions that will facilitate the promotion of ecological citizenship, enabling 
individuals and communities to live sustainably, have to be created by ecological citizens 
themselves. Innovations discussed allow citizens to assume control of socio-natural 
                                                 
29 There are individualist practices in civil society. In this sense, Pudup notes that contemporary organized 
garden projects are animated by a discourse of personal responsibility and  individual empowerment (2008). 
As she puts it, “[c]hange in persons through their individual plant cultivation takes precedence over any 
transformation that may ensue from people working with and/or beside other people. In other words, 
gardening is a personal and not a social process in contemporary garden projects”. This “individual 
transformation through collective gardening” she argues “is in keeping with neoliberal political rationalities 
requiring new ways of governing not so much in the “absence” of the state, as in the presence of state power 
and authority manifest in calls for personal responsibility, empowerment and individual choice” (2008: 
1230). Of course these are problems of contemporary civil societies, characterized perhaps more by 
individualism than by collectivism. This suggests that collective action in civil society is needed precisely to 
counteract this individualism. 
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relations and collectively determine new economic relations and institutions within which 
alternative paths to sustainability can be tested. 
 Ecological citizenship has to be related to a collective project aimed at producing 
social and environmental change, at creating the conditions were people can live 
sustainably and be ecological citizens. Although the public sphere aspects of civil society 
are important for ecological citizenship transformation, the self-organisational dimension is 
perhaps more relevant because, as well as being a form of resistance to domination, it 
facilitates social innovation and new systems of provision in ways that enable ecological 
citizens to reduce their footprints and live sustainably, as it is clear that current systems of 
provision make individual acts of ecological citizenship difficult.  
Different institutions may nurture the process of ecological citizenship 
transformation. This chapter has looked at the social economy and particularly at 
alternative consumption practices which provide the context where ecological citizenship 
can be expressed, where it is rendered meaningful, and not reduced to individual acts of 
consumption and lifestyles changes. This context is characterised by a new infrastructure 
that encourages localised and decentralised economic relations that reduce the gap between 
production and consumption, encourage decreasing consumption and the adoption of self-
production practices. Some of the alternative sustainable consumption practices discussed, 
like complementary currencies encourage sharing or hiring goods, and access to services, 
instead of private ownership. 
The issues of food and consumption emerge as particularly relevant. Most of the 
projects in civil society examined stress the ideas of food security and food sovereignty, 
and the fact that the promotion of ecological citizenship requires reclaiming food decisions 
and provision from corporations. This suggests that ecological citizenship should be 
strongly related to democratising and politicising consumption. 
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In addition, in order to create the appropriate infrastructure to frame the practice of 
ecological citizenship, the informal sphere of the economy, outside of the realm of paid 
work, could be strengthened. In fact, some of the grassroots strategies mentioned, like time 
banks and LETS, contribute to a redefinition of work, consistent with the practice of 
ecological citizenship30. The social contract that constitutes the welfare state determines 
that citizens have an obligation to work in order to enjoy the benefits and protection of the 
state, and that those unable to work will receive social assistance. This contract embodies a 
work ethic that establishes how income is distributed in modern societies, that is, income 
depends on formal employment and the unemployed are socially excluded. Due to the fact 
that only formal paid work counts, community-based and voluntary activities have 
decreased, and women tend to do less care work for the community as they are encouraged 
to enter the formal economy of paid employment (Seyfang, 2009: 163-164). This approach 
is preventing the provision of socially necessary labour at the community level, while 
being an obstacle for the promotion of ecological citizenship. Care work and socially 
necessary services, like child and elderly care, are provided by the private market rather 
than collectively by the members of the community through mutual aid and solidarity. 
On the other hand, in a waged, industrialist society which compels citizens to have 
a paid job and to be part of a capitalist model of social relations – where nature is seen as a 
mere resource– it is difficult to lead a sustainable life. We should wonder with Valdivielso 
then “...how is it possible to be an ecological citizen while being a waged worker?” (2005: 
247). The alienating world of paid work prevents the “worker citizen” from being an 
ecological citizen. This view of work and the labour society can be resisted with a shift 
towards the “third sector” of “convivial” or “reciprocal” economic and socionatural 
relations (Valdivielso, 2005: 248), where alternative economic innovations, like those 
                                                 
30 On work, the informal economy and ecological citizenship, see also Barry (1999). 
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discussed in this chapter, are being tested. In the third sector, a “new post-productivist 
contract” could emerge. This new social contract would “relax the identification of social 
rights with industrialist commitment through waged work” (Valdivielso, 2005: 246), and 
“sanction the right ‘not to work to destroy the world’, thus debilitating the association 
between industrial/wage and social aspects of labour” (Valdivielso, 2005: 248), while 
promoting ecological modes of work and systems of production respectful with nature; it 
could also bring about more egalitarian material conditions and lifestyles for all 
(Valdivielso, 2005: 252). The third sector could be a productive sphere where ecological 
citizens may be able to live sustainably and avoid, to some extent, waged labour.  
Some of these third sector initiatives, for instance time banks, give value to 
activities excluded from the formal economy but which are crucial for the functioning of 
societies, and in particular for the creation of sustainable communities. Time banks 
recognise skills and knowledge that citizens possess but which the formal economy does 
not value –community and socially necessary work. They empower citizens who are 
marginalised in other spheres of formal labour relations. These alternative systems of 
money detach income from formal employment and define work in a broad sense to 
include unpaid labour and exchanges of services. Therefore time banks not only promote 
sustainable forms of consumption, alternative currencies, and new systems of provision 
and needs-satisfaction – less environmentally damaging - but also contribute to the search 
for a new meaning and significance of work where this is valued for the way it contributes 
to community building and solidarity, as illustrated in the work of Seyfang (2009). 
Despite all the arguments advanced here, it should be noted that a focus on 
collective responsibility and on changes in systems of provision, does not mean rejecting 
the importance of personal individual acts. Lifestyle changes and collective action are 
reinforcing. Although ecological citizenship should transcend the individual, its promotion 
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will always embrace lifestyle practices, since it seeks to include the private sphere in the 
realm of politics by considering the private domain as a site for citizen activity.  Practices 
based on self-sufficiency and self-restriction of excessive consumption, like the use of 
bicycle or public transport, growing and cooking one’s food, decreasing meet intake, or 
shared use of the car and washing machine instead of private ownership and use, result in 
ecological footprint reduction. And this, we should not forget, is the objective of ecological 





In view of thinking of the promotion of ecological citizenship, what is most 
relevant about the initiatives analysed in this chapter is that they stress civil society’s 
capacity of self-organisation. These are examples of citizens’ getting control of the issues 
concerning their everyday lives in an active and creative way, and building infrastructures 
that enable them to live sustainably. In this sense, the promotion of ecological citizenship 
in civil society stresses civil society’s potential to bring about democratisation, justice and 
sustainability. 
Although the practice of ecological citizenship entails opposition through 
conventional political and citizenship activities, like lobbying, boycotting and 
campaigning, it also involves other forms of activity.  This is because ecological 
citizenship is a type of citizenship enacted not only in the political sphere, but also in 
spaces outside of it, like economic and social institutions in which citizens are embedded. 
In this sense, some of the examples illustrated in this chapter differ from dominant 
accounts of ecological citizenship and green democratic thought – illustrated in Chapters 3 
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and 4 - which present the institutions of a green state’s deliberative democracy and the 
green public sphere as the most appropriate sites for the cultivation of ecological 
citizenship, as the place where citizens both learn and exhibit critical and political skills.  
Thinking of practices such as seed saving and urban gardening as routes to 
ecological citizenship resists views - like those illustrated in the previous chapter - that 
what counts as valuable political action is debate, and that non-discursive activity is pre-
political, in the sense that it is not the result of political debate in the public sphere, or non-
political, in the sense that it belongs to the realm of the social or/and the economic. 
Initiatives like those discussed in this chapter focus on the quotidian dimension of politics 
and contribute to a redefinition of political action. 
 These civil society based routes to ecological citizenship go beyond the strictly 
environmental dimension so as to include the political, economic, social and cultural 
domains. They promote visions of sustainable development, prosperity and wellbeing 
beyond eco-efficiency, ecological modernisation and green consumerism. In this sense, 













 This study has explored a variety of answers to the question of how to promote 
ecological citizenship. Different mechanisms in distinct spheres of life and driven by 
diverse actors may lead to ecological citizenship transformation. Yet this theoretical 
enquiry has suggested that some routes are more effective than others. I have focused on 
the questions of political agency and forms of social organisation. An approach including 
the state, the green state, the green public sphere and civil society as categories of analysis 
was used to assess the diverse possibilities for the promotion of ecological citizenship. 
 Despite the fact that ecological citizenship is a transnational or non-territorial 
concept of citizenship, it is common among green theorists to argue that states should 
intervene somehow in its articulation. The analysis of state-sponsored forms of ecological 
citizenship carried out here suggested that state bodies are not well-equipped to encourage 
eco-citizenship or, perhaps, that they have not understood what ecological citizenship 
involves. States seem to pursue the greening of citizenship assuming that individual pro-
environmental behaviour is possible within unsustainable dominant practices, that is, there 
is a neglect of the context that frames personal responsibility and action.  
As we have seen, there are multiple ways to consider the promotion of ecological 
citizenship, and the reasons why some of them may be favoured over others depend to a 
great extent on how ecological citizenship is defined. If we seek to expand constitutional 
rights, we need states – or transnational green states. If we think of obligations of justice 
expressed through decreasing the negative environmental impact of individual and 
collective acts, states may not be so indispensable. However, state institutions can give 
support to ecological citizens in their quest for sustainable living. By providing more 
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public services and removing social inequalities states could indirectly enhance ecological 
citizenship. 
I have argued that the prospects for ecological citizenship transformation within the 
structures of a green state are more encouraging than in the case of actually existing states. 
In a green state, ecological citizenship is a constitutional mandate and is to be enacted in 
the context of an ecological democracy. Citizens’ environmental responsibility is assumed 
and expressed through democratic participation and representation. The idea of a 
framework for ecological citizenship activity is present here – in the form of ecologically 
oriented political institutions, legal systems, economic and international relations – and this 
is more than a favourable framework: the whole machinery of the state is put to the service 
of environmental and social justice.  
Yet two main issues are indicative of the problems that the promotion of ecological 
citizenship by green states may face. The first relates to the means used to expand 
ecological citizenship: ecological democracy. The central implication is that ecological 
citizenship is encouraged through and enacted in political communication. This approach is 
vulnerable to all the criticisms raised against deliberative democracy in general – above all, 
that the capacity for transformation of citizens’ values and preferences may not be realised, 
due to issues of power, asymmetries in participation, citizens’ resources, time and skills - 
and at eco-deliberative democracy in particular – namely, that more participation may not 
lead to increased sustainable outcomes, that citizens may not get to see the benefits of pro-
environmental action and that ecological citizenship motivations might not be internalised. 
In addition, when ecological citizenship is conceived as the assumption of responsibility 
for the environment expressed through participation in public debates and deliberative 
decision-making procedures, rationality and discourse – albeit an ecological rationality and 
a green discourse - are privileged over other means for ecological citizenship learning and 
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forms of citizen action, especially those concerning practice and activity outside the public 
sphere and the policy processes of the state. 
The second problem seems less relevant to our project but in fact it is important. 
Arguments defending the ecological restructuring of the state are very optimistic, 
especially the view that the green state will be successful in putting capitalism to the ends 
of environmental justice. Of course the green state has mechanisms to - at least ideally - 
guarantee a democratic transition towards a less damaging economy: citizens’ scrutiny and 
control. But in being a process that originates within liberal democratic institutions and 
within capitalistic relations, the possibilities for ecological democracy may be co-opted 
before this is implemented and before the mechanisms for reflexive ecological 
modernisation are put in place. If a green state (that is to emerge from the liberal-capitalist 
order) is too inclusive of civil society and public sphere deliberations, the transformations 
originated in these spheres outside the state that are then to transform and green it, may be 
neutralised and absorbed. This would not only render difficult the task of creating a green 
state guided by ecological values, but would also constitute an obstacle to the promotion of 
ecological citizenship.  
Due to these limitations, I suggest a focus on institutions and forms of action 
coordination outside the state. In this context, the green public sphere may be appropriate. 
This is a space that conceives debate as the quintessential form of citizen action, like the 
green state. But, in contrast to the green state – devoted to the aims of social, 
environmental and communicative justice - in a green public sphere discourse has intrinsic 
aims, as it is dedicated to sustaining itself. The reason why this account of the public 
sphere is so celebrated among eco-political theorists is because it stresses the value of 
pluralism and respect for difference, and this, besides being the only way of dealing with a 
plurality of ecologisms and environmentalisms, radicalisms and reformisms, is for most the 
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path that ecological politics should follow: highly democratic, accepting that in the face of 
uncertainty, the only solution is to hear as many voices as possible and embrace different 
tactics.  
A green public sphere as Torgerson understands it is not suitable for fostering 
ecological citizenship because it excludes purposive activity, like ecological citizens’ 
duties to achieve justice.  It also neglects the social and economic spheres – where 
ecological citizenship understood as sustainable living is mostly practised - and it ignores 
citizen activity that draws on practical experience. Yet a green public sphere is still 
important for the promotion of ecological citizenship. It is through the public sphere that 
civil society performs functions of democratisation and influence over states and 
economies, exposing injustice and anti-ecological practices and being confrontational. 
Ecological citizenship as a path to socio-environmental change – beyond its democratic 
and intrinsic value, which is not to be forgotten – requires opposition to anti-ecological 
dynamics that are obstacles to the sustainability of life and more democratic societies. To 
this end, the democratising and confrontational functions of the public sphere are needed 
and, in this sense, the public sphere is a key vehicle for the promotion of ecological 
citizenship. With this is mind, I have argued for a redefinition of the concept of the green 
public sphere in a direction that may better facilitate ecological citizenship.  
However, we are still within the world of discourse. Here citizenship is concerned 
with reporting, condemning, revealing, claiming. And this, although being constitutive of 
ecological citizenship’s aim to encourage and exemplify sustainability and oppose 
injustice, does not fully capture the nature of ecological citizenship responsibility. This 
also involves creating spaces where citizens can minimise the ecological impact of their 
daily lives. Ecological citizenship is about quotidian practices, everyday interactions with 
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nature through walking, moving, consuming, travelling, working. And this embraces, but 
also transcends, the public sphere.  
So, after looking at how states can facilitate sustainability in these spheres of life, 
and having concluded that the focus is too much on changing individuals’ habits and not 
enough on building the spaces that facilitate sustainable living, attention should be paid to 
civil society to look for more hopeful possibilities there. It is important to distinguish 
between civil society and the public sphere, and to acknowledge that although the public 
sphere is located, mostly, in civil society, there is a part of civil society activity and 
functions that cannot be related to the public sphere. And this dimension is relevant for the 
promotion of ecological citizenship, as it deals with the self-organising aspects of civil 
society, with self-development. From this perspective, the practice of ecological 
citizenship in civil society requires the creation and maintenance of infrastructures and 
systems of provisions of goods - outside the dominant market and state-based socio-
economic organisations - that render possible sustainable forms of living and give cohesion 
to individual ecological citizenship behaviours. Of course this requires debates about how 
to create and organise these alternative systems of provision and to which specific ends, so 
there is a deliberative dimension in these practices too. But beyond debate, what facilitates 
ecological citizenship learning is the experience of getting involved. Through engagement 
in practices that create alternative and sustainable structures within which it is possible to 
be a sustainable consumer, producer or worker, ecological citizenship transformation may 
take place, as knowledge, motivation and skills are gained as a result of lived experience.  
Other than facilitating personal transformation, these activities give expression to 
the collective dimension of ecological citizenship, as citizens get together to jointly 
determine and enact their common future and the most adequate forms of social and 
economic organisation. In this sense, ecological citizenship may produce intra-society 
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change. One of the ideas emanating from the discussions in this thesis is that a politics of 
ecological citizenship should not just be related to sustainability and justice but also to 
democratisation, and this includes but goes beyond political institutions. The promotion of 
ecological citizenship should go hand to hand with democratisation of societies and their 
economies. 
Now, the fact is that there is hierarchy, individualism, and all sorts of power in civil 
society. What is more, some civil-society based projects, despite being emancipatory, are 
not ecological and may even be anti-ecological - they may facilitate more just and 
egalitarian forms of living but generate large footprints and unsustainability. We should be 
cautious and not uncritically praise all initiatives just because they are in civil society. 
Similarly, we should accept that not all projects in civil society facilitate ecological 
citizenship. Even the same type of activity may sometimes lead to ecological citizenship 
learning while in other contexts it may lack a collective, bottom-up, self-organising 
dimension, as in the example of urban gardens discussed in the last chapter.  Yet a concept 
of ecological citizenship framed in terms of responsibilities of justice and living 
sustainably still seems to be more effectively learnt and materialised in civil society-
centred projects. And if this is accepted, it gives us an idea of what type of institutions, 
spaces, relations and practices may best encourage ecological citizenship so that we can 
think of how they may be expanded.  
Even though civil society should be autonomous, this does not mean that it can be 
completely autonomous from the state. State activities and regulations penetrate civil 
society and shape cultural, social and economic relations – just as civil society activities 
sometimes target the state and influence its policy. However, civil society can be the 
source of legitimate and binding decisions, even if these do not emanate from state bodies. 
These decisions can be implemented and put into practice without being further 
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institutionalised by the state. This is a form of civil society paragovernmental activity that 
seeks to affect social organisation directly. In this sense, civil society-based practices like 
those analysed do not need to be backed by states.  
Yet there could be a role for the state. Future research may focus on the state-civil 
society interface from this angle. In this sense, it could be argued that for these civil 
society-based practices to be spread, not only with a view to building more sustainable 
societies but also to creating more ecological citizens beyond those already convinced, 
state support may be required. This could consist of passing favourable legislation that 
encourages rather than discourages these alternative practices, to provide funding or to 
facilitate public services using some of these non-mainstream channels. Nevertheless 
research on state-civil society partnerships should take into account the dangers that this 
may entail for the autonomy, spontaneity and critical orientation of civil society initiatives, 
and how to avoid co-option. If the state acts as a facilitator and assumes some form of 
control in planning and orchestration, these initiatives may turn into something other than 
was intended. Perhaps the state could play a different role and be just another participant, 
being itself an ecological citizen within these new systems of provision. This would also be 
an eco-state but different from the green state, or perhaps just the most local, lower-level 
aspect of the green state – which Eckersley’s theory for instance, with its transnational 
focus, overlooks. As well as encouraging citizens’ policy input, it would facilitate citizens’ 
daily practices of ecological citizenship. This could be another focus of the connection 
between green theories of the state and ecological citizenship, perhaps to be added to the 
link through democratic participation in the state’s policy processes.      
Ecological citizens need ecological civil societies. This research suggests that civil 
society becomes ecological not only when it has a rich associational life, with green 
movements’ activity targeting the state and corporations, fighting for environmental justice 
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and rights, when it creates and consolidates green public spheres that change assumptions 
in mainstream discourses and cultural horizons. An ecological civil society arises when 
citizens and groups articulate systems of provision that are just and environmentally 
sustainable. And to this end, ecological citizenship has an essential role to play. 
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